gists notwithstanding. Instead, he maintains that environmentalists and scientists can work together with philosophers of technology to find reasonable solutions—and this collaboration is something that has not been tried adequately to date.

In the epilogue, Ihde reconfirms the convergence between scientific technologies and other image-based technologies used in computers for business and home, medical technologies, media, and entertainment technologies. Ultimately he concludes that not only will Virtual Reality in any of these senses not actually “replace” Real Life, but more than that, Virtual Reality will not necessarily affect Real Life in any particular, determining way. And that is because our embodiment is as it always has been, in Real Life—it is engaged in multiple and various possible ways with the world around it—and, in the present culture, this engagement is with technology, all the way down to the private level of the home.

The book is a fairly straightforward phenomenology of embodiment, and I find little to criticize in this regard. It will make a good text for courses designed around issues of technology or embodiment, and even environmental courses. In addition it is an important addition to the field in general and should be read by anyone working in any of these areas who is interested in a perspective on bodies in technology.

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_Nietzsche’s Postmoralism_ joins the growing ranks of books in analytic philosophy focused on and concerned with what Christine Korsgaard has called the “normative question” (Korsgaard 1996). The volume compiles the work of many of the most prominent contemporary Nietzsche scholars in analytic philosophy, and the essays that compose it seek to flesh out the meaning of what Richard Schacht argues are the “two undeniably central tasks of [Nietzsche’s] ‘philosophy of the future,’” namely, “(re-)interpretation and (re-)valuation” (4). While this particular collection of essays does not necessarily present radically new
interpretations of Nietzsche for those already immersed in Continental scholarship, the volume as a whole represents an important effort by analytic philosophers to engage Nietzsche’s thought from within, on Nietzsche’s own terms. The most engaging and insightful essays manage to combine this care and perspective with analytic philosophy’s hallmark concern for rigorous argumentation and logical consistency.

The most substantive contributions to the volume come in the final few essays by Schacht, Maudemarie Clark, and James Conant. Clark makes a persuasive case for Bernard Williams’s debt to Nietzsche, arguing that Williams successfully overcomes objections to his earlier critique of morality only by becoming more fully Nietzschean in his later work. Schacht meticulously sorts out the competing interpretations of and possibilities for a “Nietzschean Normativity,” ultimately advancing a more or less psychological interpretation of a normativity that goes beyond good and evil. But the volume saves its best for last, in Conant’s revisitation of Nietzsche’s early work. Conant’s careful reading of Schopenhauer as Educator presents the best case I have seen to date for a Nietzschean “perfectionism” that is nevertheless consonant with modern, democratic sentiments. Conant’s insistence that the order of Nietzsche’s aphorisms, texts, and philosophical development matters is an important methodological point that is all too often overlooked by Nietzsche scholars, and his interpretation of Nietzsche’s early writings is thorough and cogent. Ultimately, Conant avoids answering the crucial question of how he thinks Nietzsche’s early and later works are related. It is clearly much easier to argue that Nietzsche’s perfectionism is a matter of self-improvement, inspired (not demanded) by “exemplars” who proliferate within a plural society, on the basis of Nietzsche’s earlier writings than it is from the later works. Moreover, I think the thesis that Nietzsche is uninterested in toppling morality per se (with only Christian morality being his target) is untenable. Nevertheless, Conant’s essay is a model of careful scholarship, and a pleasure to read besides.

