CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Language in Macedonia as an Identity Construction Site

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1. Introduction

Language contact can be understood as comprising the phenomena of linguistic variation and, ultimately, change resulting from multilingualism. Such contact can occur in an atmosphere of conflict, which implies a social and/or political attempt to eliminate the contact by either assimilation or separation, or it can occur in an environment of coexistence, which could be defined as the lack of such attempts without, however, necessarily leading to different results, i.e., coexistence does not necessarily entail stability, although such may be the case. Thus, for example, the multilingual contact that led to the situation identified at the beginning of this century as the Balkan linguistic league (Trubetzkoy 1923; Friedman 1997), a language group characterized by significant shared structural innovations, could only have resulted from centuries of relatively stable coexistence. The past century in the Balkans, however, has been unstable linguistically as well as politically, and the two phenomena are not unrelated. In some areas change and shift are occurring in obvious conditions of conflict and elsewhere under conditions that could be described as coexistence. As “the world’s most famous contact situation” (Thomason and Kaufman 1985, 95), the Balkans constitute a particularly appropriate focus for a study of language “collision.” This appropriateness is enhanced by the abundant media attention that has been focused on the region since the so-called fall of communism and the subsequent outbreak of a series of ever-southward moving armed conflicts (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Preshevo Valley [southwest corner of Serbia], Macedonia). I propose, therefore, to examine the fate of the Balkan languages in their twentieth-century sociopolitical context as artifacts of identity formation. As a frame for my study, I shall take the geographic region of Macedonia (see definition below), which has long been described as the linguistic “heart” of the Balkan contact area (Hamp 1977, 281), as well as its geopolitical “apple of discord.”

It is indeed ironic that this center of conflicting territorial claims that was the main focus of the Second Balkan War in 1913 (see Map 1) was referred to
as the "oasis of peace" for almost a decade after the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession. During the course of this past century, the region has undergone various partitions and remains a site of competing claims, among them linguistic ones. If the very term Balkan has, since the end of World War I, come to be associated with the notion of fragmentation, then in that same West European (or "Euro-American") discourse, Macedonia (or its French form Macédoine) has come to mean the intermingling of those fragments (apparently originally a reference to the perception of multi-ethnicity in ancient Macedonia, see Lunt 1984, 96). It is yet another irony that the term Balkanism, when used geopolitically, means fragmentation due to conflict while its use as a linguistic term means precisely the opposite, i.e., a shared feature due to linguistic contact, in other words, interpenetrating coexistence.

2. Defining Macedonia

Owing to the level of contestation, one cannot begin a discussion of language and politics in Macedonia without first defining what is meant by Macedonia. At the beginning of his study of the relationship of politics to the ethnographic cartography of Macedonia from 1730 to 1950, Wilkinson (1951, 1), claims that "Macedonia defies definition" (Brown 1995, 34), and then goes on to claim that "[o]f all attempts to define Macedonia, that which makes its appeal to physical geography is least profitable, and also the easiest to refute" (Wilkinson 1951, 2). On the next page, however, Wilkinson writes that he uses the name Macedonia "as a convenient means of referring to the region which lies between the Sar [sic] mountains in the north, the Aegean sea in the south, the lower Mesta river and Rodopi mountains in the east, and the Albanian highlands in the west" (1951, 3). This is essentially the same physical definition used since the days of classical geographers (Wilkinson 1951, 1; Barker 1950, 9), despite differences in detail at the edges and the occasional Greek or Serbian attempt to set the northern boundary somewhere in the middle of the region thus defined (Wilkinson 1951, 2, 4). It is the definition that has informed most of the debate since the nineteenth century, and it is the one that I shall utilize here. I shall use the term Macedonia or geographic Macedonia to refer to this region as defined by physical geography. I shall modify the term Macedonia with the adjectives Vardar, Aegean, and Pirin, to refer to the regions that correspond politically to the modern-day Republic of Macedonia, the Greek province of Makedonia, and the Bulgarian district of Blagoevgrad, respectively. These political divisions correspond—with a few minor
subsequent adjustments—to the boundaries set by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913. To these three traditional regions can be added Gona-Golobro-Prespa, consisting of the western mountain slopes from Sharr to the southern tip of Lake Little Prespa, regions located in Kosovo and Albania.3

3. The Languages of Macedonia

Turning now to the linguistic situation, one can, without fear of any accusation of lack of objectivity, identify the following linguistic groups as present among significant numbers of people on the territory of geographic Macedonia: Albanian, Hellenic, Romance, Slavic, Turkic, and Indic (i.e., Romani). The moment one attempts to become more specific at the taxonomic, distributional, or statistical levels, however, one is immediately confronted by contestation. At the taxonomic level, one encounters contestation over the distinction between language and dialect for Slavic and Romance, dialect competition for Albanian and Indic, and competition between language and religion for Hellenic and Turkic. Nor do these characterizations exhaust the possibilities, but they will suffice for our purposes of focusing on those conflicts that are most salient. Distributional and statistical contestations are interrelated, albeit separate. The former is concerned with absolute presence, the latter with relative presence. I shall begin with the taxonomy of Slavic, which is arguably the most contested of the above mentioned language groups at that level. For the purpose of our focus here, the main question is the relationship of Macedonian to neighboring Bulgarian and, to a lesser extent, Serbian.

The classic debate about the distinction between language and dialect (Haugen 1966; Lunt 1984, 91; Posner 1996, 189–226) continues to be waged with a vehemence that has continued more or less unabated since the middle of the nineteenth century, with the exception of a brief hiatus between 1946 and 1948.4 The classic, but to the best of my knowledge apocryphal, adage attributed to Max Weinreich (except by some Scandinavians, who attribute it to Otto Jespersen: Jens Allwood, University of Göteborg, p.c. 1995) that a language is a dialect with an army, while equally applicable to the various standards that have developed or are developing among South Slavic speakers, is nonetheless only selectively applied not only by numerous politicians, journalists, and diplomats, but also by some linguists, historians, and other academics. Some of these, while not motivated by national interests, nonetheless present uneven accounts of the role of construction in identity formation, reifying one identity vis-à-vis another. It is thus that Macedonian is “objectively” or “linguistically” presented as a dialect of Bulgarian, which is equivalent to describing Dutch as a dialect of German (or perhaps more exactly, Frisian as a dialect of either Dutch or German). Since this debate cannot be properly understood without some sense of the historical background, I shall outline its main contours (for greater detail see Friedman 1975, 1985, 1998a, 2000, 78, 312; Lunt 1984, 115).5

4. The Development of Macedonian Linguistic Identity

If we take the years at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries as the point of departure, the position of language as an identity marker in the Ottoman empire, including Macedonia and adjacent regions, was not particularly salient.6 Religion was a far more important source of identity,7 and the majority of the population was either (Greek Orthodox) Christian or Muslim, for which the labels Greek and Turk, respectively, were commonly used.8 This is to say that at that time the term Greek did not necessarily refer to a speaker of Greek (which language in any case was then referred to as Romain, i.e., Roman—a reference to Christian Byzantium rather than the pagan Hellenes [Herzfeld 1993, 199–200]), and Turk did not necessarily refer to a speaker of Turkish. Rather the terms meant ‘Greek Orthodox Christian’ and ‘Muslim,’ respectively.9 At the same time, none of the literary languages then in use were vernacular-based. To the extent that Slavic was used in writing at all, it was restricted primarily to monasteries—and insofar as literacy existed in Macedonia outside ecclesiastical circles (and often even inside them), Greek had to a large extent supplanted Slavic, especially in the south. As vernacular-based Slavic literacy emerged in the course of the early nineteenth century to compete with both Greek and late varieties of Church Slavonic (including here for general purposes Slaveno-Serbian), two centers of literacy emerged on Macedo-Bulgarian territory, one in what is today southwestern Macedonia and the other in what is now northeastern Bulgaria. During this same period, Vuk Karadžić was laying the foundations for what would become literary Serbo-Croatian based on the dialects spoken between northwestern Montenegro and southwestern Serbia, i.e., eastern Herzegovinian neo-Slovenian (see Naylor 1980 for details). That linguistic boundaries had not yet been conceptualized in modern terms can be seen in the fact that as late as 1822, Vuk found it necessary to argue that Bulgarian was not a dialect of Serbian (de Bray 1980, 78, 312; Lunt 1984, 115).

