1 Friedman

Populations and Powder Kegs: The Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, and "Europe**

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Among the uses or abuses of history are the assignment of blame and the abdication of responsibility. Thus, for example, M. Edith Durham (1925) in her book The Sarajevo Crime lays the entire blame for World War One at the doorstep of Serbia, while in Belgrade there is a street named in honor of Gavrilo Princip, the perpetrator of the assassination to which Durham's title refers. In Sarajevo itself, at least before the current war, there was a museum at one end of the bridge where the assassination took place commemorating those who undertook it. Among the displays at this museum was a political cartoon from the period shortly before the outbreak of the Great War. The cartoon shows a disorderly circle of powder kegs, some with long, dangling fuses, others on their sides with gun-powder spilling out. Amidst these powder kegs are a few thin, ill-shaven men in national costumes of the Balkan nations looking around bewildered. Standing outside the circle, eagerly extending lit matches to them are well-fed, well-groomed men in the West European formal dress of the Great Powers. Thus was the concept of "Balkan powder keg" understood in Former Yugoslavia.¹ There is a certain irony in the image of the Balkans in the center and the Great Powers at the periphery, since in fact precisely the opposite is and has been the case in virtually every sphere of relations between Southeastern Europe and the rest of that continent. And there is a periphery within the periphery. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, national movements in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia all crystallized in such a way that Macedonia was (and is) at the edge of their overlapping claims. Macedonia is thus a center of conflict because it is the periphery of all its neighbors, who are themselves on the periphery of Europe. One of the ways that conflict has been expressed is through rival census claims.

In comparison to the current position of Albania and Kosovo, Macedonia is both central and liminal. Unlike Kosovo with its shadow government and parallel education system, Macedonia meets the normal requirements of an independent country, but unlike Albania with its unequivocal international status and membership in the United Nations under its own name, Macedonia does not enjoy the normal recognition of an independent European state. Kosovo can be viewed as a region where an ethnolinguistic minority dominates the majority; Albania is a country ruled by its ethnolinguistic majority (although the veracity of the 1989 census figures on minorities is questionable). But Macedonia is partially occupied by foreign troops (formerly UNPROFOR, now UNPREDEP) and is still the occasional object of a dispute over whether there exists a majority ethnolinguistic group or even a plurality. The very legitimacy of the identity of the majority ethnolinguistic group, i.e. the Macedonians, is still subjected to equivocation, both purposeful and naive. And thus, while in many respects the situation of Albanian majorities in both Albania and Kosovo may be either economically or politically worse than the situation of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, it is Macedonia that is arguably the most unstable of the three, the country on which both Albanian and Kosovar attention is focused (as seen in public statements by leaders such as Sali Berisha and Ibrahim Rugova), and it is the country on whose situation I shall concentrate in this paper. The question of establishing an Albanian-language university in Macedonia that received a great deal of press attention in early 1995 is only one in a series of issues that has recently placed Albanian and Macedonian political leaders in opposing camps and for which Albanians have demanded outside support or mediation. An event that took place in the summer of 1994, namely the extraordinary census, provides an opportunity to view more broadly both the complexity of the Macedonian scene of which the Albanians are a part and the role of European mediation.² The 1994 Macedonian census raises fundamental issues of which the more recent conflicts such as those over education and language use at the federal level are continuations, and that census is worthy of a more detailed account as an historical moment around which national and international tensions crystallized. Regardless of the outcome of Macedonia's future, the 1994 census is one of the key links in the chain of events leading to it.

The counting of populations has been potentially fraught with political tensions for millennia. We read in the Book of Numbers (I:2-3) of a census for the purpose of preparing for war, and the census mentioned in the Gospel of Luke (II:1-5), was quite probably connected with Roman efforts at consolidating its hegemony in what was then still the kingdom (as opposed to province) of Judea (cf. Alford 1874[1980]:456-57; Wilson 1942:201). From 21 June until mid-July 1994, under intense internal and external political pressure, an extraordinary census took place in Republic of Macedonia -- the ordinary census having been conducted in 1991, when the Republic was still "Socialist" and a part of what is now Former Yugoslavia. The 1994 census was not funded by the government of the country, as is ordinarily the case with modern censuses in sovereign states, but by supranational organizations -- the Council of Europe (CE), which has so far refused to admit the Republic of Macedonia, and the European Union (EU), whose policies toward Macedonia have often been dominated by Greece. The overseers of the census appointed by the European organizations were officially called "the Group of Experts", a term whose implications I shall return to shortly. I was working that summer as a senior policy and political analyst covering Macedonia for the Analysis and Assessment Unit organized by Dr. Susan Woodward for the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, attached to the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) stationed in Former
Yugoslavia. In connection with these duties, I arranged to be authorized as an outside observer of the extraordinary 1994 census in my capacity as a member of an international organization in accordance with Article 33 of the Census Law. Although I was not officially connected with any of the funding organizations, the majority of their representatives were quite willing to allow me to accompany them on their duties and attend their meetings. Some of them even went so far as to make use of my knowledge of Macedonia. As a result, I was able to observe both the process of the census and the European observers who were supposed to be observing it.

Questions of ethnic identity, citizenship, language rights, and the interrelationships of the concepts of language, religion, and "nationality" were hotly contested and rendered the census a clearly political event rather than the statistical exercise it was officially claimed to be. And this was not the first time that Macedonian census figures have been the subject of conflict concerning these factors. At the beginning of this century, as at the end, economic and political structures in the Balkans were unstable and/or in transition, wars were being fought, interethnic tensions were high, and Macedonia was the object of conflicting claims supported in part by conflicting census figures. In this paper, I shall examine the 1994 Macedonian census both as an event in itself, and as a part of the larger context of quests for identity and hegemony in the Balkans. In so doing, I hope to shed light not only on both specific and general questions connected with the concepts of ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, with citizenship and hegemony, but also on the relationship of the supranational to the national, of the central to the marginal, and of "Europe" to the land mass west of the Ural and north of the Mediterranean. I will suggest that the Western Great Powers that to a great extent determine (and fund) the policies of the so-called international community, by imposing their own constructs while continuing marginalize Macedonia are not contributing to its stabilization.

In her article on the current Western "reinvention" of the Balkans, Todorova (1994) has accurately criticized the "ancient hatreds" and "distant tribal past" accounts for the motivations of the current Balkan conflicts invoked by writers and politicians as such Robert Kaplan and George Kennan. (We can note here in passing that no such rhetoric has been invoked in any attempt to explain the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe in recent years.) There is a much more complex dynamic operating between Western Europe and Southeastern Europe, and this is nowhere more clear than in the Republic of Macedonia. The events of the past can be invoked to influence the present, but they should not be confused with the present itself. However, since census figures were used to bolster justifications of the partitions of geographic Macedonia that resulted in the current situation, a brief look of some those claims provides a useful background to subsequent censuses including the most recent.