The remaining pieces in the volume take up various sub-themes that any discussion of (re-)interpretation and (re-)evaluation must necessarily engage, but are for the most part less satisfying than the final few. Robert Solomon’s essay, “Nietzsche’s Virtues,” seems hastily conceived, and fails to follow through on any of the multiple and provocative insights it presents. The argument of Rüdiger Bittner’s essay, which addresses the apparent contradiction between Nietzsche’s denial of substance and the “doctrine” of will to power, proves compelling only to the extent that it can persuade the reader of Nietzsche’s having committed doltish philosophical errors. According to Bittner, not only did Nietzsche fail to understand that (acts of) force and domination require both agents and objects, but he also problematically maintains that the mode of human perception is essentially creative. The latter is indefensible, according to Bittner, since no one but God can be understood to have “really” created anything; the former is untenable because “power talk makes no sense in a world
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without agents” (38). Yet was Nietzsche simply too dim to have understood the “real” meaning of creativity, much less the “nature” of power and its reliance on subject and object? Or is he perhaps suggesting an entirely different perspective altogether? Bittner concludes that we must reject the notion of will to power, since it leaves no room for “likings, appreciations, colors, aspects, etc., to come when ‘they’ want, rather than when we want,” and argues that Nietzsche, in fetishizing creativity, remains under the sway of “one of God’s longer shadows” (45). Bittner seems to be reaching for a more phenomenological account of our relationship with the world than he believes Nietzsche presents, yet Bittner nevertheless fails utterly to engage Nietzsche’s thought from within, and therefore to grapple honestly and seriously with Nietzsche in any sophisticated way.

Perception is also the subject of Ivan Soll’s essay, which makes the persuasive (if unexciting) argument that Nietzsche’s statements regarding the (non)existence of “reality” or things-in-themselves can be grounded in Nietzsche’s understanding of everyday experience, wherein we are rarely conscious of the ways in which we order the world in order to perceive it. Thus Nietzsche’s claims regarding the distortion of knowledge or the interpretive character of perception may be understood on the basis of a latent distinction by Nietzsche between experience and consciousness. Soll’s call to carefully reconsider our experience of the world is warranted, yet raises the questions as to why Nietzsche might desire such reconsideration, and if such a demand might ultimately amount to a desire for or will to “truth.” Moreover, has Soll’s argument merely replaced the “true” world of the beyond with a “real” world of experience, which some kind of consciousness raising can, upon greater reflection, increasingly apprehend?

A trio of essays by Alan Schrift, Alan White, and Robert Pippin address more psychological questions. Schrift’s primarily schematic reconsideration of subjectivity argues that the Übermensch functions in Nietzsche’s texts “not as the name of a particular being or type of being,” but rather as the potential accomplishment of the new subjectivity Nietzsche attempts to produce. Übermensch thus designates a process of subject formation, not its ultimate goal, representing the subject as never a “completed project, but always as a work in process” (58). White’s essay devotes close attention to the word Redlichkeit, often translated as “honesty,” and its development throughout the course of Nietzsche’s writing. Although White problematically concludes that human beings are “animals whose telos or perfection is Redlichkeit” (75), and his ultimate interpretation of Redlichkeit bears close resemblance to a kind of pragmatic ethics that is foreign to Nietzsche, White’s essay raises a number of important questions—heretofore unacknowledged—regarding our understanding and translation of this difficult term in Nietzsche’s thought. Finally, Pippen argues that Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of morality, religion, and philosophy reveals each to be a manifestation of human desire for stability. Pippen thus believes that Nietzsche—like Plato—understands the will to truth as fun-
damentally erotic in character. Although the textual support for Pippen’s thesis is sparse, his argument is nevertheless the most intriguing to be advanced in this volume.

Although *Nietzsche’s Postmoralism* overall does not break significant new ground in the larger realm of Nietzsche interpretation, it is nevertheless one more mark of contemporary analytic philosophy’s continual self-transformation, and perhaps a harbinger of greater changes to come. These contributions are welcome additions to the field of Nietzsche scholarship, which awaits its own transformation from the attempt.

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**Works Cited**


“My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the majority think? The most reasonable people, to whom one should pay more attention, will believe that things were done as they were done.”

—Plato, *Crito*

Donn Welton’s mission in this text is to be among the most reasonable people. He carefully surveys the entirety of Husserl’s work to see how things were done. To such thorough work, we should pay more attention. Welton traces the evolution of Husserl’s attempts to deal with philosophical problems through all of the major stages of his career. He takes care to place Husserl’s unpublished and published works on equal footing, showing each work’s role in the development of Husserl’s thought. He necessarily ends up also revealing ways in which exclusive attention to the published works, or to only some among them, fosters a partial, not to say misleading, picture. Still, the book is not a debate with other