By the middle of the nineteenth century, a conflict had arisen over what was to serve as the dialectal base for the emerging Bulgarian literary standard. It is
clear from the attacks in the Constantinopolitan Bulgarian-language press on the language of textbooks based on western Macedonian dialects that the differences between the Balkan Slavic dialects of northeastern Bulgaria and those of southwestern Macedonia were sufficiently salient to native speakers that they could, and ultimately did, serve as the bases of separate literary languages and separate identities.\textsuperscript{13} The following quotation from an 1851 editorial is illustrative: "As concerns the language of Mr. Jordan [Hadži Konstantinov-Džinot of Veleš, in western Macedonia], anyone can see that it is so different from our written and spoken language, so that to a person reading it for the first time it will appear not only incomprehensible but completely different. [. . . ] it can be more easily learned and spoken correctly by a foreigner, and not by a native Bulgarian. May the residents of Skopje forgive us, along with those who speak a similar language; since they do not understand our language nor can they speak it." (\textit{Carigradski vestnik} no. 55, 6 October 1851; cited in Dimitrovski et al. 1978, 23.)

It was precisely this type of rejection that helped lead to the formation of a separate Macedonian linguistic and ethnic consciousness. Such a formation took place, however, under extreme political duress. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, national movements in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia all crystallized in such a way that Macedonia was (and is) at the edge of their overlapping territorial claims (see Map 1 above).\textsuperscript{14} In both Serbia and Bulgaria, language was used as one of the bases of those claims.\textsuperscript{15} Since the Slavic dialects of Macedonia are located on the South Slavic continuum in a region between Bulgaria and Serbia, linguists in both camps chose shared features in one direction or the other to justify territorial expansion, as illustrated in Map 2 and the following quotation from Vaillant (1938, 195–96, 197, 208): "Some bring up Bulgarian traits of Macedonian, others Serbian ones: They battle fiercely, brandishing the postponed article [isogloss 2] or the treatment of č [isogloss 1], delivering blows with jers or the nasal vowels; the battle is confused and unmethodical [. . . ], and it demonstrates that Macedonian furnishes arms to both camps [. . . ] At the time of the first historical data from the ninth and tenth centuries [. . . ] Macedonian was closely allied with Bulgarian, and its subsequent evolution was parallel to that of Bulgarian; still it was sufficiently independent that it is difficult to make of Macedonian a simple dialect of Bulgarian, and it is more accurate to attribute to it a separate place in a Macedo-Bulgarian group."

It is clear that by the beginning of the twentieth century (when Macedonia was still a part of Turkey, but independent Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian states were already in existence) a separate Macedonian consciousness was well-

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Map 2. Differing isoglosses used to support conflicting territorial claims [1] the reflex of Common Slavic *ti*, [2] the presence of a definite article. These representations are highly schematic. The precise distribution of features is complex but irrelevant to the basic point. See Ivić (1958, 25–49) and Alexander (2000, 17–18).

established not only among some intellectuals (Misirkov 1903) but even in some rural areas. The following example, from a British philhellene, is illustrative:\textsuperscript{16}

On the second day of my stay in Vodená [Greek Edhessa—VAF] I made an excursion with Mr. Kalopathakes to two villages. [. . . ] Vladova, the first village, was reached after a two-hours' ride. [. . . ] I sent out for a man who seemed to be a leading spirit in the place, and he came into the guard-house and answered my questions freely in the presence of the Turkish captain. [. . . ] I asked what
language they spoke and my Greek interpreter carelessly rendered the answer Bulgar. The man himself had said Makedonski! I drew attention to this word, and the witness explained that he did not consider the rural dialect used in Macedonia the same as Bulgarian and refused to call it by that name. It was Macedonian, a word to which he gave the Slave [sic!] form Makedonski. (Upward 1908, 202–4)

Nonetheless, the lack of any sort of state, ecclesiastical, or other governmental type of structure together with the propagandas (and organized violence) of the already existing Balkan states that were seeking to extend their territorial rule to include Macedonia contributed not only to a retardation of the process of the development of a Macedonian standard language but also to the development of Macedonian ethnic consciousness. The result was a sense among many Slavic-speakers in Macedonia that the only choices for identity were those supported by established power structures, i.e., Greek, Bulgarian, or Serbian. (Moreover, the entire identity question was felt by many Muslim speakers of Macedonian to have nothing to do with them, an attitude that persists in some areas into the present day.) Thus people's choices for identity were often motivated by factors other than language, and situations arose in which three brothers could each have three different national identities (Danforth 1995). The partition of geographic Macedonia in 1913 among Greece, Serbia (later Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, and Albania increased this sense of limitation among many Macedonians. Thus, for example, Krsnt P. Misirkov, who in 1903 had written an articulate program for Macedonian self-determination and a literary language (Misirkov 1903), ended his life in the 1920s advocating Bulgarian identity for Macedonians as a choice preferable to Serbian (Nihtinen 1995).

5. Macedonian Outside the Republic

Vardar Macedonia, which was given to Serbia by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, became the People's Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation in 1944 and the independent Republic of Macedonia in 1991. It was only here that a Macedonian literary language was allowed to develop. In Pirin Macedonia, except for the brief hiatus of 1946–48, Macedonian was considered a dialect of Bulgarian, and, after 1958, Macedonian ethnic identity became an unrecognized minority category, which it remains to this day.17 Similarly in Aegean Macedonia, except for the Atecelar of 1925 that was published in accordance with article 6 of the Treaty of Sèvres but never distributed (Andonovski 1985b) and a few brief efforts during the Greek Civil War, which were discouraged even by the Greek communists (Risteski 1988; Rossos 1997), Macedonian has been a proscribed language. During the 1930s mothers were jailed for speaking it to their babies, and schoolchildren had their tongues pierced with needles and rubbed with hot pepper for speaking it in school (Risteski 1988, 97-102). Persecution of Macedonian is considerably less vehement in Greece today, but on-going. In addition to police harassment (Smiger 1998, 21–22), the Greek government continues to refuse to recognize that Greece has any national minorities at all (a Reuters press release cited by Greek Helsinki Watch 23 July 1999 gives a typical example, as does the ethnographic map of the Balkans published as a supplement to the February 2000 issue of National Geographic [Vol. 197, no. 2]). In mid-1998, according to the researchers involved, the first EU-funded minority language research project in Greece was stopped by the government because the people concerned Macedonian. The Greek government did permit the development of a second EU-funded minority language project dealing with Arvanitika, a group of Albanian dialects spoken in central and southern Greece since the Byzantine period and successfully driven during the course of this century to the brink of extinction, so that they can now serve as a permitted topic of investigation and thereby legitimate Greece as a "European" country.14 In Albania education in Macedonian is supported only through grade four and only in the southernmost of the three Macedonian-speaking areas (Lower Prespa). Members of the Albanian government have occasionally made public statements siding with Bulgarian claims and questioning the legitimacy of Macedonian identity (e.g., a statement made by then-president of Albania Sali Berisha reported in MILS 6 March 1995). In the course of the 1990s, Serbian extremist politicians such as Vojislav Sečelj occasionally made statements to the effect that Macedonians are Serbs, and the Serbian government did not cooperate with the Macedonian government in the counting of Macedonians living in Serbia during the 1994 census. Macedonian language schools in Serbia ceased to operate shortly after Macedonia declared independence.

