latter amounted to the only "precondition" he attached to such talks, but it is a difficult one to surmount in view of Serbian objections.

The positions expressed by Albanian political leaders in Tirana are consistent with those expressed by this Kosovar leader, as well as the more pragmatic unofficial views expressed in Belgrade. They also are consistent with the views of Macedonian government officials and of more pragmatic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political leaders. All these views converge around the idea of negotiating a short-term modus vivendi in Kosovo consisting of some form of autonomy that could be described as "1974 plus." This modus vivendi would permit the conduct of longer-term negotiations over a more lasting solution to the Kosovo question. An interim solution within the framework of the FRY would contribute to reducing tensions in Macedonia. Encouragement and support from the political leadership of Albania for negotiations within the frameworks of the FRY and the existing Macedonian state would make a significant contribution to strengthening the position of ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo and Macedonia who embark on such a strategy and help protect them against the inevitable attacks of more extreme nationalists within their own communities.

--- Appendix A ---

Observing the Observers

Language, Ethnicity, and Power in the 1994 Macedonian Census and Beyond

Victor A. Friedman

In Sarajevo, before the Yugoslav war, there was a museum at one end of the bridge where Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated. Among the displays at this museum was a political cartoon from the period shortly before the outbreak of the Great War. The cartoon shows a disorderly circle of powder kegs, some with long, dangling fuses, others on their sides with gunpowder spilling out. In the center of the circle formed by these powder kegs are a few thin, ill-shaven, dark-mustachioed men in national costumes of the Balkan nations looking around bewildered. Standing outside the circle, eagerly extending lit matches to them, are plump, pale, well-groomed men in the West European formal dress of the Great Powers. Thus was the concept of "Balkan powder keg" understood in former Yugoslavia. There is a certain irony in the image of the Balkans in the center and the Great Powers at the periphery, since in fact precisely the opposite is and has been the case in virtually every sphere of
relations between southeastern Europe and the rest of that continent. And Macedonia became and remains a potential center of conflict because it is on the periphery of all its neighbors, who are themselves on the periphery of Europe. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, national movements in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia all crystallized in such a way that Macedonia was (and is) at the edge of their overlapping claims. One way that conflict has been expressed is through rival census claims.

In comparison to the current position of Albania and Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia is both central and liminal. Unlike Kosovo with its shadow government and parallel education system, Macedonia meets the normal requirements for an independent country, but unlike Albania with its unequivocal international status and membership in the United Nations under its own name, Macedonia does not enjoy the normal recognition of an independent European state insofar as only some countries have recognized it under its own constitutional name, while others use the temporary United Nations term “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).” Kosovo can be viewed as a region where an ethnolinguistic Serbian minority dominates the Albanian majority; Albania is a country ruled by its ethnolinguistic majority. But in Macedonia, which has foreign troops stationed inside its borders (the U.S. and Nordic battalions of the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia), the very legitimacy of the identity of the majority ethnolinguistic group, that is, the Macedonians, is still subjected to equivocation, both purposeful and naive. Moreover, some actors would dispute whether the Macedonians constitute a majority, or even a plurality, in the Republic of Macedonia. Although in many respects the situation of Albanian majorities in both Albania and Kosovo can be viewed as economically or politically worse than the situation of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, it is Macedonia that is arguably the most unstable of the three, the country on which Albanian and Kosovar attention is focused. One expression of the instability in Macedonia is the persistence of conflicting population figures.

CENSUSES: THE POLITICS OF COUNTING

The counting of populations has been potentially fraught with political tension for millennia. The Book of Numbers (1:2-3) describes a census for the purpose of preparing for war, and the census mentioned in the Gospel of Luke (II:1-5) was quite probably connected with Roman efforts at consolidating hegemony in what was then still the kingdom (but later the province) of Judaea. From June 21 until mid-July 1994, under intense internal and external political pressure, an extraordinary census took place in the Republic of Macedonia—the ordinary census having been conducted in 1991, when the republic was still “socialist” and a part of what is now former Yugoslavia. The 1994 census was not funded by the government of the country, as is ordinarily the case with modern censuses in sovereign states, but by international organizations—the Council of Europe (CE), which at that time still refused to admit the Republic of Macedonia, and the European Union (EU), whose policies toward Macedonia have often been dominated by Greece. The extraordinary census of 1994 thus provides an opportunity to view more broadly both the complexity of the Macedonian scene and the role of European mediation. The 1994 Macedonian census raises fundamental issues of which the more recent conflicts such as those over education and language use at the republic level are continuations, and it is thus worthy of a more detailed account as a historical moment around which national and international tensions crystallized. Whatever the developments in Macedonia’s future, the 1994 census is one of the key links in the chain of events leading to it. In this chapter, I examine the 1994 Macedonian census both as an event in itself, and as a part of the larger context of quests for identity and hegemony in the Balkans. In so doing, I hope to shed light not only on specific and general questions connected with the concepts of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity, but also on the relationship of the supranational to the national, of the central to the marginal, and of “Europe” to the land mass west of the Urals and north of the Mediterranean. I suggest that the Western Powers, which to a great extent determine (and fund) the policies of the those actors designated as the international community, have continued to marginalize Macedonia by imposing their own constructs. These efforts have not contributed to the stabilization of Macedonia.

