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THE SECOND PERSON

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Introduction

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The present volume grew out of a two-year SIAS Summer Institute titled The Second Person: Comparative Perspectives that took place at the National Institute of Humanities at Chapel Hill in August, 2011, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in August, 2012. The participants of that institute set out to examine the concept of the second person. Though supposedly that concept had recently moved into the center of research in a number of distinct fields (although not necessarily always under that description), up until that point little systematic attempt had been made to comprehend it in its full generality. In fact, researchers within each of these fields appeared to be largely unconscious of strikingly parallel developments in the other fields. What we are here calling “the second person” presently goes by many names. The terminology employed to designate it not only varies tremendously from one field to the next, but such changes in terminology are often regarded as changes in topic. When viewed from this perspective, the concerns of this volume may appear to be quite scattered—ranging over topics as ostensibly diverse as those of “joint intention”, “bi-polar relations”, “trust”, “authority”, “justice”, “recognition”, and “acknowledgment”. The present volume inherits the aim of the original Summer Institute out of which it grows: to do justice to the particulars of the phenomena appearing in these different guises, while at the same time seeking to reveal a common underlying problem, with the aim of uncovering
the ubiquity of a single conceptual structure. Accordingly, a secondary aim of both that Institute and this volume is to overcome a number of disciplinary and institutional divides that have plagued inquiry into the topic, not only between fields of inquiry, but even within them. The following four divides are especially noteworthy here: (1) between historians of ideas and contemporary theorists, (2) between European-Continental and Anglo-American theoretical traditions, (3) between traditions of empirical inquiry into and a priori reflection on the capacities of higher animals, and (4) between theorists of the foundations of practical agency and theorists of the foundations of theoretical cognition. Each of the essays collected in this volume seeks to bridge one or more of these divides. Collectively, they seek to uncover a topic whose true contours until now have largely been obscured from view.

I. AN OBSCURE OBJECT OF DESIRE: THE SECOND PERSON

The term we apply to designate the unifying topic of this volume—“the second person”—is one that has acquired a recent currency in certain quarters. Someone who surveys the literature in philosophy over the past decade—and not least in that portion of it that seeks close contact with empirical psychological or even neurological research—might well gain the impression that a new topic has emerged, attracting great interest across a wide range of fields. In this literature, the term “second person” is presented as signifying a novel perspective from which mind and action, morality and knowledge, are now to be approached. This perspective is sometimes heralded as being superior to, indeed superseding, traditional philosophical approaches based on either the first-person perspective of the thinker and agent or the third-person perspective of the theoretician and observer.

This unity of rhetoric notwithstanding, the same survey, however, is likely to throw a reader into confusion, as she will find it difficult to discern the presence of a corresponding unity of idea animating the various debates proclaiming to advance a second-personal account of their topic. There are two reasons for this, which each, though in converse ways, attest to a regrettable dominance of the word “the second person” over the concept it signifies. The first of these reasons has to do with the ways in which the various portions of this body of secondary literature remain poorly acquainted with one another, while supposedly being committed to adapting the method found in one area to the treatment of problems in another. Hence, while one area of thought may pick up the terminology of “the second person” from another, this generally happens in such a way that they end up agreeing merely in word and not in concept. For example, a philosopher of law will notice that something called a “second-person approach” is currently popular among certain researchers in the philosophy of mind and will attempt to apply it to her problems in the philosophy of law, without having any genuine appreciation of the
theoretical impasse that the philosopher of mind seeks to overcome through the adoption of such an approach.