Such, then, is the situation of Macedonian in the various Balkan countries in which it is spoken. Within the Republic of Macedonia, however, there are five officially recognized minority ("nationality") languages: Albanian, Turkish, Aromanian, Romani, and Serbian.19 As such, the Republic of Macedonia represents a kind of Balkan microcosm. While a complete history of the standardization of all these languages is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, a few salient facts on each will be essential to our main points.
6. Albanian

Albanian has two main dialects, Geg, spoken north of the river Shkumbi (which runs through central Albania), and Tosk, spoken to the south. The Albanian dialects of Montenegro, Kosovo, and most of Macedonia are Geg. Those of Greece and the southwestern corner of Macedonia are Tosk. During the first half of this century, there was no official attempt at legislating a unified Albanian literary language, although a Literary Committee met in Shkodër in 1916 and agreed to elaborate a standard based on Elbasan Gegg with some concessions to Tosk. In practice, both literary Geg and literary Tosk continued to be elaborated in Albania until after World War II (Pipa 1989, 3–4), when the communist regime succeeded in imposing a Tosk-based unified standard on all of Albania, taking the dialect of Korçë as the basis. This standard was officially adopted by the Albanians of what was then Yugoslavia—thus replacing the Geg-based standard they had been elaborating prior to that—in a process that began in 1968 and culminated in the first unified Albanian orthographic handbook and dictionary agreed upon in 1972. With the so-called fall of communism and the upheavals of the past decade, the question of reintroducing literary Geg as a co-equal variant with the current Tosk-based standard was raised at a conference in the fall of 1992 and has remained a salient issue ever since (e.g., Çeliku 1995, 215–16). The Gegg of Shkodër, the town in northwest Albania with an old, independent literary tradition as well as a university, have proposed the revival of literary Geg, and the Tirana establishment and Tosks of the south have opposed it. The Kosovars favor a single standard but declined to define how that standard should be determined (Bajranci 1995). They do not want to support a diglossic situation from their perceived need for (trans-)national unity, but neither do they wish to abandon the possibility that their dialectal base (which is northeastern Geg and thus significantly different from the nditional Western Geg of Shkodër) could be more represented.

Aside from the Albanians of Albania and former Yugoslavia, there are three distinct groups of Albanians in what is now Greece. One group calls their language arberisht (in Greek Arvanitika) and emigrated from southern Albania/Epirus to Thessaly, Central Greece, Euboea, the Peloponnese, and various islands during the Byzantine and early Ottoman periods, at which time these dialects separated from the main body of southern Tosk. These Albanian-speakers are Christians and Greek-identified. Many of the leading figures in the Greek independence movement of the nineteenth century and subsequent politics were in fact native speakers of Arvanitika. A second group are the Çams of southern Epirus (Çameri), most of them Muslim.

Although exempted from the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey following World War I (Ladas 1932, 380–88)—itself the largest act of "ethnic cleansing" in the twentieth century—most of them were driven into Albania at the end of World War II (ASHH 1998, 47). These speakers represent a geographic extension of the southern Tosk dialects of Albania proper, the division being the political boundary between Greece and Albania established by the Protocol of Florence in 1913, which corresponds more or less to the current border. A third group consists of northern Tosk speakers who emigrated during the Ottoman period and live in village enclaves such as Lehovo (Florina district) and Mandres (Kilkis district).

7. Serbian and Turkish

Of the remaining four languages, Serbian and Turkish on the one hand and Vlah and Romani on the other represent striking contrasts. Both Serbian and Turkish have well-established norms that are based in other states, and their modern-day standardizations took place far from Macedonia. Interestingly enough, both languages also have made inroads on speakers of Macedonian dialects, but in different ways. Among Macedonian-speaking Muslims in the Debar region of Western Macedonia, an association between Macedonian identity and the Macedonian Orthodox Church has alienated Macedonian-speaking Muslims to the extent that some communities have demanded that the government provide Turkish-language elementary schools for their children (MILS 17 February 1998; also Nova Makedonija 91/05/13). The situation is exacerbated by both some Turkish ethnotypes who, in an attempt to increase their power base, have claimed that Macedonian-speaking Muslims are linguistically Slavicized Turks (although the historical record shows that they are in fact descendants of Slavic-speaking converts to Islam) and by the emphasis of some Macedonian nationalist politicians on the connection between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and Macedonian nationality (MILS 23 October 1996). During the 1994 census, there were numerous cases in certain Macedonian-speaking Muslim villages in which monolingual Macedonian Muslim families would demand a bilingual Turkish form with an interpreter but then have to have the Turkish translated into Macedonian (Friedman 1996). These incidents are part of a larger pattern of conscious language shift based on religion (Fraenkel 1993). This issue of schooling is particularly fraught with complications. On the one hand, the purpose of minority-language schooling is to facilitate children's learning by teaching them in the language they know from home. This purpose is defeated if the language
of instruction is one the children do not know. On the other hand, framed as a human rights issue, representatives of organizations such as the OSCE (p.c., Skopje, 1995) interpret Article 26, Section 3 of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) as giving parents the right to choose the language in which their children will be schooled (and demand that the state supply the schools), even if that choice is detrimental to the children's progress in school. In the case of Serbian—leaving to one side those who came to Macedonia in the relatively recent past—there are speakers in the northern Macedonian dialect area, e.g., some villages on Kozjak and Skopska Crna Gora, who identify as Serbian on the basis of religion or national feeling and whose dialects in no way differ from those of their Macedonian-identified neighbors (Videoeski 1998, 10).

8. Romani and Vlah

The situation for Vlah and Romani is quite different. Both of these languages are transnational, not fully standardized, and not associated with a nation-state. In the case of Vlah, there are those who would make of it a dialect of Romanian (see Iâncescu 1980, 30–46 for a summary of the debate in Romania) just as there are those who treat Macedonian as a dialect of Bulgarian, while in the case of Romani, some post-modern literary critics—writing as historians—have argued that Romani is not an ethnicity but rather some sort of Western construct and that Romani is not a language at all (Willems 1997). With the Vlahs, as with the Macedonians, the distinctness of their identity and language is based in their own perceptions combined with an ontologically distinct linguistic base (in the case of Vlah, one that separated from Daco-Romanian about a thousand years ago). The distinctness and coherence of the Romani language (despite dialectal diversity) is obvious to anyone who has done fieldwork with Romani or Roms in Eastern Europe. It is only those who have worked exclusively in countries where Roms have assimilated linguistically or those who have done no fieldwork at all that can maintain—on the basis of their lack of experience—that Romani is not a distinct language and a member of the Indic linguistic group. On the other hand, the phenomenon of assimilation affects both Roms and Vlahs, albeit in different directions. The majority of Macedonian Roms are Muslims, and as a result there have been tendencies among them to assimilate to Albanian or Turkish language and nationality, although some have assimilated to Macedonian. In the case of the Vlahs (including Megleno-Romanians), most of those who were Muslims went to Turkey, while Christian Vlahs in the Republic of Macedonia tend to assimilate as Macedonians.

Within the context of standardization in the Republic of Macedonia, there is dialectal competition within both Romani and Vlah. Most of the Roms in Macedonia speak a variant of the Arli dialect, which belongs to the Balkan group, but a significant number also speak Džambaz, which is closer to the so-called Vlax group. The emerging standard is based on Arli, but with certain compromises in the direction of Vlax group, to which the native dialects of some of the main activists belong. Similarly in the case of Vlah, there is an East/West division, with the western dialects being somewhat more prestigious because they are associated with urban Vlahs, but the emerging standard is influenced by the fact that those producing the texts are from the East.