The figures in Table 1 are cited in d’Estournelles de Constant (1914:28-30) from Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek sources, respectively. They refer to three different views by writers representing the three states that were independent and had territorial claims on Macedonia at the outbreak of the First Balkan War. I have added a Turkish account of the 1905 Ottoman census for comparison (Saral 1975:152).

| TABLE ONE |
|----------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| **Bulgarian** | **%**    | **Serbian** | **%**    | **Greek** | **%**    | **Turkish** | **%**    |
| Bulgarians        | 1,181,336 | 52.31       | 57,600   | 2.01      | 332,162  | 19.26      | 896,497  | 30.8    |
| Greeks           | 223,702   | 10.13       | 201,140  | 7.01      | 652,795  | 37.85      | 307,000  | 10.6    |
| Serbians         | 700       | 0.03        | 2,048,320| 71.35     | –        | –         | 100,000  | 3.4     |
| Albanians        | 128,711   | 5.70        | 165,620  | 5.77      | –        | –         | –        | –       |
| Turks            | 499,204   | 22.11       | 231,400  | 8.06      | 634,017  | 36.76      | 1,508,507| 51.85   |
| Wallachians      | 80,767    | 3.58        | 69,665   | 2.43      | 25,101   | 1.45       | 99,000   | 3.4     |
| Jews             | 67,840    | 3.00        | 64,645   | 2.25      | 53,147   | 3.08       | –        | –       |
| Gypsies          | 54,557    | 2.41        | 28,730   | 1.00      | 8,911    | 0.52       | –        | –       |
| Miscellaneous    | 16,407    | 0.73        | 3,500    | 0.12      | 18,685   | 1.08       | –        | –       |
| Total            | 2,258,224 | 100.00      | 2,870,620| 100.00    | 1,724,818| 100.00     | 2,911,004| 100.00  |

Although Dako (1919:75) in his book significantly entitled *Albania: Master Key to the Near East* cites similar figures and refers to the obvious discrepancies as 'amusing', these discrepancies are not entirely arbitrary. Rather, at least to some extent, different authors have selected criteria that would support their point of view.

In the case of Greek and Turkish authors, the choice was based on religion and/or schooling. Any member of the Greek Orthodox Church, or, after 1870, any Patriarchist (as opposed to Exarchists, called "schismatics" by Nicolaides [1899:26]) as well as anyone who went to a Greek school (and since schooling was controlled by religion, Macedonian Christians were left with little choice until the mid-nineteenth century) was counted by the Greeks as a Greek, hence expressions such as "slavophone Greek" and "albanophone Greek". The complete absence of Albanians from the Greek figures is explained by their being counted as Turks, Greeks, or Miscellaneous on the basis of religion (Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic; cf. also note 5).

Since the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian schools remained relatively weak except in parts of the north and west of Macedonia, Serbian authors selected specific isoglosses, i.e. dialect boundaries based on individual linguistic features, to justify ethnic and therefore territorial claims, as illustrated in Table Two.
The isogloss illustrated by column one -- the reflexes of Common Slavic *tʃ/*dʒ, where Serbian and Macedonian have a single palatal stop or affricate rather than a combination of palatal fricative plus affricate or stop -- was used by Belić (1919:250) to justify Serbian claims to virtually all of northern and central Macedonia. By extending the criterion to include column two -- the reflex of Common Slavic *e -- Serbian linguists could extend Serbian territorial claims into the western third of Bulgaria. On the other hand, choosing a feature such as the presence of the postponed definite article -- as in the third column -- helped justify Bulgarian territorial claims to the entire Timok-Morava valley in southern Serbia in addition to Macedonia. Bulgarian figures assumed that virtually any Slav in Macedonia was Bulgarian, and increased the numbers by assuming higher fertility and incidence of extended families for Slavs than for other groups (Kâncëv 1900:136-37). Thus, for example, if a given village had fifty Albanian houses and forty Slavic houses, by counting 5 members per Albanian household and 7 members per Slavic household based on the foregoing assumption, we end up with a Slavic majority despite the smaller number of houses: 280 Slavs as opposed to 250 Albanians.

Notably absent from these statistics are any figures representing the views of Macedonians themselves. Except for the map by Cupovski (1913, cited in Petruševski 1992:83), which in any case is not a statistical document, we have very little in the published literature except occasional moments such as Pulevski’s statement of Macedonian national consciousness (1875:48-49) and Misirkov’s formulation of Macedonian language and statehood (1903:71), the Kostur (Greek Kastoria) school of 1892 (Andonovski 1985) and Upward’s (1908:204) account of his trip to Voden (Greek Edessa). As Rossos (1994) has made abundantly clear, the suppression of Macedonian ethnic identity in all its manifestations was not only in the interests of all the small powers that lay claim to the territory, but ultimately also in the interests of the great powers that supported the various small powers and that ultimately had a stake in maintaining the partitions of Macedonia as a viable solution for peace. In certain respects that situation is being replicated today, and population figures are again being used to bolster conflicting claims ranging from minority rights to irredentism. In particular, the technique of privileging religion over language as the basis of identity, which was used by both Turks and Greeks (and later Bulgarians and Serbs) to hegemone and assimilate various populations in Macedonia, is again being brought into play, as will be seen below.

From April 1-15 1991, under conditions of impending political disintegration, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia conducted its last census. Before the end of that year, while the census data were still being processed, war had broken out in former Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia had subsequently declared independence. The census itself was carried out in an atmosphere of distrust and animosity. Led by the two largest Albanian-identified political parties in Macedonia, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP, in Albanian PPD) and the smaller but more vocal and radical Peoples Democratic Party (NDP, in Albanian PDP) -- both founded in 1990 -- the majority of Albanians in Macedonia (and elsewhere) boycotted the 1991 census, claiming that they would be purposefully undercounted. The Bureau of Statistics estimated the data for Albanians in the boycotted communes (opštini) by means of statistical projections utilizing the data from the 1981 census, natural growth of the population during the inter-census period, migration, and other statistical data (Antonovska et al. 1991). The preliminary results were published in November 1991. Tables Three and Four give comparative statistics in raw numbers for 1953 through 1994 and percentages for the last three censuses. I have also given percentages of increase/decrease for the censuses from 1961-91. The categories “Egyptian” and “Bosniac” represent new sociopolitical realities.