By way of orientation, it may help if we allow ourselves to briefly touch on two reciprocally related examples of such a form of merely apparent agreement in concept, as it occurs in what are taken to be two independent departments of philosophical inquiry: (1) Many discussions in contemporary ethical theory proceed as if there is no fundamental difficulty that need concern the practical philosopher attaching to the issue of how it is so much as possible to apprehend another self-conscious subject of thought. This is viewed rather as a problem for epistemologists—how can I know that the other is the same sort of subject as I am? It is simply assumed that the resolution of this philosophical puzzle lies outside the sphere of ethics proper. The crucial question for the ethicist is rather generally taken to be something more akin to the following: how can such a subject, as such, constitute the source of a unique kind of moral requirement? This, in turn, is treated as a difficulty to be resolved through the application exclusively of the tools of practical philosophy. It is thereby generally assumed that the latter question, regarding the source of moral requirements, admits of full and adequate resolution apart from any consideration of the former, regarding our knowledge of the other, which thus, in effect, is outsourced to epistemology. (2) Many debates in contemporary philosophy of mind involve a perplexity over the question of how it can be so much as possible for one self-conscious subject to form the very idea of another such subject, where this is now assumed to be a problem falling entirely within the province of theoretical philosophy—one whose resolution neither requires nor permits the least assistance from the practical philosopher. What is required rather, on this way of regarding the matter, is an account of the right sort of “stance” to be adopted towards the other. A debate is thus joined in the contemporary philosophy of mind regarding what the nature of this stance might be: a “design stance”, a “theory-theory”, the postulation of an “underlying unobservable” (a “self-conscious” mind) as the underlying cause of otherwise remarkable forms of behavior, etc. The crucial, apparently inconsequential, assumption that thus comes to inform the entire discussion is the following: namely, that the sort of attitude towards the other to be accounted for here (one that permits the other to come into view as a self-conscious subject) must be of a purely theoretical nature. Once the problem is thus framed, the notion that this very idea (of another self-conscious subject) could be essentially constituted by the manner in which it figures in acts of will and desire will not occur. Just as the contemporary ethicist seeks to isolate his philosophical difficulty, which falls within his area of specialization, from any which ought properly to concern the epistemologist, so, too, we find the philosopher of mind assuming that the problem at the center of his inquiry to be fully solvable simply by elaborating the right theory of mind.

What happens here is that a pair of reciprocally related questions—in this case, the supposedly merely epistemological one regarding the other as an object of knowledge (and thus assigned to the province of theoretical philosophy) and
the supposedly merely ethical one regarding the other as a source of moral obligation (and thus assigned to the province of practical philosophy)—are apprehended and treated as utterly independent of one another. When such interrelated pairs of questions come to be apprehended and treated in this piecemeal manner, then their respective solutions cannot proceed from a unified concept. The term “second person” as it figures in these treatments amounts to nothing more than a coincidence of terminology over two “areas” of philosophy. A full philosophical recognition of the way in which the problems themselves coincide—that is, of the way in which we have here to do with what are au fond two sides of a single problem—is a condition of getting into view the full depth and extent of the problem itself. This is the problem this volume as a whole seeks to thematize under the heading of the problem of the second person.

The second reason why it is difficult to discern a unitary idea under the currently popular heading of “the second person” is the converse of the first one. The topic of the preceding paragraph was how contemporary philosophical literature on “the second person” often exhibits an agreement in word that fails to reflect a corresponding agreement in concept. That same literature suffers no less, however, from a corresponding inability to appreciate the extent to which certain forms of agreement in concept are not marked by an agreement in word. That is to say, there is little awareness, in the current literature inspired by the idea of the second person, that the idea in question may equally be thought through the use of other words. This lack of awareness is also the source of the impression, engendered by a rhetoric characteristic of much of this literature, that interest in the second person is something novel, nay even revolutionary. However, the novelty is at best relative to various insulated bodies of literature. Thus, for example, the burgeoning secondary literature on (what is now called) “joint attention” in both philosophy and developmental psychology takes itself to have discovered a hitherto unheeded phenomenon, never imagining that, for example, Aristotle regards that shared form of consciousness (in which two self-conscious subjects reciprocally relate themselves to one another) as constituting nothing less than the fundamental formal character of human community. As the latter observation suggests, the conceptual structure that we aim here to uncover in its full generality and signify with the expression “the second person” is arguably one that has figured equally at the center of philosophical reflection from its very remote to its most recent past. What is new is not so much the thing, but the presently fashionable name for it, drawn from a manner in which it is reflected in the grammatical structure of natural language.

A relevant such part of the recent past, in the field of philosophy of law, is, for example, Ernest Weinrib’s seminal monograph, The Idea of Private Law. This work argues for the irreducibility of the legal relation of plaintiff and defendant in tort law, as well as that of partners in contract. This opposes a common trend in contemporary jurisprudence to attempt to subordinate both of these forms of reciprocal relation to some set of general principles through which the concept
of a common good is to be thought and pursued. In arguing for the irreducible bipolarity of such relations, Weinrib is, in effect, concerned to insist that neither of its poles can be apprehended in isolation, i.e., apart from the nexus in which they each have their life. Although Weinrib is working in the somewhat philosophically peripheral area of the jurisprudence of private law, the formal structure he is concerned to lay bare is in fact one that can be discerned to be no less present in the analyses of a number of contemporary authors working in more mainstream areas of theoretical and practical philosophy. It is the fact of these remarkable parallels that provides a primary source of inspiration for this volume as a whole.