9. Language and Other Determiners of Ethnicity

While most of the ethnic or "nationality" categories of Macedonia correspond to linguistic categories, there are several that do not and should be mentioned here. The two most salient are Muslim (Musliman) and Egyptian (Egipčanin or Egipćan, plural Egipčani, Gucpi). The category Muslim is religiously rather than linguistically defined and is most often declared by Macedonian-speaking Muslims (sometimes called Torbe) who consider Macedonian to be a Christian category. Most others who declare Muslim nationality speak some variant of the former Serbo-Croatian (Southern West South Slavic), although some of these now declare their nationality as Bosniac. (The category Bosniac is problematic for the Sandžak Muslims, who speak Southern West South Slavic but live in a historically distinct region—the former Sandžak of Novi Pazar—which is now divided between Serbia and Montenegro.) Egipčani are mostly Albanian-speakers, although some speak Macedonian (see Table 3). On the basis of their ethnonym and physiognomy they are assumed by most others in Macedonia and elsewhere to be linguistically assimilated Roms, but they do not identify as Gypsies. Although as late as the early 1970s I knew Gucpi who told me "we don't know where we come from" and who rejected being identified with Gypsies, by 1981 members of this community were declaring themselves as Egyptians (Friedman 1985) and claimed descent from Egyptians either who had been brought to the Balkans by Alexander the Great or who had migrated there during the Byzantine period (Risteski 1990, 11). Although not recognized as a separate nationality category in the 1981 census, in the 1991 and 1994 censuses they were so recognized.

The old manipulation of religion also intersects with the more recent concept of citizenship in Greece in various official attempts to separate minority language from identity formation. Thus, for example, while the Albanian-
speaking Orthodox Christians of Albania are referred to as Albanophone Greeks (Ruches 1967) on the basis of religion. Turkish-speaking Muslim Greek citizens in Greek Thrace (who identify themselves as a Turkish minority) are referred to as Muslim Greeks on the basis of citizenship. The term Slavophone Greek is sometimes used for Macedonian-speakers, with the basis being either religion or citizenship. However, members of the Greek-speaking minority of Albania are never referred to as Hellenophone Albanians nor are the Greek-speakers of Turkey ever labeled in Greek sources as Hellenophone Turks. The relation between religion and nationality among Albanians and Greeks continues to be sensitive, as the following news item demonstrates: “Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha told journalists in Tirana on 9 November that the Socialist-backed draft constitution will lead to ‘a process of massive changes in Albanian nationalities’ and ‘a quiet and soft ethnic cleansing, not through massacres, hunger, or diseases but through visas, baptisms, money, and jobs.’ He added that the draft ‘destroys Albanian nationalities’ because it allows citizens to change their declared nationality and religion. He suggested this will enable ethnic Albanians to declare themselves ethnic Greeks in order to improve their chances of emigrating to and finding a job in Greece” (Fabian Schmidt, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Vol. 2, No. 217, Part II, 10 November 1998).

Another deployment of ethnicity as a category of legitimacy that utilizes language as both a legitimizer and a delegitimizing in a double-standard type of hegemonic discourse is the practice in various sources of information (print and other news media, official and NGO reports, etc.) of referring to Albanians in Macedonia (and elsewhere) as ethnic Albanians while in these same sources Macedonians are not referred to as ethnic Macedonians but rather as Slav Macedonians, Macedonian Slavs, Slavo-Macedonians or some variant thereof. The argument that has been offered is that since the Republic of Macedonia is a multi-ethnic society, the term Macedonian by itself is potentially unclear. The underlying discourse, however, is one that recognizes Albanian as a language and an ethnicity as well as a citizenship category (for the Republic of Albania) while denying the same possibilities to ethnic Macedonians. The implication is that the language spoken by ethnic Macedonians is Slavic (Slavic being a linguistic category) but not necessarily independent (Macedonian being deployed as a geographic or political category), and that Macedonian does not constitute an ethnic identity. This discourse in turn leaves room for questioning the legitimacy of the Macedonian state and its territory (see note 14) and also helps delegitimize claims for recognition on the part of ethnic Macedonian minorities outside the Republic of Macedonia. The nature of this discourse is exposed by comparison with

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>% Bulgar</th>
<th>% Serb</th>
<th>% Greek</th>
<th>% Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>1,181,336</td>
<td>52.31</td>
<td>57.69</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>19.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2,048,320</td>
<td>71.35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>228,702</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>201,140</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>65.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>128,711</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>165,620</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>499,204</td>
<td>22.11</td>
<td>231,400</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>634,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>219,571</td>
<td>9.72</td>
<td>166,540</td>
<td>13.86</td>
<td>105,844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 2,258,224 100.0 2,870,620 100.0 1,724,818 100.0 2,911,004 100.0

*Vlachs, Roms (Gypsies), Jews, Circassians, etc.

Russia, which is also a multi-ethnic society. When it is necessary to specify Russian as referring to Russian-speakers inside or outside of Russia the term ethnic Russian is used, never Slavo-Russian, Russian Slavs, Slav Russians, etc.

10. Censuses, Languages, and Nationality Categories

While religion, language, and nationality (or ethnicity) compete as sites for the construction and reproduction of identity, numbers also compete as legitimations of status and even as justifications for territorial claims. It was during the late nineteenth century that nationality was introduced as a category for censuses, a move supported by self-defined nation-states such as France and resisted by multinational states such as Austria-Hungary (Gal 1993, 344-45). The manipulations of such census figures were used by competing nation states in their claims to Macedonia during the period leading up to the Balkan Wars and again in connection with the Yugoslav Wars of Succession. Table 1 reproduces claims from four different sources (each with a specific national interest) made for the population of Macedonia while it was still part of Turkey.

These discrepancies are not entirely arbitrary. Rather, at least to some extent, different authors selected criteria that would support their point of view. Thus the Greek and Turkish figures used as the criterion of ascription, resulting in the complete elimination of the Albanians, who were counted as Turk if Muslim, Greek if Orthodox, or Other if Catholic. The Serbs were likewise eliminated from Greek figures because the Greek definition of
Macedonian territory stopped short of the northern districts included in the jurisdiction of the Serbian church. Bulgarian and Serbian figures used linguistic criteria, but chose different isoglosses (see Map 2) to justify the claims for the territorial extent of Bulgarian or Serbian.

During the decades following the end of World War II, declarations of Albanian and Turkish nationality were directly influenced by political events as illustrated by census figures in Table 2.

When the 1948 census was conducted, relations between Yugoslavia and Albania were good while those between Yugoslavia and Turkey were not. By 1953, Tito had broken with Stalin and in the wake of that split Yugoslavia had broken with Albania while improving relations with Turkey. The subsequent decades saw both emigration to Turkey (sometimes for economic reasons, but see also Akan 2000, 81–119) by those declaring Turkish nationality (sometimes declared on the basis of Muslim religion rather than Turkish mother tongue) as well as rising Albanian nationalism and pressure on Muslims in Kosovo and Western Macedonia to declare Albanian nationality (Tanasković 1992, 143–44; Akan 2000, 179–221).

The 1981 census was the last uncontested census conducted in former Yugoslavia.

By 1991 the situation had deteriorated to the extent that Albanians boycotted what would be the last census of the SFRY (former Yugoslavia), arguing they would be unfairly undercounted. An extraordinary census was conducted in the Republic of Macedonia in 1994, primarily in response to Albanian claims of under-representation in the 1991 census (for which the number of Albanians had been estimated owing to their boycott). In the 1994 census, which was funded and overseen by the Council of Europe and the European Union, 22.7 percent of the total population declared Albanian nationality. Nonetheless, despite the fact that it was at the urging of ethnic Albanian elites that Albanians in Macedonia boycotted the 1991 census, the Albanian Academy of Sciences claimed:

For almost 20 years, Macedonian authorities have not announced the exact number of Albanians. Officially they claim that Albanians represent about 23% of the population of the Republic. [. . .] But other sources speak of a larger number of Albanians. One can say without fear that they represent not less than 35% of its [Macedonia’s] population. As a consequence, the Macedonians represent only 55% of the population, including here those who consider themselves Bulgarian (the others are Serbs, Turks, and Roms). With such a significant importance, the Albanians cannot in any sense be considered as a minority but as participants, equal to the Macedonians, in their common state. (ASHSH 1998, 44)

The Albanian state itself is well aware of potential challenges to its own hegemony from its minorities, as indicated by the fact that in its 2001 census it omitted questions concerning the religion and ethnicity of its population, a move that was protested by Greek and Macedonian minority organizations in Albania (MILS 12 April 2001, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 72, Part II, 12 April 2001).