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<td>13281871.4</td>
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<td>77255</td>
<td>770801.1-12</td>
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<td>1085521.1-17</td>
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### TABLE FOUR

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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosniac</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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Before the preliminary figures for the 1991 census were published, Albanian political actors began an international media campaign declaring not merely that they had been miscounted, but that in fact Albanians constituted about 40% of the population of Macedonia, i.e. seven to eight hundred thousand (Nova Makedonija 910420). Representatives of other groups also cited larger statistics: Serbs claimed up to 300,000, Turks up to 200,000, Roms 200,000, Greeks 250,000, Gjupci 30,000, Bulgarians and Vlachs similar figures (cf. MILS 930113, MILS 930222). Added together, they surpassed the total number of inhabitants of Macedonia without Macedonians. The point was clearly not one of statistical accuracy but rather claims to political power and hegemony.

The success of the Albanian public relations can be seen in the fact that within a year of the publication of the preliminary results of the 1991 Yugoslav census, Dr. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, a German diplomat with the rank of Ambassador and head of the Working Group for Human Rights and Minorities within the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), called for an extraordinary census in Macedonia to be supervised by the “international community” (MILS 921125). Ambassador Ahrens made two proposals: one involved only those areas with large Albanian populations, the other concerned the entire country. Such a pair of proposals had many implications and repercussions. The first proposal, by focusing on the Albanians to the exclusion of all the other minorities of Macedonia, which, according to the 1991 census made up 14.37% of the population, gave implicit legitimacy to Albanian claims for special treatment in addition to legitimizing Albanian politicians' right to claim discrimination at such a level and to demand a recount, as it were. At the same time, the proposals helped reify as a Macedo-Albanian conflict tensions that had been building since the riots in Kosovo in 1981 but that were not an inherent feature of Macedonian life at all periods.

Ahrens' announcement of November 1992 was followed by nineteen months of uninterrupted dispute. First there was an intense controversy over whether or not to hold the census. This agreed upon, there followed prolonged debate over the wording of the census law, which was eventually passed with the support of the Albanian members of parliament. One of the chief issues was language-use in the census, and article 35 of the census law provided for bilingual forms in Albanian, Turkish, Romani, Vlah, and Serbian in addition to Macedonian. Finally, just as the census was actually beginning, there were serious behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Albanian members of parliament, who threatened to call for a boycott, despite the presence of the ICOM (International Census Observation Mission) observers and the expense incurred by the European organizations.

As mentioned earlier, it is not without significance that the supervisors of the census observation mission were called The Group of Experts. Writing about other proclaimed experts involved in Balkan affairs, Todorova (1994:481-82) points out that expert power depends on the perception of its target, not on the quality of its information. The fields of expertise of the ICOM Group of Experts did not include knowledge pertaining to Macedonia. Rather they were West European statisticians and bureaucrats who were quite surprised when they discovered that they were embroiled in highly charged political issues as opposed to a mechanical statistical exercise. The two exceptions on the observation team were two Greek historians from the Institute of Balkan Studies at Thessaloniki, who thus had the opportunity to spread Greek propaganda (cf. note 18). According to a member of the Group of Experts, there was originally only one Greek on the observation team, but the weekend before they set off, while the chief of the statistical bureau in Brussels was out of town, the vice-chief, who is Greek, put two more Greeks on without anyone's approval. The Macedonian government granted them visas without demure in an effort to keep the matter as calm as possible.
The 1994 Macedonian census was linked to a political goal, namely the claim of Albanian politicians for special (non-minority) status for Albanians within Macedonia based on their large numbers. The Council of Europe, however, attempted to avoid the impression that it was involving itself in the internal political affairs of a sovereign state not only by publicly declaring that the census was merely a statistical exercise, but by avoiding the direct involvement of any parties that were familiar with Macedonia, except the two Greek historians, who could hardly have been described as objective. By labeling the leadership of ICOM the Group of Experts, the CE was attempting to lay claim to adjudicating authority in Macedonian internal affairs and at the same time project an image of objectivity.21

The lack of concern with knowledge of Macedonia on the part of the CE and ICOM was given symbolic representation in the orientation packet for members of the ICOM team. The only item relating to the country itself rather than ICOM's mission in it was a chart listing Cyrillic printed and cursive letters with the names of the letters in Cyrillic and Latin orthography and labeled simply L'alphabet. The very lack of a qualifying adjective in a sense erases Macedonian from the observer's view, and in fact the chart was not a guide to Macedonian Cyrillic, but actually a guide to Russian Cyrillic with the last six letters omitted. Although the last six letters of Russian Cyrillic do not occur in Macedonian, there are seven other letters (ј, ѓ, ј, і, ј, ј, ј) that are used in Macedonian Cyrillic but not in Russian and were thus missing from the chart.22 To compound the effect, the names of the Russian Cyrillic letters utilize a vowel whose letter comes at the end of the alphabet, so the names of the letters used a symbol that was not given in the list of letters. This chart not only embodied the arrogance with which the CE and ICOM approached the Macedonian context in which it presumed to operate, but gave false information to the purveyors of expert knowledge. In its concern for the Albanian question, ICOM could not be bothered to encourage any understanding of the Macedonian.

Similarly, the privileging of Albanian claims over all others was symbolically represented on the ICOM observers' control forms for censused households. Although the Macedonian control forms had sections for indicating the six ethnic affiliations defined by the languages of the census forms (Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, Romani, Vlah, Serbian), as did the ICOM control form on enumerators, the ICOM household control form specified only Macedonian and Albanian, the remainder being subsumed under 'Others'.

A revelatory incident occurred on the first day of the census, 21 June 1994, at the press conference on the census given by Ambassador Ahrens of ICFY, Werner Haug, Chairman of the Group of Experts Council of Europe/European Union, and Robin Guthrie, Director of Social and Economic Affairs, Council of Europe. The press conference of the expert team focused on Albanian objections to question 6 on form p-1, Citizenship, for which the four possible answers were Macedonian, Alien, Person without citizenship, and Pending status (votek).23 Ahrens stressed the European contention that the census was a statistical exercise and was completely separate from politics. After the press conference the expert team had a separate meeting with PDP members headed by Abdurahman Aliti, who later became president of the PDP. The topic was a threatened last-minute boycott mentioned above. Haug refused to enter into discussion with the politicians, insisting that the census really was a statistical exercise and that he must keep himself outside political questions. By the end of the census, however, Haug had realized what a political imbroglio he had gotten into and was meeting with all sorts of politicians. In fact, Haug's frequent connections with the various non-Macedonian ethnic parties was a source of objection at the Macedonian Census Commission, although they had to admit that Haug was extremely correct in informing them of all his official meetings and faxing them copies of any resulting documents.