To find a particularly noteworthy example of how this formal structure may recur at the heart of the treatment of topics already forming the concern of mainstream practical philosophy, one need look no further than to various of Michael Thompson’s recent essays—perhaps most prominent among these are the following three: “A Puzzle about Justice”, “I and You”, and “Propositional Attitudes and Propositional Nexuses”\(^2\). The first of these finds a puzzle in the question of how two agents can be bound together in a relation of justice—a relation that requires that they, at least in principle, be able reciprocally to recognize the practical law through which they come thus to be related to one another. The second of these allows itself to be puzzled by how one subject is supposed to figure in the thought of another according to various popular contemporary accounts of such phenomena as what a speaker means by an utterance (Grice),\(^3\) the assurances that acts of promising provide (Scanlon),\(^4\) the execution of a joint action (Bratman),\(^5\) and the shared knowledge involved in mutual participation in the same game (contemporary game theorists).\(^6\) Such accounts proceed by equipping each of the interrelated subjects with a recursively elaborated representation of the other subject’s thoughts. Thompson observes that there is a pressure, within each such account, to take the representation of the other subject to a yet higher order. For at each given height of the stack of intentions and thoughts of one of the subjects, the question whether the entire stack of that given height is itself intended, known, or intended to be known by the other subject may be asked, and it seems that only a positive answer can secure the true nature of the relation. Aside from the secondary difficulty that a regress of higher-order representations would seem to be required to hold together the thoughts or intentions that jointly comprise such a stack, the primary difficulty lies simply in the fact that the very form of representation of the other subject here required is never subjected to proper philosophical scrutiny. Once we ask how the other subject is represented in the thoughts and attitudes described by the accounts, it emerges that the account would not even seem to be correct if such representation were effected by means of a name, if the subject were represented demonstratively, etc. Indeed, the only form of representation of the other subject that will make the account plausible is the one expressed by a certain use of the second person pronoun. However, this form of thought of another subject exhibits precisely the character of the relations of mind that the aforementioned accounts set out to elucidate in the first place. Some philosophers,
therefore, scrupulously eschew employing that pronoun in their respective analyses of the form of representation in question out of fear of introducing circularity into their account.

The inspiration for much of Thompson’s work on this topic can arguably be traced to a comparatively neglected theme in the work of G. E. M. Anscombe—a theme whose very unity tends to be overlooked by assigning each of the essays which treat of it to a different field: in the one case to the field of the epistemology of testimony,⁷ in another case to the field of the philosophy of religion,⁸ in a third case to the field of moral philosophy and the topic of the source of the binding power of promises.⁹ What is here missed is that each of the essays in question are equally concerned to address the topic of the fundamental logical difference between “believing someone” and “believing something”, as well as to elucidate the character of the nexus between persons that is the condition of the former form of relation. This latter concern is particularly on display in her essay, “Promising and Its Justice”, that treats of the kinds of relation that are constituted by the participants’ mutual comprehension of their very relation—her two main examples in her work on this topic are marriage and debt.¹⁰ What emerges from this work of Anscombe’s is the following idea: an appreciation of the relation of justice in which any two subjects reciprocally stand to each other is inseparable from an appreciation of the actual practice of the manner in which they reciprocally address certain speech acts (of marrying, promising, agreeing to repay a loan, etc.) to each other. Justice is internal to a mode of being that is constituted in and through such acts of reciprocal address.

Though this work of Anscombe’s remains relatively neglected among theorists of justice, she is famous for her seminal work in the area that officially goes by the title of “action theory”, especially as put forward in her groundbreaking monograph, Intention.¹¹ If, however, one reads that monograph in the light of the essays mentioned above, it becomes much more difficult to overlook that her whole treatment of action proceeds from an examination of the question “What are you doing?” It is no accident that Anscombe proceeds in such a way—i.e. that the conception of what someone is doing appears in addressive form, namely, as a conception of what you are doing. In counterdistinction to the methodological individualism that characterizes most contemporary work in the philosophy of action, Anscombe’s entire approach to the topic suggests that it belongs to the logical nature of action that in doing something (in the sense of that expression that is to be elucidated) the acting subject places herself in a relation to other acting subjects.