11. Linguistic Constituencies

Although these “other sources” are not named and no concrete basis is given for the figure 35 percent, the rejection of the term minority is itself not a matter of mere arithmetic, since even if the proportion were in fact 35/65, Albanians would still be a minority and Macedonians a majority in numerical terms. The question is rather one of constituency, i.e., the demand for the status of constitutive nation, a concept based on the notion of the nation-state and one used to determine language policy in former Yugoslavia (Kovačev 1992), in which Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian, and Slovenian, as the languages of constituent nations, were official at the national level, while all other languages, as the languages of national minorities (changed to nationalities in the 1974 constitution for all languages except Roms and Vlachs, who were given the status of ethnic groups), were official at a local or other smaller level.

The phrase equal participation, however, calls to mind the use of equal in the following statement, taken from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Memorandum: “Without the equal participation of the Serbian people and Serbia in the entire process of the determination and realization of all vital decisions, Yugoslavia cannot be strong; its very existence as a democratic and socialist union would come into question” (SANU 1986, 146). A complete analysis and comparison of the 1986 SANU document and the 1998 ASHSH document are beyond the scope of this article, but we can note here that the apparent similarities do not encourage optimism, given the role of the SANU Memorandum in heralding the open rise of Serbian nationalism. It is worthy
of note that the Albanian demand is not for a state without a national basis nor for one in which all possible nationalities are constitutive, but rather for a bi-national state.

Burg (1996, 150–57) critiques the role of ethnic elites in dismantling multi-ethnic states, and it is worth noting that the oft-cited success stories of Switzerland and Belgium are not without current problems. Thus Grin (1999, 13) writes of Switzerland that it appears to be faced either with an “economisation” of linguistic and cultural differences, in the sense that these differences translate into unequal access to socio-economic success or “an ‘ethnicisation’ of socio-economic inequality, which would no longer manifest itself along the usual lines of education, socio-economic background, occupation, or more generally, social class, but along linguistic, cultural or quasi-ethnic lines. Either way, this can only be deeply divisive and would not bode well for the long-term cohesion of the country.” As for Belgium, politicians have long been accused of attempting to dismantle the state, and the following newspaper quotation is typical: “Some observers say [the victory of the Liberal Party] may be the last chance to hold Belgium together as a single country, with the extreme Vlaams Blok, which also scored well in the election, eager for a split” (Herald Tribune 13 July 1999, p. 7).

12. Language and Identity as Non-Isomorphic

A final example of the extent to which language has come increasingly to stand for identity since World War II is given in Tables 3 and 4, which quantify degrees of non-correspondence between declared nationality and declared mother tongue in the 1953 and 1994 censuses in the Macedonian republic. Table 3 gives a detailed breakdown of declared mother tongue and declared nationality. These are summarized in Table 4, where in each of the two charts, the top figure is the total of those whose declared nationality differed from the corresponding declared mother tongue (Non-co), followed by a figure indicating the percentage of the total of those declaring the mother tongue in question that the non-corresponding number represents. The lower figure gives the numerical total of those declaring the relevant mother tongue. In each chart an overall total is given below the language-by-language totals. While it is clear from these figures that declared nationality does not always correspond to declared mother tongue, it is equally clear that in all cases except the former Serbo-Croatian there has been an increasing tendency toward such congruence, in many cases a dramatic one.15

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### Table 3. Difference between declared nationality and declared mother tongue for the six main languages of the Republic of Macedonia: 1953 and 1994

| Sources: Savesni zavod za statistiku 1959, Republikni zavod za statistika 1996 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                | Declared         | Declared         | Declared         | Declared         | Declared         | Declared         | Declared         | Declared         |
|                                | Nationality      | Macedonian       | Albanian         | Turkish          | Serbo-Croat      | Romani          | Vlah            | Bulgarian       |
| Macdonians                      | 853971           | 1986             | 281              | 934              | 277             | 2565            |
| Albanians                       | 2152             | 153502           | 6569             | 181              | 70              | 1               |
| Turks                           | 32392            | 27087            | 143615           | 534              | 70              | 10              |
| Roma                            | 1040             | 860              | 2066             | 25               | 16456           | 1               |
| Vlahs                           | 137              | 4                | 2                | 14               | 0               | 8130            |
| Serbs                           | 3945             | 0                | 8                | 31070            | 41              | 9               |
| Muslims                         | -                | -                | -                | -                | -               | -               |
| Yugoslavs                       | 2152             | 25               | 50               | 563              | 2               | 4               |
| Others                          | 322              | 341              | 569              | 5258             | 173             | 31              |
| Total                           | 896651           | 183805           | 153160           | 38579            | 17089           | 10751           |

| 1994 Declared Mother Tongue     |                          | 1994 Declared Mother Tongue |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                | Nationality      | Macedonian       | Albanian         | Turkish          | Serbo-Croat      | Romani          | Vlah            | Bulgarian       |
| Macdonians                      | 1289868         | 124             | 124              | 1938             | 94             | 259             | 125             |
| Albanians                       | 2063            | 426418          | 210              | 135              | x              | x               | 0               |
| Turks                           | 10885            | 906             | 62726            | 86+x             | 11             | 0               | x               |
| Roma                            | 5974            | 1212            | 1311             | 14+x             | 34955          | x               |
| Vlahs                           | 1800            | x               | 12               | 0                | 6747           | 0               |
| Serbs                           | 11693           | 0               | 8                | 27843            | x              | x               | 32              |
| Muslims                         | 5552            | 605             | 180              | 1181             | 20             | x               | x               |
| Bosnians*                       | 36              | 21              | x                | 312+x            | 0              | 0               | x               |
| Bulgarians                      | 358             | 0               | x                | 80               | 0              | x               | 1216            |
| Egyptians                       | 961             | 1856            | 42               | 10               | x              | 0               | 0               |
| Others                          | 3793            | 221             | 6        | 3484             | 40             | 30              | 75              |
| Total                           | 1332983         | 431363          | 64665            | 35095            | 35120          | 7036            | 1448            |

*Not Specified
x Under 10
and should thus constitute the basis of independent states, provided an im-
petus for the shift from religion to language as the basis of supra-regional iden-
tity. This ideology in turn has given rise to the modern colloquial-based liter-
ary languages of the Balkans and the educational systems necessary to perpet-
uate them (and the nation-states for which they are vehicles of construction).
Such a development has led to the decline of Balkan multi-lingualism (Icevska
and Salihu 1998, 44 for a typical current example) and produced a reservoir
for territorial conflicts, given the fact that discrete monoglot territorial units
are rare even at the village level and almost non-existent at the level of munici-
pality (Kânev 1900; Zavod za statistika na Republika Makedonija 1997), and
given the relative subjectivity of the distinction between language and dialect.

In the context of geographic Macedonia, in which all of the Balkan linguis-
tic groups are represented, the conflict and competition among Slavic, Greek,
and Albanian has been most salient, while those involving Romance, Romani,
and Turkish are relevant but not state-based. In the case of Slavic, a shift from
religion to language as a source of identity provided resistance to the hegemo-
ny of Greek, but the above mentioned ideology resulted in both the basis of a
distinct Macedonian national identity and literary language and in Bulgarian
claims that the identity does not exist and that the language is a dialect of
Bulgarian. Albanian nationhood, too, arose from the shift from religion to lan-
guage as means of identity production, but in the context of post-World War
II nation-states religion has again emerged as a significant fact in language
and/or identity shift. In the case of Greek, the maintenance of a religious-
based identity in the form of the Greek Orthodox Church has continued to
serve as a vehicle of language shift either to Greek in the case of non-
Hellenophone Greek Orthodox Christians or away from Greek in the case of
Hellenophone Muslims, who were included in the compulsory exchange of
populations following World War I (de Jong 1992). While the deportation of
Muslims from Aegean Macedonia as well as the deportation and murder of its
Jews resulted in a religiously homogenous region, linguistically Aegean
Macedonia is still as complex as Vardar Macedonia, despite on-going Greek
denials of this fact (Greek Helsinki Monitor 24 July 1999 gives a typical exa-

ple).