At the meeting after the 21 June press conference, Guthrie tried to get tough with Aliti about cooperating with the census. Aliti unhappily noted the reality that the census did indeed have a political dimension, and that if he or his party openly called for support of the census he they would be wiped of the political map (presumably by the NDP or radicals in the PDP). The best they could do was promise not to actually call for a boycott, but neither would they call for support. Although he was a moderate who understood the situation clearly and wanted to see the census work, Aliti also saw no point in allowing radicals to destroy his political career. The expert team then went to the Bureau of Statistics, where the citizenship question was again the main order of business. Since no one on the expert team knew either Macedonian or Albanian they were at a disadvantage when a question of the wording of the rules concerning the Citizenship question arose and the only rule book that was available was Macedonian. It was also clear from their discussion that they began this mission with no understanding of its political implications or the tremendous ethnic and cultural complexity of the region. They actually thought they were going to be overseeing the technical aspects of a statistical exercise.

At the end of that first day, the Group of Experts' discussion about the complications they had encountered also revealed their view of Macedonia as something other than European. One member of the Group joked that they should conduct the census like the one 2000 years ago, when everyone went to their native village, a reference to the Gospel of Luke mentioned at the beginning of this paper. The unintended irony of her comment was that this was precisely what the Macedonians would have wanted and what the Albanians would have feared, since an indeterminate number of Albanians had come to Macedonia from
Kosovo and elsewhere since World War Two, especially since the Kosovo uprising of 1981. Another member of the team, speaking in French, described how the census was conducted in Turkey, where there was a curfew (in French: couvre-feu), requiring everyone to stay indoors and await the census takers under penalty of a heavy fine. A British member of the team misunderstood the French and thought the Turks burned villages during their census. In both the joke and the misunderstanding, the Balkans in general and Macedonia in particular emerge as a primitive "other", backward or barbaric.

It was during a meeting with Albanian political leaders at the beginning of the census that I asked Ambassador Ahrens if it might not be the case that by internationalizing Albanian claims in Macedonia via the CEICFY-sponsored census ethnic tensions were in fact exacerbated. Dr. Ahrens responded that he thought the international intervention was beneficial and cited as evidence the fact that as soon as the Council of Europe agreed to fund the census Albanian claims dropped immediately from 40% to 30%, and indeed during the negotiations that I attended, at which Albanian politicians were expressing particular misgiving over the issue of citizenship, the figure they cited as a being the minimum below which they would claim falsification was 25%. I should note that even before the first results were released, the percentage claimed had jumped and after the first results were published, and despite ICOM approval, the figure 40% was again being cited, cf. also Albanian prime minister Alexander Mesi, who reportedly cited the figure 800,000 (MILS 950413).

To a certain extent, ICOM approached the Macedonian government with an almost adversarial attitude. The assumption seems to have been that the census was being conducted for the sake of the Albanians and that therefore their claims had basis in fact rather than that there was a genuine question at stake. On the one hand, Macedonia was treated on the level a colony that could not supervise its own census (cf. Anderson 1913:11-13 on British censuses in India), on the other it was treated as a sovereign state engaged in discriminatory behavior. Due both to a lack of preparation and a tendency to view the Macedonian government with distrust, the ICOM team was prey to obvious manipulations. Thus, for example, at one point in July I was approached by ICOM members who informed me that the government was discriminating against Muslims by not listing them as Bosniacs (Bošnjaci) or by not giving their language as Serbo-Croatian. Apparently they had been in contact with Bosniac political activists who had tried to convince them that all Slavic Muslims in Macedonia are Serbo-Croatian-speaking and/or Bosniacs. When I responded in dismayed amazement that there was a significant number of Macedonian-speaking Muslims -- popularly known as Torbeš, although they prefer to be called Muslimani -- the ICOM reaction was a combination of surprise and skepticism. In the end they came to understand the situation, but the very fact that such a misunderstanding could arise is a measure of the ignorance and the distrust with which the European "experts" approached the census and their inability to evaluate dubious information disseminated by some ethno-political actors.

Macedonian Muslims often live in underdeveloped, neglected, and isolated areas, e.g. the municipalities of Debar and Kičevo, where there is no ethnic absolute majority. They have therefore been vulnerable to manipulation by Albanian and Turkish politicians who have convinced some of them that they are Slavicized Albanians or Turks rather than Islamicized Slavs, and that thus their economic interests would be better served by Turkish or Albanian political parties. The emphasis of Macedonian nationalist politicians on the connection between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and Macedonian nationality has further alienated some Macedonian Muslims. Census attempts in Macedonian-speaking Muslim villages (Plasnica and Preglovo, Kičevo municipality; Zupa, Debar municipality) ran into cases where a monolingual Macedonian Muslim family would demand a bilingual Albanian or Turkish form with an interpreter but then have to have the Albanian or Turkish translated into Macedonian. These incidents were part of a larger pattern of conscious language shift based on religion, such as the incident in the monolingual Macedonian Muslim village of Bačište (Kičevo municipality), where parents demanded an Albanian school for their children (Nova Makedonija 910513; v. also Friedman 1993).

A general problem with the 1994 Macedonian census as with other European censuses was the definition of the categories "mother tongue" and "nationality" (the ICOM control forms used ethnic affiliation and national affiliation interchangeably). The concepts of ethnicity, nationality, language, and religion have a complex history of interrelationships in Macedonia, one whose complexity continues into the present day. Thus, for example, some Muslim speakers of Macedonian declare their nationality as Albanian or Turkish on the basis of identifying their religion with Turkish or Albanian ethnicity. Similarly, some Christian speakers of Albanian declare their nationality as Macedonian on the equation of Macedonian Orthodox Christianity with Macedonian ethnicity. Needless to say, Albanian ethno-politicians insist that Macedonian-identified Albanianspeak as Albanians while Macedonians insist that Albanian-identified Macedonian speakers are Macedonians. There was also the citizenship-based category Yugoslav, which until 1991 was steadily growing in popularity, not only among Slavs, but also among non-Slavs. Now that Macedonia is no longer part of Yugoslavia, however, this category has ceased to be valid for most people, since it refers to another country.

ICOM observers were unaware of the difference between Serbo-Croatian and Macedonian when they arrived to observe the census. When they finally grasped that the difference was a linguistic one, they
concluded that language was therefore the basis of nationality. While language and ethnic or national affiliation coincide to a certain extent in Macedonia, such is clearly not always the case, as can be seen not only from such categories as Muslim but also from Table Five, which gives statistics for the correspondence between declared nationality and declared mother tongue for the 1953 and 1981 censuses (figures for 1994 have not yet been processed).