I was working in summer 1994 as a senior policy and political analyst covering Macedonia for the analysis and assessment unit organized by Susan Woodward for Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, attached to the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) stationed in former Yugoslavia. In connection with these duties, I arranged to be authorized as an outside observer of the extraordinary 1994 census in my capacity as a member of an international organization in accordance with article 33 of the census law. Although I was not officially connected with any of the census’ funding organizations, the majority of their representatives
were quite willing to allow me to accompany them on their duties and attend their meetings. As a result, I was able to observe both the process of the census and the European observers who were officially observing it.

Questions of ethnic identity, citizenship, language rights, and the interrelationships of the concepts of language, religion, and “nationality” were hotly contested in Macedonia. The census was therefore a clearly political event rather than the statistical exercise officials claimed it was. And this was not the first time that Macedonian census figures have been the subject of conflict concerning these factors. At the beginning of this century, as at the end, economic and political structures in the Balkans were unstable or in transition, wars were being fought, interethnic tensions were high, and Macedonia was the object of conflicting claims supported in part by conflicting census figures. Table A.1 displays examples of the figures that were used to bolster these claims to Macedonia at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, as Ottoman power waned and the small states of southeastern Europe sought to consolidate and expand their respective hegemonies.

Although Dako in his book significantly entitled *Albania: The Master Key to the Near East* cites similar figures and refers to the obvious discrepancies as “amusing,” these discrepancies are not entirely arbitrary. Rather, at least to some extent, different authors of articles and books making nationalist arguments have selected criteria that would support their points of view.

In the case of Greek and Turkish authors, the choice was based on religion, schooling, or both. Any member of the Greek Orthodox Church, or, after 1870, any Patriarchist, as well as anyone who went to a Greek school (and because schooling was controlled by religion, Macedonian Christians were left with little choice until the mid-nineteenth century) was counted by the Greeks as a Greek. This practice gave rise to expressions such as “slaveophone Greek” and “albanophone Greek.” The complete absence of Albanians from the Greek figures is explained by their being counted as Turks, Greeks, or miscellaneous on the basis of religion (Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic).

Because the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian schools remained relatively weak except in parts of the north and west of Macedonia, Serbian authors selected specific isoglosses, that is, dialect boundaries based on individual linguistic features, to justify ethnic and therefore territorial claims, as illustrated in Table A.2 (see page 86) and Figure A.1 (see page 86).
The 1991 Yugoslav Census in Macedonia

The 1991 Yugoslav Census in Macedonia was a significant event in the history of the country. The census was conducted to gather comprehensive data on the population of Macedonia, including demographic information, which was crucial for planning and policy-making. The results of the census provided insights into the population's distribution, age structure, and other key indicators. The data collected from the census were used to inform various aspects of development, including healthcare, education, and infrastructure planning.

During the census process, data were collected through household visits, and the results were compiled and analyzed to produce reports on the population's characteristics. This information was vital for understanding the socio-economic conditions and informing public policy decisions. The data collected from the census were used to inform various aspects of development, including healthcare, education, and infrastructure planning.

The census findings highlighted the diverse population of Macedonia, with significant variations in the distribution of ethnic groups across the country. These findings underscored the importance of understanding and addressing the needs of different communities to promote social cohesion and economic development.