On the one hand Macedonian census figures demonstrate that the corre-
spondence between declared mother-tongue and declared nationality has
become more congruent during the last forty years. On the other, religion con-
tinues to compete with language as the major focus of identity. Muslims,
whose religion is also officially recognized as a nationality category, may adopt
Albanian or Turkish regardless of mother tongue while Christians may adopt

13. Conclusion

The linguistic situation in geographic Macedonia during the course of this
century can be seen as a collision of ideological fluidity and rigidity in the use
of language as an identity construction site. In connection with the conflicts
thus generated, the concepts of language and dialect as well as equality and
minority are deployed in ways such that they interact as tools of both hege-
monic discourse and resistance. The language contact that produced the
Balkan linguistic league was in its essence a historical phenomenon in which
literacy played a peripheral role. The late documentation of Balkan Romance
and Albanian (as well as Romani), plus the highly conservative literary tradi-
tions of Greek and Balkan Slavic (and also Turkish), combined with the fact
that the majority of speakers of all the languages in question were both illiter-
ate and the subjects of a single state for centuries, assured this. The nineteenth-
century ideology that nation = language = territory = state (Lunt 1984, 89;
Friedman 1997), i.e., that the human population of the world consists of
nations, which are defined by language and which occupy discrete territories

Table 4

1953

Declared Mother Tongue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declared</th>
<th>Macedonian</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Serbo-Croat</th>
<th>Romani</th>
<th>Vlah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Co</td>
<td>42140 4.6</td>
<td>30303 16.4</td>
<td>9545 6.2</td>
<td>7509 19.5</td>
<td>633 3.7</td>
<td>2621 24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>896651</td>
<td>183805</td>
<td>153160</td>
<td>38579</td>
<td>17089</td>
<td>10751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Co</td>
<td>92751 7.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>130035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1994

Declared Mother Tongue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declared</th>
<th>Macedonian</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Serbo-Croat*</th>
<th>Romani</th>
<th>Vlah</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Co</td>
<td>43115 3.2</td>
<td>4945 11.1</td>
<td>1939 2.9</td>
<td>7252 20.6</td>
<td>165 5</td>
<td>289 4.0</td>
<td>232 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1332983</td>
<td>431363</td>
<td>64665</td>
<td>35095</td>
<td>35120</td>
<td>7036</td>
<td>1448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Co</td>
<td>57937 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1907710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Macedonian or Greek, depending on where they find themselves. Also, Muslim Albanians may convert to Greek language and/or religion for economic reasons (see Schwandner-Sievers 1999 on Vlah deployment of Greek or Romanian identity for access to resources). At the same time, however, as noted above, there is a striking trend in the increasing correlation of nationality and mother tongue. And so a greater consistency of correspondence between language and ethnicity is influenced by religion, which continues to function as a kind of linguistic wild card, especially among the Muslims. The Egipčani are a special case reflecting the highly marginalized status of Roms. Finally, just as religion continues to exert its effect, so, too, the numbers game continues to be played by various interested parties, and to this has been added the rhetorical twist (already evident in the years leading up to the 1974 Yugoslav constitution) of contesting the concept of minority.

Taken as a linguistic category in the context of geographic Macedonia, minority is a highly mutable identity. For some groups, e.g., Vlahs and Roms, it is absolute, whereas for others, e.g., Macedonians and Albanians, it is relative. For some it is perceived as an attempt to deny greater legitimacy, e.g., Albanians in Macedonia, for others it is a sought-after status, e.g., Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece. In a sense the Republic of Macedonia is the very quintessence of a minority country, since all of its ethnic groups but one are in numerical minorities, but its majority ethnic group is a minority not only in all of its neighbors but in the Balkans as a whole. Moreover, the chronic denial of even so much as minority status—or even existence—to Macedonian language and ethnicity, a denial in which political leaders of minorities within Macedonia are willing to be complicit when they think it will further their goals—adds to a sense of fear within Macedonia that demands for equality are in fact preludes to demands for partition. And yet, so far neither practitioners nor theoreticians have been able to formulate an adequate answer to the question asked by Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov’s son, Vladimir, in the epigram of Susan Woodward’s account of the destruction of Yugoslavia (1995, xvi): “Why should I be a minority in your country when you can be a minority in mine?”

Notes

Throughout this article, I have cited sources and references wherever possible. A number of observations, however, are based on my own field research throughout the Balkans between 1971 and 1999 (for details see my web page located at humanities.uchicago.edu/humanities/linguistics/faculty/friedman.html). Some of this research has been supported by grants from the American Council of Learned Societies, financed in part by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Ford Foundation, from the International Research and Exchanges Board, with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, from the University of North Carolina Research Council, and research funds from the University of Chicago. I gratefully acknowledge the support of all these organizations. Some of the research was also conducted while I was on deployment in Macedonia as a Senior Political and Policy Analyst for the Analysis and Assessment Unit of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia in 1994. Some material is also based on my observations during a 1995 fact-finding mission as a member of the South Balkan Project of the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed here are entirely my own and do not reflect those of any of the above mentioned organizations. Translation from sources not in English are my own unless otherwise specified.

1. This stability, however, is underlain by a series of instabilities. The pre-Indo-European languages of the Balkans were wiped out by those of Indo-European invaders, and from prehistoric times until after the Ottoman conquest various Indo-European and Turkic languages entered the Balkans, some being established permanently, some leaving a passing lexical imprint, and some disappearing with hardly a linguistic trace.

2. This expression was frequent in the Macedonian media from the second half of 1991 until the bombing of the FRY and resultant refugee crisis of 1999. Perhaps the most poignant usage I have encountered was at the opening of a conference on Macedonian-Turkish cultural relations held at the University of Skopje in October 1991 as Yugoslav National Army planes flew low over the University. The Wars of Succession had begun that June, and Macedonia had just passed a referendum for independence in September, but the political situation was unresolved and Yugoslav National Army troops had not yet withdrawn. As of July 1999, Macedonia had survived the most serious crisis it had faced since independence, namely the complex inter-ethnic tensions resulting from the Kosovo crisis. The outbreak of armed conflict in northern Macedonia in early 2001, however, threatens to revive a 1913 scenario as of this writing (April 2001).

3. It is worth emphasizing that the term Balkanization and its congeners did not originate during the period when the Balkan states were breaking off from
the Ottoman Empire but rather at the end of World War I with the establishment of nation-states in Eastern Europe taken from territory that had been ruled by Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. Todorova (1997, 33–37) cites a usage from the 20 December 1918 New York Times in which the term is used to mean "devastation" or "ruin," but she correctly points out that the meaning of political fragmentation emerges only with the treaties following World War I that divided up the so-called "New Map of Europe" (Gibbons 1915).

4. See Kanoč (1900, 138–40) for a detailed breakdown in terms of Ottoman administrative districts. ASHSH (1998, 23) provides an interesting additional perspective: Basing itself on the last administrative division of the Ottoman Empire before its dismemberment, it claims almost all of northern Macedonia as part of "historical Kosovo with its capital Skopje." It is ironic that this definition is reminiscent of medieval Serbian claims.