There are two fundamental obstacles that tend to prevent us from seeing how these areas of philosophy are related to one another: one obstacle pertaining to self-consciousness, the other pertaining to the transactional, bipolar form. Both of these can be traced back to “empiricism.” Empiricism knows only the particular subject. For empiricism is required to conceive the referent of the second person
pronoun as if it were simply one object among others empirically given to us in experience and to conceive of the subject who achieves such knowledge as simply the subject of such a form of empirical affection. This gives rise to insurmountable difficulties when we try to comprehend the relation in which two such subjects stand to each other if their relation is of a reciprocally recognitive form.

As a way of illustrating what she calls Hume’s problem, Anscombe invites us to consider the example of two people marrying each other. It seems clear that, in order for A to be marrying B, she must comprehend that this is what she is doing: she is marrying B. We may be tempted to give a reductive account of the way in which the thought of marriage thus occurs in the very act of marriage. Anscombe herself reflects on the viability of the following proposal: there is some X such that marrying is composed of the following two independent elements: i) doing X and ii) accompanying the doing of X with thinking that one is doing X. If we permit ourselves the additional assumption that thinking something is thinking that one thinks it, then we are in a position to derive that marrying someone entails thinking that one is marrying her. Anscombe points out that no account of this form will work because, no matter what we choose as X, it may be that someone thinks she is doing X without thinking she is marrying B, and in that case, what she will be doing will not be a case of marrying B. An account of this form cannot do justice to the manner in which such a relation between subjects is constituted by a mutual comprehension of the participants. Anscombe’s appreciation of this point and her discussion of Hume’s problem in its light leads her to the following four conclusions: 1) that the concept of such a relation does not admit of an empiricist account; 2) that, in consequence, the relation in question cannot be conceived as a merely given reality; and that this shows (3) that we have to do here with a form of spontaneity—freedom, and (4) that we need to think of freedom and spontaneity as being, at bottom, relational in form.

Our contributors come to this problem—Hume’s problem, as Anscombe calls it—from very different philosophical backgrounds, bringing to their treatment of it a familiarity with one or more of the many guises in which it arises across different areas of philosophy. This wealth of diversity in perspective and specialization notwithstanding, we are now in a position to specify a certain unity of approach that runs throughout their contributions. Arguably, almost all of our authors are, either implicitly or explicitly, committed to the following thoughts: (1) The breathtakingly systematic account Weinrib offers of the bipolar structure of relations that constitute the field of private law is merely the tip of an iceberg—that it ought to be possible to provide a no less systematic account of a generic formal structure that defines relations of self-conscious subjects as such—a formal structure that has been hitherto theorized only piecemeal in various areas of philosophical inquiry (epistemology, testimony, problem of other minds, jurisprudence, political theory, action theory, and philosophy of religion, to name only those that figure in the partially overlapping backgrounds of the authors of
Thompson has properly diagnosed why attempts to represent this structure in terms of attitudes and thoughts intelligible independently of the relation in question are bound to fall prey to Hume’s problem; (3) the ultimate ground of difficulty resides in what Anscombe identifies as the real source of Hume’s problem—the assumption that the form of intelligibility here at issue is that of a phenomenon given independently of its comprehension, and therefore, (4) that no account that restricts itself to materials available to someone who conforms to the requirements of what Anscombe calls “Empiricism” will be able to do justice to the nature of the second person.

This, however, is only one side of the philosophical literature of the second half of the last century. On the other side of the English Channel, the Continental side, the distinction of the observer from the participant arguably constitutes the leading idea of various philosophies—perhaps most famously that of Jürgen Habermas and his theory of communicative reason; Axel Honneth has pursued and developed it in the field of social philosophy under the name of recognition. That is the recent Continental past. In the more remote past there looms the thought of the shared ancestors of the work just mentioned, specifically German Idealism, and more specifically still the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx. Kant’s philosophy of law is the source of Weinrib, Fichte is the source of Darwall, Hegel and Marx are the sources of Habermas and Honneth. Many of the essays in this volume draw their philosophical inspiration from an attempt to return to these wellsprings of German Idealist thought with the aim not only of demonstrating the continued philosophical fertility of this tradition, but in particular demonstrating that it harbors the philosophical resources required to enable us to make genuine progress with Hume’s problem.