### Table Five

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Macedonian</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Serbo-Croat</th>
<th>Romanj</th>
<th>Vlah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>8539711.11276878</td>
<td>198611190</td>
<td>28111160</td>
<td>93411547</td>
<td>27711316</td>
<td>256111ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>21521111218</td>
<td>1535021137418</td>
<td>6569113</td>
<td>18111440</td>
<td>70111697</td>
<td>111ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>323921116608</td>
<td>27087118592</td>
<td>1436115160768</td>
<td>53411366</td>
<td>7011194</td>
<td>1011ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roms</td>
<td>1040114160</td>
<td>860111609</td>
<td>206611808</td>
<td>2511124</td>
<td>164561136399</td>
<td>111ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlahs</td>
<td>137111111</td>
<td>4111</td>
<td>2110</td>
<td>14113</td>
<td>0112</td>
<td>8130115257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>3945118521</td>
<td>01110</td>
<td>8113</td>
<td>310711135867</td>
<td>411114</td>
<td>911ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>nsl115075</td>
<td>nsl14968</td>
<td>nsl12038</td>
<td>nsl116325</td>
<td>nsl11308</td>
<td>nsl130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>2152117645</td>
<td>25111943</td>
<td>5011274</td>
<td>563112746</td>
<td>2111530</td>
<td>411ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3221113282</td>
<td>341114247</td>
<td>569112853</td>
<td>5258117031</td>
<td>173111280</td>
<td>3111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8966511.11334498</td>
<td>1838011391829</td>
<td>1531601164907</td>
<td>385791163349</td>
<td>170891127780</td>
<td>107511ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By attempting to impose a West European construct equating language with nationality (and nationality with statehood), ICOM helped force on people the kind of choices that have led to the current conflict (cf. Gal 1993:344-45).

Lability of identity has long been a feature of life in Macedonia. The oldest generation from Western Macedonia remembers when Christians and Muslims would live under the same roof as part of the same extended family. Before the Mürsztger agreement of 2/3 October 1903, only Muslims could serve as gendarmes, and such officials had significant power at the local level (cf. Skendi 1968:203, 207, 253). In Christian families, therefore, it was not uncommon for one brother to convert to Islam in order to be in a position to protect the entire family. Everyone ate at a common table, and if, for example, pork was available and a zelnik (pie) was made, the women of the house would put pork in only half the pita and both the Christian and Muslim sides of the family would eat from the same pan. On the other hand, marriages have always been freely contracted along religious lines but across linguistic ones. The children of such "mixed" marriages would grow up bi- or multi-lingual. In recent times, when faced with the necessity of choosing a nationality, choices can follow gender lines, e.g. if a Turkish man marries an Albanian woman, the sons may be Turks and the daughters Albanian, while in other families the choice may be for one son to be Albanian and one to be Turkish. The European concept of nationality, equating ethnicity with language with state, does not correspond to the complex realities of Macedonia (nor of many, perhaps most, other countries), and by focusing on 'nationality' to the exclusion of other characteristics we get contradictory situations such as those of parents insisting that their children be schooled in a language that they do not know despite the fact that the primary justification for multilingual education at the elementary level is the idea that children learn best when taught in their mother tongue.51

The politicization of the language issue and its confusion with nationality in the 1994 census was highlighted in several incidents that occurred in Albanian-speaking villages in southwestern Macedonia, where citizens objected to the fact that some of the Albanian-speaking enumerators were not ethnic Albanians but rather Roms (Gypsies), Gupci ("Egyptians"), or Vlahs (Flaka e vëllazërit). Since most Gupci in southwestern Macedonia have Albanian as their first language and many Roms and Vlahs are fluent in it -- especially in southwestern Macedonia -- the issue was clearly not a question of the right to register in one's mother tongue but rather the demand for an ethnic Albanian, i.e. an instance of ethnic prejudice.

The events leading up to the boycott of the 1991 census, the imposition of the 1994 census, and subsequent developments show a pattern of manipulations and fragmentations of ethnic and linguistic identities utilizing legitimate grievances to benefit certain types of political elites. At the time of the census, my assessment was that it would prove a statistical success but a political failure. Insofar as it has not resulted in any significant changes in the figures -- both official and purported -- according to which ethically based political relations are determined, this prediction has held true. The ICOM final report, while not uncritical, affirmed that the census was carried out according to "European" or "international" standards. It has been refuted by the Albanian political actors who brought it about, but at the same time they have generally continued to try to work within the existing governmental framework. In January 1995, the constitutional court ruled that article 35 of the census law, which governed language use, was unconstitutional, i.e. contrary to article seven of the constitution, which declares Macedonian the official language and guarantees (or restricts) official minority language use at (or to) the local level (MILS 950126). Thus the census law solved nothing in this respect. As of this writing, the Council of Europe and similar organizations still refuse to admit the Republic of Macedonia. And so the debate continues and Macedonia remains the most marginalized sovereign state in Europe.
If one of the purposes of the externally sponsored census was to either legitimize or silence Albanian claims and thereby promote in one way or another greater stability in Macedonian society, the role of the European mediators in the continued conflict does not appear to be serving to promote stabilization. In a recent editorial published by the outspoken albeit still government-dependent weekly Puls cited in MILS (950203), Ambassador Ahrens is cited in the following terms:

"Arens [sic] developed a thesis of a parallel existence instead of a common existence between ethnic groups in Macedonia, particularly between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. According to Arens, 'there never was a true coexistence', but nationalities in Macedonia 'have always led parallel lives.' He said he had the feeling that he probably knows more about Albanian history and culture than the average Macedonian. Also, he had the impression that nationalities had aversions to one and other. He backed this claim by the fact that there are no mixed marriages, and there are ethnic tensions in both public and private communication, especially between Macedonians and Albanians."

This is a significant departure from Ahrens admonishment to Albanian politicians at the beginning of the census, when they were still threatening a boycott. At that time, Ahrens told them they were in the same boat with the Macedonians, and that if they -- the Albanians -- rocked the boat they would both drown. His newly reported tack, assuming that the report is accurate, is an exemplary instance of a present construction being projected onto the past. By means of his perceived "expert" (cf. Todorova 1994) authority, Ahrens succeeds in imposing a view of Macedonian reality that at the same time serves the interest of the local political elite that gives him his international legitimacy and promotes a version of the history of Macedonia that is not only at variance with concrete evidence but helps to reify modern ethnic conflicts.