Overall, the 1991 Yugoslav Census in Macedonia served as a critical tool for understanding the population's structure and dynamics, providing a foundation for informed decision-making and policies aimed at promoting the well-being of the Macedonian people.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECLARED NATIONALITY</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>789,548</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>860,699</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1,000,854</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>1,122,375</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>1,279,323</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>197,380</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>162,524</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>183,108</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>277,871</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>377,208</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>20,042</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>13,148</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>103,522</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>86,591</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>29,311</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>9,668</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>35,112</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>20,478</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>30,002</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>8,928</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9,752</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>10,995</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>29,880</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>29,880</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,152,986</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,300,514</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,506,033</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,647,308</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,909,136</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the percentages of declared nationalities in the Republic of Macedonia for the years 1948, 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991. The data is presented in five columns, each representing a specific year, with the corresponding percentage of each nationality. The nationalities listed are Macedonians, Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Yugoslavs. The total population for each year is shown at the bottom of the table.
population. It gave implicit legitimacy to Albanian claims for special treatment, in addition to legitimizing Albanian politicians’ right to claim discrimination and to demand a recount, as it were. At the same time, the proposals helped reify as a Macedonian-Albanian conflict tensions that had been building since the riots in Kosovo in 1981 but that were not an inherent feature of Macedonian life at all periods.

The 1994 “European” Census in Macedonia

Ahrens’ announcement of November 1992 was followed by nineteen months of uninterrupted dispute. First there was an intense controversy over whether or not to hold the census. This agreed upon, there followed prolonged debate over the wording of the census law, which was eventually passed with the support of the Albanian members of parliament. One of the chief issues was language use in the census, and article 35 of the census law provided for bilingual forms in Albanian, Turkish, Romani, Vlah, and Serbian in addition to Macedonian. Finally, just as the census was actually beginning, there were serious behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Albanian members of parliament, who threatened to call for a boycott, despite the presence of observers from the International Census Observation Mission (ICOM) and the expenses incurred by the European organizations.

The overseers of the census appointed by the European organizations were officially called the Group of Experts. Their fields of expertise, however, did not include knowledge pertaining to Macedonia. Rather they were, for the most part, statisticians and bureaucrats without previous Balkan experience. Many members of the ICOM team, including some of the highest ranking, told me that they were quite surprised when they discovered that they were embroiled in highly charged political issues, as opposed to a mechanical statistical exercise, and they expressed confusion and dismay over the complex ethnic situation they encountered. In view of the origins of the 1994 Macedonian census described above as well as explicit statements by Albanian political actors, the event was clearly linked to a political issue, namely the claim of Albanian politicians for special (minority) status for Albanians within Macedonia based on their large numbers. The Group of Experts, however, attempted to avoid the impression that it was involving itself in the internal political affairs of a sovereign state by publicly declaring that the census was merely a statistical exercise. It can be argued that by labeling the leadership of ICOM the “Group of Experts” while avoiding the direct involvement of anyone familiar with Macedonia, the CE was attempting to lay claim to adjudicating authority in Macedonian internal affairs and at the same time project an image of objectivity.

The lack of knowledge of Macedonia on the part of the CE and ICOM was given symbolic representation in the orientation packet for members of the ICOM team. The only item relating to the country itself rather than ICOM’s mission in it, was a chart listing Cyrillic printed and cursive letters with the names of the letters in Cyrillic and Latin orthography and labeled simply “L’alphabet.” The very lack of a qualifying adjective in a sense erases Macedonian from the observer’s view, and in fact the chart was not a guide to Macedonian Cyrillic, but a table of Russian Cyrillic with the last six letters blanked out. Although the last six letters of Russian Cyrillic do not occur in Macedonian, seven other letters that are used in Macedonian Cyrillic but not in Russian were missing from the chart. To compound the effect, the names of the Russian Cyrillic letters utilize a vowel whose letter comes at the end of the alphabet, so the names of the letters used a symbol that was not given in the list of letters. This chart not only embodied the lack of concern with which the CE and ICOM approached the Macedonian context in which it presumed to operate, but also gave false information to the purveyors of expert knowledge. In focusing on the Albanian question, ICOM lost sight of the Macedonian one.

Similarly, the privileging of Albanian claims over all others was symbolically represented on the ICOM observers’ control forms for censused households. Although the Macedonian control forms had sections for indicating the six ethnic affiliations defined by the languages of the census forms, as did the ICOM control form on enumerators, the ICOM household control form specified only Macedonian and Albanian, the remainder being subsumed under “Others.” The difference in these forms gave written representation to the different conceptions of ICOM and the Macedonian government concerning the purpose of the census.