To summarize: this volume is animated by both a systematic and an historical motive. It proceeds from the conviction that overt appearances are not misleading when it comes to the topic of the second person: there is a single concept unifying its various guises in the contemporary literature, and its significance ranges over all fields of philosophical reflection, from epistemology and philosophy of mind to ethics and philosophy of law, extending even to the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of love. Yet it also proceeds from the assumption that, with this observation we do not gain much more than the word, and that much work is yet to be done to develop our understanding of the fundamental concept it signifies. And we think that, in order to do so, we must consider the idea in each given field in a manner informed by comprehension of the way in which it figures in other fields. Finally, it is animated by the thought that there is much to gain from considering the deeper historical sources, both recent and remote, of current interest in the topic. So while we believe that it is necessary to reflect on the second person, we think that in order to do so profitably, we need to broaden our conception of it along two dimensions: historically, across philosophical traditions, and systematically, across philosophical disciplines.
The attraction of “the second person” is fuelled by the notion that the second-person perspective is not just one of the things that one happens upon when one examines the tapestry of human life, but rather that it is fundamental to the forms of human activity and sociality that have been the topic of philosophical reflection through the ages.

It may be helpful to approach it through the idea of a kind of perspective: the second-person perspective, to be contrasted with the first-person and the third-person perspective. These perspectives contrast as perspectives on rational activity—by which we mean, activity of a kind that essentially involves our capacities for thought and understanding. Such an activity therefore affords a first-person perspective—one which conceives it through the very thought that is internal to it. This is the perspective of the agent and thinker. It also allows for a third-person perspective—one that is taken up by subjects capable of such a perspective when they frame thoughts that are not in this way internal to that on which they afford a perspective. In such a case, the thought about the activity, in thus belonging to a third-person point of view on the activity in question, is itself distinct and separate from the activity. This is the perspective of the observer. It is by way of an initial contrast with these two forms of perspective that that of the second person is helpfully first brought into view. Thus, for example, in The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall seeks to do this by claiming that moral concepts, as such, are constituted by the second-person standpoint of someone addressing someone, demanding of her that she act in certain ways. Darwall presents this thesis as standing in opposition to the idea that reflection from the standpoint of the first person on the principles of one’s agency can yield an account of the concepts of acting well, of duty, and of responsibility. In another area, Richard Moran contends that comprehension of the manner in which someone comes to know something from another’s testimony requires considering this relation from the standpoint of the second person; he contrasts this with accounts of testimony that consider it either from the first-person standpoint of someone who weighs the evidence on which he believes what he does, or from the third-person standpoint of someone who assesses the reliability of the procedures by which someone acquires his beliefs.

The second person, thus conceived, is a perspective that is inherently two-fold: it must simultaneously and reciprocally involve the perspective of addressing and being addressed, of reproaching and being reproached, of informing and being informed, of teaching and being taught. For addressing is always a matter of addressing someone, who, on her part, is in turn being addressed. And so it is in all such cases: reproaching is always reproaching someone who is being reproached, and so on. The term “second person”, then, designates a particular
form of relation—a relation that includes and is constituted by the perspective it affords, where that perspective in turn is itself irreducibly relational or bi-polar in just this two-fold manner.

The essays collected in this volume investigate this form of relation, the relational form of thought (or, more broadly, consciousness) that is the second person. They inquire into the way in which it is essential to all forms of human rational activity—both in theoretical cognitive activity (in the acquisition and growth of that which philosophers usually call “knowledge”) and in practical (re)cognitive activity (in relationships such as those of right and of the common pursuit of the good). Some of the essays consider how it might underlie these generally as the very form of reason and normativity, others bite off one aspect of this larger topic and consider it in greater detail and depth.

III. EXPLANATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME

Under the heading “The Fundamental Character of the Second Person as a Form of Consciousness”, the first set of essays delineates the generic structure of the second person as a form of thought that is such that thinking in accordance with it constitutes a transaction between subjects. This conception of the second person can be found to be at work, in one way or another, in each of the essays collected in this volume, although different essays develop it very differently, thereby sometimes reaching surprisingly different conclusions.

If we are to conceive the second person as involving a form of thought that is transactional, then we first need to understand the concept of transaction itself. Thus the first essay of this set (Anton Ford) develops the logical form of transaction: a transaction is a dynamic relation, a relation that distinguishes its terms as agent and patient. The second person then emerges as a species of this general form, a species of transaction that is constituted by the reciprocally related self-conscious understandings of the patient and agent so related. The subsequent two essays (Glenda Satne and Jeremy Wanderer) in this volume seek to display the fundamentality of this form of reciprocal understanding to the very ideas of speech and reason respectively.