In a slightly broader context, Todorova (1994) falls into a similar trap of projecting the present onto the past, albeit for quite different reasons, when she attempts to demonstrate that the only meanings for the term Balkanism are "politically and ethnically fragmented" and, citing Bercovici (1937), "Austro-Hungarian political policy relating to the Balkans". In fact, there is a very widely accepted meaning of the term Balkanism that is precisely the opposite of fragmented. In linguistics, a Balkanism is a feature shared among the unrelated or only distantly related languages of the Balkans. The grammatical structures of the Balkan languages attest to centuries of multilingualism and interethnic contact at the most intimate levels. Thus, for example, the development of perfects using the auxiliary 'have' or the replacement of infinitives with subjunctive clauses shared by Balkan Slavic, Balkan Romance, Albanian, Greek, and even some Balkan Turkish dialects result from people speaking each others' languages. During the 1994 census, Debar proved to be the most intractable commune (for reason relating more to competition between the periphery and the center than between ethnicities), and in the end was the only commune in which the census was not completed. And yet, the Albanian and Macedonian dialects of Debar provide a striking example of phonological similarity that results from centuries of bilingualism.

The 1994 census highlighted, among other things, the ambiguity of the term "Europe". Geographically, it refers to a continent bounded by the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the southern slopes of the Caucasus and the western slopes of the Urals. Politically, however, the term "Europe" often still has the meaning of "Western Europe" or the Europe of the Great Powers. Thus, for example, the most powerful political unit on the continent calls itself the European Union, although only Western European nations plus Greece are included in it. It is no coincidence that Greece has embarked on a vigorous internal propaganda campaign stressing its membership in this "Europe." The symbolism of what can be called "political Europe" as a center of power to which the southeast, especially Macedonia, is marginal is illustrated by the fact that despite my being an American and an employee of UNPROFOR, an ethnic Albanian politician accompanying me into a restricted building explained to the guard (in Macedonian): "Toj e od Evropa" 'He is from Europe', meaning that external entity exercising its power in Macedonia. In its manner of imposing the 1994 census on Macedonia, political Europe sought to maintain its hegemonic relationship to its southeastern periphery in general and this periphery of peripheries in particular.

This Europe was utilized by both Albanian and Macedonian political actors to further their particular goals. The Albanian politicians mobilized quite legitimate social and political grievances based on very real discriminations against ethnic Albanian citizens of Macedonia, ranging from censorship and restriction of language and property rights to firings and jail sentences -- especially since 1981 -- to further a own careers and demands for autonomy, federalization, and ultimately irredentism (cf. Xhaferi 1994). Macedonian statisticians and politicians, faced with the choice between an externally imposed census or further destabilization due to a loss of legitimacy in an international community that was already permitting Macedonia's economic strangulation while continuing to prevent the full realization of its sovereignty, chose the census. But they then imposed their own condition, namely that the funding be sufficient to cover not merely the nationality question, which was the only one Europe sought to resolve and the only one which Albanian ethno-politicians could use to legitimate their claims on the international scene, but also all those features of the Macedonian economy (e.g. agricultural property, land use, etc.) that form part of a complete census but that had been omitted from the 1991 census due to insufficient funding in the context of economic crisis.
As I mentioned earlier, the 1994 census was a statistical success but a political failure. Although it legitimated the basic statistics of the 1991 census, it did nothing to resolve the issues of political hegemony and access to resources that continue to plague Macedonia. However, it did help to reify a conflict whose roots in Macedonian history are not as deep as some political actors would pretend. In seeking to impose a vision of nationality that does not correspond to Macedonia's complex cultural context and in refusing to take the necessary concrete steps to integrate Macedonia fully into the mechanisms of international politics and economy, political Europe reproduces its vision of Balkan "otherness" and marginality in Macedonia, leaving it open to further destabilization.

NOTES

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1 Cf. Todorova 1994:460 on recent attempts to resuscitate the myth of Balkan responsibility for World War One.

2 Although U.S. officials reportedly supported the extraordinary census in their private discussions with Macedonian leaders, there was no public U.S. support or participation. The census was essentially a "European" event taking place on Macedonian territory. Cf. note 33 and the paragraph to which it refers.

3 The Bulgarian figures are from 1900, the Serbian from 1889, and the Greek from 1904. The Greek figures omit the sandžak of Skopje (Üsküp, vilayet of Kosovo [hellenized spuriously as Kosşyphedion in Nicolaides 1899:25]), while the Bulgarian figures include the kaza of Tetovo (Kalkan-delen, sandžak of Prizren, vilayet of Kosovo) and the sandžaks of Debar (Dibre-i bâlâ) and Reka (Rikkalar/Zir Nânice) in the sandžak of Debar (vilayet of Bitola/Monastir). All the figures include the remaining kazas in the sandžaks of the vilayets of Salonika and Bitola/Monastir belonging to geographic Macedonia. For ease of comparison, I have added percentages.

4 The selection from d'Estournelles de Constant (1914) was chosen because it is both typical of the discrepancies and because the republication of this report in 1993 has given it greater currency in the present situation. For a Greek view of the period that refers to other sources, see Christides (1949:32-33). For figures relating to the post-war period, see Popovski (1981:187, 192-93, 247).

5 Saral (1975:152) does not distinguish Turks from Albanians but writes: "Muslim (the majority Turkish, the minority Albanian)."

6 The mutability of the Western construction of "Near East" as a place of the "oriental" (in Said's sense) is clearly seen in the fact that at the beginning of this century it could refer to Turkey in Europe, i.e. the Balkans (pace Todorova 1994:455).
It is significant that while claiming factors other than language as the determiners of nationality, every Greek government has prohibited education in the languages of Greek Orthodox Christians other than Greek. This is because language can function as the determinant of nationality or as a pathway to altered ethnic self-identification, although it does not always do so.

Similarities in folklore and folk traditions were also adduced to support Serbian claims. The forms cited in the table are those used in the modern standard languages. The dialectal situation is considerably more complicated but is irrelevant to the basic point being illustrated here.

Belić (1919:250), citing Meillet, writes that the Macedonian dialects are neither Serbian nor Bulgarian and that politics will determine the linguistic fate of Macedonia. However, he then goes on to claim that the north and central Macedonian dialects are basically Serbian while the south is basically Bulgarian on the basis of a single isogloss. Belić (1919:253-56, 264) ridicules Bulgarian scholars who were claiming all of Macedonian as well as Southern Serbian as Bulgarian dialects by suggesting that his opinion coincided with that of impartial European scholarship, i.e. his interpretation of Meillet, because Serbia had contact with the West while Bulgaria "slept deeply under the Turkish yoke," and that the resulting difference in intellectual development could not easily be overcome. The genuinely impartial French scholar Vaillant (1938:119), however, observes that Belić's argument is based on one phonetic trait and that most Slavists agree that Macedonian is actually a part of a Macedo-Bulgarian group that has been subjected to the prolonged influence of Serbian. He lists numerous phonological traits which link Macedonian with Bulgarian rather than Serbian, e.g. the fate of the jers and juses, ϱ/ǔ/, and vocalic /ǔ/, and notes that vestiges of /ǔt/ in the /k/ area show that the latter reflex is the result of substitution, e.g., in Galičnik gǎkí 'breeches' but gǎsnik (cf. Bulgarian gašnik) 'a belt for holding up gǎkí, and concludes that Macedonian is not a dialect of Bulgarian but deserves a separate place in Macedo-Bulgarian group (Vaillant 1938:204-08). It is important to note that Vaillant wrote this six years before the political recognition of Macedonian as an independent language.