On the first day of the census, June 21, 1994, I attended a press conference given by Ambassador Ahrens of ICFY, Werner Haug, chairman of the Group of Experts, and Robin Guthrie, director of Social and Economic Affairs, Council of Europe. In addition to insisting to those assembled that the census was a statistical exercise with no political dimension, the expert team focused on Albanian objections to question 6 on form p-1, citizenship, for which the four possible answers were Macedonian, alien, person without citizenship, and pending status
group joked that they should conduct the census like the one 2,000 years ago, when everyone went to his or her native village, a reference to the Gospel of Luke mentioned at the beginning of this paper. The unintended irony of her comment was that this was precisely what the Macedonians would have wanted and what the Albanians would have feared, because an indeterminate number of Albanians had come to Macedonia from Kosovo and elsewhere since World War II, especially since the Kosovo uprising of 1981. The citizenship law set the term of residence at fifteen years, which had the effect of excluding the most recent wave of Albanian immigration. During the debate over this law, Macedonian nationalist politicians advocated a term of thirty years; Albanian politicians pressed for five years. The longer term would have excluded the majority of Albanians who had come to Macedonia from Kosovo.\(^4\) Another member of the team, speaking in French, described how the census was conducted in Turkey, where there was a curfew (in French, couvre-feu), requiring everyone to stay indoors and await the census takers under penalty of a heavy fine. A British member of the team misunderstood the French and thought the Turks burned villages during their census. In both the joke and the misunderstanding, the Balkans in general and Macedonia in particular emerge as a primitive “other,” backward or barbaric.

It was at the beginning of another meeting between the Group of Experts and Albanian political leaders the following morning that I asked Ambassador Ahrens if it might not be the case that ethnic tensions were in fact exacerbated by internationalizing Albanian claims in Macedonia via the CE/ICFY-sponsored census.\(^4\) Dr. Ahrens responded that he thought the international intervention was beneficial and cited as evidence the fact that as soon as the CE agreed to fund the census, Albanian claims dropped immediately from 40 percent to 30 percent. Indeed, during the negotiations that I attended, at which Albanian politicians were expressing particular misgivings over the issue of citizenship, the figure they cited as the minimum below which they would claim falsification was 25 percent. I should note that even before the first results were released, the percentage claimed had jumped, and after the first results were published, and despite ICOM approval, the figure 40 percent was again being cited (Albanian prime minister Alexander Meksi, for example, reportedly cited the figure 800,000).\(^5\)

At times ICOM approached the Macedonian government with a seriously distrustful, almost adversarial attitude. Because the 1994 census was being conducted as a result of the Albanian boycott of the 1991
census, there was a tendency at ICOM to view Albanian claims as based in fact rather than raising an unresolved question. Thus ICOM sometimes viewed the Macedonian government as guilty unless proven innocent. Censuses conducted by sovereign states are not normally overseen by other organizations, while censuses in colonies are supervised by their colonial rulers. The fact that the 1994 census in the Republic of Macedonia was conducted under pressure from and with funding from external organizations put the country in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, the external funding and oversight by individuals who were not citizens of Macedonia put the country in a position similar to that of a nonsovereign entity. On the other hand, Macedonia was treated as a sovereign state engaged in discriminatory behavior. The following incident shows how ICOM's lack of preparation combined with its tendency to view the Macedonian government with distrust led to incorrect judgments. In July 1 was approached by ICOM members who informed me that the government was discriminating against Muslims by not listing them as Bosniacs (Bosnjaci) or by not giving their language as Serbo-Croatian. These ICOM members had been in contact with Bosniac political activists who had tried to convince them that all Slavic Muslims in Macedonia are Serbo-Croatian-speaking, Bosniac, or both. When I responded that there was a significant number of Macedonian-speaking Muslims—popularly known as Torbeš, although they prefer to be called Muslimani—who do not speak Serbo-Croatian and who do not identify as Bosniac, the ICOM reaction was a combination of surprise and skepticism. In the end they came to understand that the situation was indeed as I had explained it to them, but the very fact that such a misunderstanding could arise demonstrates not only the distrust toward the Macedonians with which the European experts approached the census but also their difficulty in distinguishing information from misinformation disseminated by some ethnopolitical actors.