Under the next pair of headings, two further groups of essays investigate the second person as a form of practical thought: thought that is by its very nature efficacious in action. This inquiry into the practical dimensions of the second person is divided into two subsections whose respective topics are signaled by the headings of the two sections: first, “The Second Person as a Form of Practical Consciousness”, followed by “The Second Person as the Form of Private Law”. While the first two essays, which make up the first of these sections, consider the second person as it informs the constitution of an agent’s powers (Will Small) and of her ethical thought (Matthias Haase), the three further essays, which make up the
following section, thematize the second person as it appears within the realm of law, namely, first, as the form according to which parties are joined in private law (Ariel Zylberman), second, as the ethical foundation of this legal nexus (Wolfram Gobsch), and, third, as that which allows us properly to distinguish the form of practical relation through private law from the non-legal interpersonal relations of honor and blame (Stephen Darwall).

Under the heading “The Place of the Second Person in Theoretical Knowledge”, the fourth set of essays considers the second person as it informs theoretical knowledge. Specifically, it investigates how recognition of the transactional character of testimony should shape an account of its epistemology. The first of these essays (Benjamin McMyler) argues that it does so by providing a distinctive kind of reason for believing, one that is analogous to the reason for acting provided by commands. In this way, it challenges Darwall’s influential contention that only within practical reason can there be a form of reason that is irreducibly second-personal. The following essay (Fabian Börchers) is equally concerned to take issue with this contention of Darwall’s, albeit from a different direction: It questions whether the role of the second person is ever, be it in the practical or the theoretical sphere, to be understood through the idea of a special kind of reason—challenging the assumption that second-personal reasons constitute a *sui generis* species of reasons. This opens up into the topic of the next two essays (Alexandra Newton and Sebastian Rödl respectively), each of which is concerned with the way in which the second person belongs to the very idea of theoretical knowledge. Though they approach the topic differently, these two essays are united in the thought that testimony should not be conceived as a transaction that provides a distinctive form of reason, yet both seek to do justice to the manner in which the relation of giving and receiving testimony is integral to theoretical knowledge as such.

Finally, under the heading “Address and Acknowledgment”, the fifth and last set of papers takes up issues that a traditional classification of philosophical topics would locate squarely within the field of philosophy of mind. They seek to show that these topics, properly treated, overflow the borders of such a field. These essays concern themselves with the way in which a subject, fundamentally, figures in the consciousness of another subject. They argue from different angles that the perspective of the second person is the fundamental and irreducible form of consciousness of a subject as such. Thus the first two of these essays (Monika Dullstein and David Lauer), in their respective contributions, bring out how we fail to comprehend what it is to know and understand another person if we treat another person as if she were simply a particularly peculiar sort of object of theoretical apprehension. The assumption that both these essays are, above all, concerned to target is the following: that the framework of concepts developed in the first instance to account for knowledge of an object given in experience can do justice to the formal character of a self-conscious subject’s knowledge of another such subject. For this occludes a decisive trait of knowledge of a person: such knowledge is constituted by a form of activity not only on the part of the subject who is doing
the knowing, but equally and simultaneously on the part of the subject whom she thus knows. Finally, in the very last essay in this volume (Adrian Haddock), it is argued that the capacity to address and be addressed by another is not, or at least not merely, a faculty of the human mind, but rather an essential character of the human body—of the material reality of the human being—through which, and as which, one human being, as such, addresses other such beings.

NOTES

6. A classic account of such shared knowledge is to be found in David Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).
10. In the essay cited in the previous footnote, she takes marriage as her main example to illustrate the difficulty in question. In other essays, she works with debt as her main example; see, e.g., her discussions of “X owes Y money” in “On Brute Facts” and in “Modern Moral Philosophy,” both collected in *Ethics, Religion and Politics: Collected Philosophical Papers*, Vol. III, op. Cit.
12. See the opening pages of Anscombe’s “On Promising and its Justice, and Whether it Need be Respected In Foro Interno,” op. Cit.
13. With regard to this first point, the most noteworthy exception among the contributors to this volume (and, indeed, arguably the most eloquent advocate of such a piecemeal approach in the contemporary literature) is Stephen Darwall. He is an influential advocate of the second person in ethical theory and a vehement opponent of the idea that testimony involves a second-personal relation. See his *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).