Also absent here are Albanian and Romanian figures. Although Albanians laid claim to the western half of Macedonia as far as a line running from Kumanovo through Veles, the population figures that I have found in Albanian sources of the period do not attempt any ethnic breakdown but rather imply that the regions in question are simply Albanian with the occasional "colony" from some other ethnic group (e.g. Duko 1919:5). It would appear that the limits of Greater Albanian territorial claims were obtained by drawing a line connected all the outlying Albanian-speaking villages of Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and Epirus and then claiming all the territory inside those boundaries. In some respects, the Albanian situation at the turn of the century resembled the Macedonian: Albanian claims were marginalized due to their lack of any Great Power support. Moreover, Turkey, which in this case functioned like other small powers such as Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, attempted to render the Albanians invisible, by claiming them as Turks on the basis of religion (cf. Note 5 above). In this they would be supported by Greece, which claimed all of Southern Albania on the basis of that part of the population that was Orthodox Christian. This left the Catholics of Northern Albania, which Serbia and Montenegro were ready to absorb. Unlike the Macedonians, however, who, as Slavs speaking dialects midway between Serbian and Bulgarian, could be plausibly assimilated to one or the other despite the fact that they were arguably neither (cf. Vaillant 1938 cited in note 9), the dialects of Albanian could not be linguistically claimed by any neighbors and were therefore instead discredited as being merely a Mischsprache, a mixture of all the languages of the Balkans with almost no indigenous elements. To this was added the claim that the North and South (Geg and Tosk) Albanian dialects were so different as to be incapable of uniting into a single language. Thus, aside from the use of religion as a means of denying legitimacy to both Macedonian and Albanian ethnic identity, both groups were also linguistically marginalized. In the case of Macedonians, they were told that they spoke either Serbian or Bulgarian, while in the case of Albanians, they were told that their language was not really a language at all. (The Greeks had tried this type of strategy on the Bulgarians at an earlier period, cf. Nicolaides 1899:60, 120). The principle difference was that Albanians had sufficient national consciousness and political organization to lay claim successfully to a part of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in which they constituted a majority while the Macedonians were left completely out of these processes. Although the Romanian government showed some interest in supporting Vlah claims, especially after the establishment of a Vlah Church (and therefore millet) in 1905, the Romanians were too far away, and the Vlahs too few in number and not particularly strong in national consciousness. Those in the towns were mainly Greek-identified merchants while the transhumant shepherds of the countryside were hardly in a position to organize (cf. Brown 1995).

Upward (1908:204) writes of an interview he conducted in a village two hours ride from Voden: "I asked what language they spoke and my Greek interpreter carelessly rendered the answer Bulgare. The man himself had said makedonski! I drew attention to this word, and the witness explained that he did not consider the rural dialect used in Macedonia the same as Bulgarian, and refused to call it by that name. It was Macedonian, a word to which he gave the Slave [sic] form of Makedonski." On the next page he continues: "The Exarchist claimed that his party had sixty or seventy houses in the village; the Patriarch had awarded him fifteen or twenty."
The Party for Democratic Prosperity was founded on 15 April 1990 in Tetovo, now a predominantly Albanian town with close historical and communication links to Kosovo, which is just on the other side of Mount Šar. Branches of the PDP continued to be founded in various towns throughout western Macedonia during 1990. Although proclaiming as its major goal minority rights -- and indeed in the 1990 local elections seven Turks and seven Muslims (presumably Slavic-speaking) were elected to local councils (Antonovska et al. 1994a:57) -- the parties are basically Albanian rights parties that advocate special treatment for Albanians as being not a minority but a "constitutive nation" in Macedonia. The boycott was first called for by the Peoples Democratic Party and was observed in the communes of Debar, Gostivar, Kičevo, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Skopje, Struga, Tetovo, and Titov Veles (Antonovska et al. 1991).

The large variations in percentages of increase/decrease are due not only to mechanical shifts (immigration and emigration) but also to socio-politically motivated changes in choices in declaring identity (cf. Gal 1993). The history and specifics of these phenomena are beyond the scope of this paper and deserve separate monographic treatment. My purpose in calling attention to them here is to emphasize the fact that shifts in demography and shifts in identity are independent phenomena.

"Egyptians", in Macedonian Gupci, Egüpci or Egitkani (also Guptin) are descended of Roms but do not speak Romani and do not identify themselves as Roms. The ethnonyms themselves are cognate with English Gypsy, which is derived from the claim or belief that the Romani people came from Egypt. The majority of Egipkani live in Ohrid and Struga and speak Albanian, those of Bitola speak Macedonian. Some Egipkani attempted to register as a separate ethnic group in the 1981 census, but they were listed as "unknown" (Sabota 920306). The Egipkani claim to be descended from Egyptians, but there is no concrete evidence to support this claim. A more likely explanation is that they became sedentarized at a very early date and assimilated linguistically but not ethnically to non-Romani speakers and maintained ethnic separateness from Romani-speakers whether nomadic or sedentarized at a later date (see also Duizings Forthcoming and Hancock 1995). The category Bosniac refers to Serbo-Croatian-speaking Muslims.

According to Dr. Svetlana Antonovska (p.c. 950525), Director of the Republic Bureau of Statistics, the lower figures for some nationalities in 1994 vs. 1991 is due to the fact that citizens living abroad for more than one year were included in the 1991 census, whereas in the 1994 census -- in accordance with international norms -- only those citizens living abroad for one year or less were counted.

This figure includes those who declared "Yugoslav" as well as nationalities not counted separately in the census, mostly from Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East (MIC 950105). See note 17.

Yugoslav and Macedonian censuses distinguished up to 34 nationality categories as well as several other types including those who declared a regional identity and those who did not declare a nationality. For the sake of conciseness, I have grouped all the smaller categories, none of which are relevant for this paper, under the designation Other. This designation includes the following specified groups: Austrian, English, Belgian, German, Danish, Jewish, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Rusyn, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, French, Dutch, Croatian, Montenegrin, Czech, Swiss and Swedish.