5. These regions still have significant numbers of Macedonian-speaking villages. The classification of the Slavic dialects of Gora as Macedonian rather than Serbian, on the basis of certain salient, relatively archaic innovations shared with most of western Macedonia, e.g., fixed antepenultimate stress, was proposed by Videoški (1986) and tacitly accepted by Brozović and Ivči (1988). The speakers themselves are Muslim and have traditionally been identified as neither Serbian nor Macedonian but rather as Goran. They read Standard Macedonian easier to understand than Standard Serbian, however, and share salient folklore with Macedonians rather than Serbs (Naim Dokle, personal communication, Tirana, 1995; also attested in Letters to the Editor published in Nova Makedonija 18 and 25 January 1986, p. 2). When Serbian negotiators finally recognized the existing borders between Macedonia and the FRY (including Kosovo) in February 2001, after almost a decade of foot-dragging, a group of Gorans sought inclusion in Macedonia or special status with dual citizenship and Macedonian schools (MILS 13 February 2001). The compromise was to agree to establish a new border crossing at Resetelica-Stražim (MILS 16 February 2001). The Macedonian-speakers of the Golo Brdo region (Albanian Golloborë) are mixed Christian and Muslim. Those of Lower Prespa and adjacent regions are Christians. Only the Christian villagers of southeastern Albania have Macedonian-language schooling (through grade four).

6. At the end of World War II, with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the same political camp and discussions of a Balkan federation, Bulgaria recognized Macedonian as a language, as a nationality, and as a minority on its territory. With the Tito-Stalin break of 1948, however, Bulgaria repudiated first the Macedonian standard language (Koneski 1948) and subsequently (from 1958)
11. Jews and Armenians constituted other religiously defined, officially recognized minorities in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Balkans at that time. By the end of World War II, most Armenians had left for Soviet Armenia, and most Macedonian Jews had been murdered by the Nazis and their collaborators (Assa 1972, 92–119).

12. Nonetheless, people in Ottoman Turkey were not unaware of the distinction between language and religion. We have records of nineteenth-century jokes whose point was that Slavic-speaking Muslims called themselves Turks but did not necessarily know Turkish (Cepenkov 1972, 132–34). It would be interesting albeit difficult to trace the origins of these jokes, however, since the attestations date from the mid-nineteenth century. It is possible that these jokes are actually manifestations of a growing ideological awareness of the shift from religion to language as an identity marker (see also Akan 2000, 123, 143, 194, 213).

13. An independent issue is the boundary of Balkan as opposed to non-Balkan South Slavic. Sandfeld (1930) included Serbian in his study of Balkan linguistics, as do some others, but it is well recognized among Balkanists that the processes of structural convergence that characterize the Balkan linguistic league—and in the case of Slavic in particular differentiate the Balkan Slavic dialects from the rest of Slavic as a genetic group within Indo-European—did not extend over the whole of Southern West Slavic dialectal territory nor even over the whole of that territory subject to Ottoman suzerainty for an extended period. Heuristically speaking, it is only the so-called Turlak (Prizren-Tinok) dialects of Serbian that participated in the processes.

14. See ASHSH 1998 and Velev 1998 for modern-day Albanian and Bulgarian equivalents of such claims couches in terms of “ethnic Albanian territory” and “ethnic Bulgarian territory,” respectively. See MANU 1999 for a response to the former. Maximal Aromanian claims also included part of Macedonia, but the minimalist claims for an independent Pindos Republic were limited to that part of former Ottoman territory that lay between the Greek border of 1912, the Albanian border of 1913, Mt. Grammos and the town of Yanina (Ioannina), i.e., what became the northeastern part of Greek Epirus (Ionescu 1945). Trajkovski (1997, 76, 81, 83, 84) gives a Macedonian conflation of ethnic and geographic.

15. Greek claims usually referred to religion (see Table 1), but they also deployed language on occasion. Language-based claims, however, referred to the language of “commercial relations” and not to home language (Nicolaides 1899, 1–2).

16. See also Brown 1996, which presents evidence from the immigration records of Ellis Island that Macedonian peasants fleeing Ottoman Turkey after the unsuccessful uprising of 1903 identified their nationality as Macedonian. Also, Dimovski 1968 and Andonovski 1985a adduce evidence from an 1893 report by the Serbian consul at Monastir (Bitola) that a group of Macedonians in Kostur (Greek Kastoria) attempted to eliminate both Greek and Bulgarian from the parish school and use Macedonian as the language of instruction. The Greek bishop succeeded in convincing the Turkish governor of Kostur to close both the school and the one church in town that was using the Slavonic liturgy. The matter ended when a Bulgarian representative from Plovdiv convinced the parish council to adopt literary Bulgarian lest they lose both their church and their school to the Greeks.

17. In the 1992 Bulgarian census, 10,800 people claimed Macedonian nationality. In 1997 Bulgarian Prime Minister Petar Stojanov asserted to the European parliament that there is no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria (MILS 21 September 1998). As indicated above, the February 1999 language agreement includes a clause (Article 11) in which the Republic of Macedonia de facto promises not to support the claims of the Pirin Macedonians.

18. It is no coincidence that Zazari, a recent minority language project funded by the European Commission and based in Florina (Macedonian Lerin), is aimed only at Aromanian, Albanian and Romani (Interface No. 35, August 1999, p. 3). This is despite the fact that there is only one Albanian-speaking village in the Florina region (Lehovo) whereas Macedonian continues to thrive even after a century of expulsions and other repressive policies. Similarly, Volume 5 (1996–98) of the Greek journal Ellēnikē Dialektologia, devoted entirely to “bilingual communities of the Greek people” (Oi digýloses ammades tov ellēnikou hōrou)—itself a formulation intended to avoid the acknowledgment of the existence of language-identified minorities—covers all the minority languages of Greece except Macedonian.

19. The wording of the constitution mentions “Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roms and other nationalities,” but Article 35 of the 1994 census law specified the five languages mentioned above as official, together with Macedonian, for the census (see Friedman 1996). Linguistically, there is a distinction between Aromanian and Megleno-Romanian, but for our purposes here they can be treated together as Vlah. See Friedman 1994 for details.

20. The main bundle of isoglosses separating Greg and Tosh in Macedonia runs along the course of the river Drin through the middle of the town of Struga, at the north end of Lake Ohrid. There are also non-contiguous Tosh Albanian dialects spoken in Italy (Arbërësh), related to those of southern Greece (Arvanitika), also dating from the Byzantine period or the beginning of the Ottoman conquest, as well as Albanian-speaking villages elsewhere in
were standardized in 1972" (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline Vol. 5, No. 86, Part II, 4 May 2001). While it is unclear whether this distortion of the adoption of standard Albanian outside of Albania (with the resulting production of textbooks in standard Albanian in former Yugoslavia and the relevant successors) is the fault of Minister Ruka or some journalist, the entire event represents a striking example of the instrumentalization of language in a context with clear extra-linguistic implications.

23. Some Kosovars view the situation as being that of a single standard with two variants (that of Albania and that of Kosovo). In practice the situation in Geg-speaking regions is diglossic—the standard is used in writing and formal contexts, Geg is used informally and colloquially.

24. The form *abër-* is derived from *alban-* (via Greek change of /l/ to /r/ before the consonant and Toks rhotacism of the /nt/) and originally referred to a region in central Albania. The name *shqip*, which is modern Albanian for "Albanian," used in Albania proper and contiguous territory, does not appear until the Ottoman period and appears to derive from an expression meaning "pronounce clearly" (Hamp 1994).


26. These latter actually emigrated from Mandrica in what is today southeastern Bulgaria as a result of the Balkan Wars (Hamp 1965). They were thus originally part of the Albanian diaspora that migrated to Thrace, but the origins of most of that migration are on the same northern Toks territory (see Friedman 1995). A fourth group could be said to comprise the many thousands of post-1989 economic migrants from Albania currently living in Greece and Italy. These do not constitute the same type of long-settled stable communities, however.

27. The precipitous banning of the Muslim veil (*zar* and *feredže*) as part of a secularization campaign of the early 1950s also created significant alienation of some Macedonian-speaking Muslims from the state and increased their sense that Macedonian identity was a Christian identity. The current dispute is thus not a new one (see Friedman 1993, 82–89; Akan 2000, 21 and passim). However, there are also Macedonian Muslim organizations actively encouraging Macedonian Muslim identification with Macedonian language and ethnicity.