Albanian political actors were supported in their claim by Greece (MILS 921230), which denies the existence of a Macedonian language and nationality altogether, particularly on its own territory (Human rights Watch/Helsinki 1994:11).

Niyazi Limanovski, head of the organization of Macedonian Muslims, came out against census. Bekir Zhuta, a PDP minister in parliament and Albanian from Struga, stated that there was no need for help from outside. Both were accused by radical Albanians of trying to divide and conquer, although Zhuta did serve as his party's spokesman in declaring the census invalid after the preliminary results were published. (MILS 940413, MILS 941118).

Article 7 of the Macedonian constitution reads: "The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language in the Republic of Macedonia. In the units of local self-government where the majority of the inhabitants belong to a nationality, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in a manner determined by law. In the units of local self-government where there is a considerable number of inhabitants belonging to a nationality, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, under conditions and in a manner determined by law." The nationalities named are Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Roms in that order. Serbs object to the fact that they are not specifically named but are subsumed under the expression "other nationalities". When the census law was being debated, Macedonian nationalists argued that the forms should only be in Macedonian, since the census was being conducted at the national and not the local level. In the end, however, bilingual forms were used for all five principal minority languages (but see the discussion later in this paper). The census also had the effect of legitimizing certain directions in the codification of Literary Romani -- a process that has been ongoing since the mid-seventies in Macedonia (see Friedman 1985) -- and of Literary Arumanian, which has gained significant momentum since 1989. It is interesting to note that the Turkish forms were printed without the diacritics of Turkish orthography. While
this would not hinder comprehension, it underlines a certain lack of sensitivity that was apparently not crucial. To the best of my knowledge, no objections were raised by any parties concerning this point.

21 Lack of objectivity was also ascribed by the Macedonians to a high-ranking member of the ICOM team who was perceived as being particularly difficult -- even nasty -- due to the person's being of Albanian descent. I was unable to verify this rumor, however. The individual in question did seem to be a source or at least an active supporter of the adversarial attitude described later in this paper, but this behavior could have been a reflection of the tensions underlying the census itself or idiosyncrasies of the individual's personality rather than an emotional attitude resulting from ethnic background.

22 There are also two other Russian letters (Ѣ and ё) that do not occur in Macedonian.

23 Albanian politicians (e.g. Xheladin Murati, who was head of the PDP when the census began but subsequently resigned) claimed that the question about citizenship was designed to demonstrate that the majority of Albanians in Macedonia were dojdeni 'immigrants'. The chief problem was that despite assurances to the contrary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVR) had not succeeded in distributing all citizenship documents by the time the census began. In Eastern Macedonia this was not particularly important. Thus, for example, in Radoviš the local government actually used census enumerators to help distribute citizenship documents. Although the problems of document distribution occurred throughout Macedonia, Albanians maintained that a disproportionately high number of qualified Albanians were without citizenship documents. This problem was complicated by the number of Albanians that have fled oppression in Kosovo but whose status in Macedonia is unregulated. A compromise solution was eventually reached. However, a special MVR form tabulating citizenship was added on 2 July in three group areas, and the ICOM mission was upset at this irregularity. Cf. Gal (1993:345) on abuses of the 1941 Hungarian census during the post-war period, when the 1941 census data, which was supposed to be confidential, was used to deport not only Germans in Hungary who had openly worked for the Nazis, but also anyone who had claimed German nationality and later anyone who had claimed German as their mother tongue.

24 The citizenship law set the term of residence at fifteen years, i.e. it was designed precisely to exclude the most recent wave of Albanian immigration. During the debate over this law, Macedonian nationalist politicians advocated a term of thirty years, Albanian politicians pressed for five years. The longer term would have excluded the majority of Albanians who had come to Macedonia from Kosovo.

25 That same day an article appeared in Nova Makedonija (950622) presenting this question as an assertion, i.e. that international attention had exacerbated ethnic tension. It should be noted that although the European Union and the Economic Commission for Europe were involved in the census, the chief actors were ICFY, which proposed it, and the CE, which funded it.

26 The polemic over figures also continued during the course of the census itself. An article in the Skopje-based Albanian-language daily newspaper Flaka e vellazërimit (940711) entitled "Over 8,000 Albanians" reported that one of the municipal instructors in Bitola claimed this figure for that municipality. "Any other figure connected with the number of Albanians given by the Bureau of Statistics will be declared a falsification... I have so informed all communal, public and international bodies" (my translation). This figure continued to be cited in the Albanian-language media despite the fact that the data had not yet been processed. The official preliminary figure for Albanians in municipality of Bitola was 3,970 (Antonovska et al. 1994b).

27 Historical evidence supports the latter, not the former, contention, cf. Limanovski (1993).

28 The banning to the Muslim veil (zar and feredže) in the early 1950's also created significant alienation of some Macedonian-speaking Muslims from the state and increased their sense that Macedonian identity was a Christian identity. The current dispute is thus not a new one. However, there are also Macedonian Muslim organizations actively encouraging Macedonian Muslim identification with Macedonian language and ethnicity.

29 Gal (1993:344-45) discusses how the 1873 Statistical Congress insistence on the requirement of a language question in censuses forced people in Austria-Hungary to think of nationality in terms of language instead of citizenship. Then in the 1941 Hungarian census, a separate nationality question was added, which was even more overtly politically manipulated.

30 An example of how "national" feelings in Macedonia are more complex than portrayed by ethno-political (or international) organizations is the Serbian husband of a Macedonian who, unbeknownst to his wife, had always declared himself a Yugoslav in national censuses. He went through a great personal crisis in connection with the 1994 census, since he did not wish to identify with current Serbian policies and did not consider Yugoslav to be a valid category any longer. He chose to declare himself as a Macedonian.

31 The problem of identity in relation to both the census and Macedonian foreign relations received the following expression in the satirical journal Osten (950708): "I'm going to declare myself as a Martian in the census." "Can you speak Martian?" "No need to. Here you can declare yourself a Turk or Albanian without knowing Turkish or Albanian. It's enough to be a Muslim. And as a Martian, no one can negate me. The
Martians were never Greeks or involved in a Serbo-Bulgarian quarrel. "I dig it, buddy. You'll go far in life." (my translation).

32 Todorova (p.c. 950315) has corrected this in her subsequent work.

33 The image of "Europe" as a political and/or cultural entity that represents a desired or rejected "other" has been and is widespread in the economically peripheral nations of continental Europe. See Gal (1991) for a Hungarian example with additional references.

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MIC=Macedonian Information Center (News Service)

MILS=Macedonian Information Liaison Service (News Service)


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