28. This situation obtains mainly in the Debar region. In the Kîčevo region, there is a similar shift among Macedonian-speaking Muslims, but in the direction of Albanian. Shifts from Albanian to Macedonian also occur among Albanian-speaking Christians.
29. Section 3 makes no reference to language but rather to “type of education.” The situation thus created is arguably in conflict with Section Two of Article 26, which defines the goals of education (Dembour 1996).

30. A similar attempt to delegitimize Aromanian as a language, albeit different in its motivation, is Lazarou’s (1986) attempt to demonstrate that the Aromanian dialects of Greece are not Romance but rather rellexified Greek. While silly in terms of modern historical linguistic methodology (see Kazazis 1996 for a detailed critique), such work is quite practical for the expansion of Hellenism and Greek nation-building mythology. Such techniques are not limited to Southeastern Europe. The following Reuters item from 5 August 1999 supplied by Greek Helsinki Watch is worth quoting in this context: “Turkey’s parliamentary authorities on Thursday erased a reference to Kurdish as a second language from the official biography of an Islamist MP after far-right MPs objected. MP Mehmet Fuat Firat had listed Kurdish as one of his foreign languages along with Arabic and Persian, but deputies from the ruling coalition complained that Kurdish is not a recognized language in Turkey. The entry was subsequently deleted from Firat’s biography on the parliament’s Internet website. ‘We find it strange that he should try to show that such a language exists when it is not recognized by the Turkish state,’ MHP deputy Mustafa Gul told Reuters. ‘It’s not a language, it’s a dialect, an accent.’ For that reason we applied to the parliamentary speaker to have it corrected,” he said. A Kurdish newspaper protested, meanwhile, about Firat’s having had to list Kurdish as a foreign language where it was in fact his mother tongue. Some 10 million ethnic Kurds live in Turkey but the use of Kurdish was banned until as recently as 1991. There are still legal restrictions on education and broadcasting in Kurdish. The parallels with Greek minority policies are striking. In both Turkey and Greece the claim is made that a given minority language (Kurdish and Macedonian, respectively) does not exist, or it is delegitimized as a mother tongue: So-called Slavophone Greeks, i.e., Macedonians, are sometimes referred to as bilinguals, as if it were impossible to have a mother-tongue other than Greek—see note 18 above), and Macedonian itself is referred to by Greeks as dopika “local [talk]” (sometimes rendered in the local dialect of Macedonian as dopitski), as if it were a dialect of Greek rather than a separate language. There is evidence that similar erasure (see Gal and Irvine 1995, 975–75) of minorities is taking place in Kosovo. In his “Letter from Kosovo #2 [13 July 1999],” American journalist Peter Lippman writes: “In Prizren most of the Albanians speak Turkish as a second, often as a first, language” (http://www.glypx.com/BalkanWitness). Such a statement, of course, raises the issue of the correspondence between language and nationality or ethnic identity (see Franckel 1993; Akan 2000; as well as the discussion later in this article). In 1981 there were more than ten thousand Turks in Prizren and near-by villages (Tanaskovic 1992, 143). While the expulsion of Serbs and Romans from Kosovo since the end of the spring 1999 NATO bombing campaign is well documented in the news, the treatment of Turks has gone unmentioned, but at least some of them fled to Macedonia during the NATO bombing. In Kosovo, even before the break-up of former Yugoslavia, there were complaints in the Turkish-language press that Turks were being treated as third-class citizens because not only was there much less Turkish-language broadcasting than either Albanian or Serbo-Croatian, but most of it was on the third channel, which broadcast at only one kilowatt and could not be heard beyond Pristina. This was as opposed to the first channel broadcasting in Albanian at 1,000 kw or the second, in Serbo-Croatian at 100 kw (Birlik 8/24/89, p. 4; see Friedman 1993).

31. This situation is quite different from that of the Literary Moldavian of the Soviet era (post-Soviet Moldovian), which is based on the same Wallachian dialectal base as standard Romanian rather than being based on the dialects of Moldova (see Dyer 1996). There is also a significant difference from the current differentiation of the former Serbo-Croatian into separate Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian. While dialects of the former Serbo-Croatian are regionally clearly differentiated, they do not follow ethnic lines to any structurally significant degree (see Greenberg 1996), and all three of the currently developing standards historically share the same Eastern Hercegovinian neo-Stokavian dialectal base, albeit one that has been elaborated in different directions.

32. The Muslim Aromanians and Megleno-Romanians of Aegean Macedonia were included among those expelled to Turkey in the compulsory exchange of populations between those two countries after World War I. During the Ottoman period, many urban Christian Vlachs identified as Greeks (the Vlachs did not achieve their own church and thus the status of millet until 1905) and during subsequent upheavals went to Greece and assimilated as Greeks. Vlachs today living in Greece are under the same assimilatory pressures as other non-Greek-speaking orthodox Christians, while among those in Albania some have assimilated as Albanian, some as Greek, while others are asserting their difference (Schwandner-Sievers 1999). The Muslim Vlachs of Dolna Belica in the republic of Macedonia have assimilated to Albanian language and identity.

33. The Vlach dialects of Romani are descended from dialects that were spoken for a significant period of time in Romania and contain a salient proportion of Romanian loanwords as well as certain specific internal developments, such as the use of an unrounded vowel in the 1 SG preterit and the loss of intervocalic /l/ before a high front vowel.

34. The older Aromanian dialectal division is North (Albania)/South
(Greece). Owing to patterns of migration and transhumance, however, this division is realized as an East/West split in the Republic of Macedonia.

35. Given the fact that most Egipčani have Albanian as their first language, one can surmise that the motivation for the recognition was to discourage their registration as Albanians. This surmise is supported by statements in the Macedonian press during the 1991 and 1994 censuses, although it was never explicitly formulated policy. Romani activists have also made public statements insisting that the Egipčani should be counted as Roma (see Friedman 1996; also Duijzings 2000, 132–56).

36. On the cover of Ellēnikē Dialektologia Vol. 5 (see note 8 above), the Turkish dialect of western Thrace is referred to as Μουσουλμανικά Θρακές “Thracian Muslim” rather than Τουρκικά “Turkish.”


38. The examples are legion, but a recent one (as of this writing) occurred in a Chicago Tribune item reproduced by the Euro-Balkan Institute Briefing on the Macedonian Crisis (9 May 2000, ebalkan@yorkos.org.mk). It is worth noting that quite recently both the BBC News service and the ICG (International Crisis Group) have taken cognizance of this issue and altered their usage from Macedonian Slav, Slav[o]-Macedonian, etc., to ethnic Macedonian.


40. See Friedman 1996 for a detailed account of the 1994 Macedonian census.

41. The 1994 census was partially boycotted in the Debar and Župa municipalities, and figures for those two were estimated.

42. While the Albanian claims can be considered moot in the absence of concrete evidence, other accusations leveled at Macedonia in connection with the recent census are just plain false. Thus, for example, Bell (1998, 29) writes: “For its part, the Macedonian republic has not been sympathetic toward its citizens who wish to express a Bulgarian ethnicity; the recently completed census did not find a single Bulgarian in the county.” Nikolov (2000, 229) makes a similarly false claim. While the official figure of 1,448 declared Bulgarians (see Table 3) may be argued over in terms of relative accuracy, there is no way that the publication of this figure can be construed as complete absence. Such misrepresentations, needless to say, increase a sense of insecurity and beleaguerment among Macedonians, making political compromise that much more difficult.

43. The relative stability of the former Serbo-Croatian in this respect is related to various political and demographic factors beyond the scope of this paper.

Figures for other categories (Other, Unknown, etc.) are not reproduced here.

44. This figure represents Serbian and Croatian which were listed as separate languages in the 1994 census.

45. 6426 Bosnians were listed in the column ‘Other’ for mother tongue. Presumably the overwhelming majority declared Bosnian. 7795 Muslims were also in the ‘Other’ column and presumably also listed Bosnian.

46. This figure represents Serbian and Croatian which were listed as separate languages in the 1994 census.

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Makedonski jazik.


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accompanying map in Banu Armănească, no. 1 [15], [1999]: 15–18.


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