Macedonian Muslims often live in underdeveloped, neglected, and isolated areas, such as the municipalities of Debar and Kičevo, where there is no ethnic absolute majority. They have therefore been vulnerable to manipulation by Albanian and Turkish politicians who have convinced some of them that they are Slavicized Albanians or Turks rather than Islamicized Slavs and that they could therefore rely more on Turkish or Albanian political parties to support their economic interests, because in economies of shortage such interests tend to fragment along ethnic lines. The emphasis of Macedonian nationalist politicians on the connection between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and

Macedonian nationality has further alienated some Macedonian Muslims. Census attempts in Macedonian-speaking Muslim villages ran into cases where a monolingual Macedonian Muslim family would demand a bilingual Albanian or Turkish form with an interpreter but then have to have the Albanian or Turkish translated into Macedonian. These incidents were part of a larger pattern of conscious language shift based on religion, such as the incident in the monolingual Macedonian Muslim village of Bačiče (Kičevo municipality), where parents demanded an Albanian school for their children.

A general problem with the 1994 Macedonian census, as with other European censuses, was the definition of the categories “mother tongue” and “nationality” (the ICOM control forms used “ethnic affiliation” and “national affiliation” interchangeably). The concepts of ethnicity, nationality, language, and religion have a complex history of interrelationships in Macedonia, one whose complexity continues today. Thus, for example, some Muslim speakers of Macedonian declare their nationality as Albanian or Turkish on the basis of identifying their religion with Turkish or Albanian ethnicity. Similarly, some Christian speakers of Albanian declare their nationality as Macedonian by equating Macedonian Orthodox Christianity with Macedonian ethnicity. As might be expected, Albanian ethnopoliticians insist that Macedonian-identified Albanian-speakers are Albanians, while Macedonians insist that Albanian-identified Macedonian speakers are Macedonians. There was also the citizenship-based category Yugoslav, which until 1991 was steadily growing in popularity among both Slavs and non-Slavs. Now that Macedonia is no longer part of Yugoslavia, however, this category has ceased to be valid for most people, because it refers to another country.

At least some ICOM observers were unaware of the difference between Serbo-Croatian and Macedonian when they arrived to observe the census, as reflected in their questions to me. When they finally grasped that the difference was a linguistic one, they concluded that language was therefore the basis of nationality. While language and ethnic or national affiliation coincide to a certain extent in Macedonia, such is clearly not always the case, as can be seen not only from such categories as “Muslim” but also from Table A.4 (see page 98), which gives statistics for the correspondence between declared nationality and declared mother tongue for the 1953 and 1981 censuses (figures for 1994 have not yet been processed).

By attempting to impose a West European construct equating language with nationality (and nationality with statehood), ICOM helped
force on people the kind of choices that have led to the current conflict. Moreover, the composition of the census form, which required respondents to declare a single mother tongue, effectively erased the multilingualism that has characterized the Balkans for centuries—if not millennia—and that is still a significant feature of Macedonian life in some areas.\footnote{31}

Lability of identity has long been a feature of life in Macedonia. The oldest generation from Western Macedonia remembers when Christians and Muslims would live under the same roof as part of the same extended family. Before the Mürșteg agreement of October 2–3, 1903, only Muslims could serve as gendarmes, and such officials had significant power at the local level.\footnote{32} In Christian families, therefore, it was not uncommon for one brother to convert to Islam in order to be in a position to protect the entire family. Everyone ate at a common table, and if, for example, pork were available and a zelnik (pie) was made, the women of the house would put pork in only half the pita and both the Christian and Muslim sides of the family would eat from the same pan. Marriages have always been freely contracted across religious lines but across linguistic ones. The children of such “mixed” marriages would grow up bilingual or multilingual. In recent times, when faced with the necessity of choosing a nationality, choices can follow gender lines; for example, if a Turkish man marries an Albanian woman, the sons may be Turks and the daughters Albanian, while in other families the choice may be for one son to be Albanian and one to be Turkish. The European concept of nationality, equating ethnicity with language with state, does not correspond to the complex realities of Macedonia (nor of many, perhaps most, other countries), and by focusing on “nationality” to the exclusion of other characteristics we get contradictory situations such as those of parents insisting that their children be schooled in a language that they do not know despite the fact that the primary justification for multilingual education at the elementary level is that children learn best when taught in their mother tongue.\footnote{33}

The politicization of the language issue and its confusion with nationality in the 1994 census was highlighted in several incidents that occurred in Albanian-speaking villages in southwestern Macedonia, where citizens objected because some of the Albanian-speaking enumerated were not ethnic Albanians but rather Roms (Gypsies), Gëpci (“Egyptians”), or Vlhls.\footnote{34} Since most Gëpci in southwestern Macedonia have Albanian as their first language, and many Roms and Vlhls are fluent in it—especially in southwestern Macedonia—the issue clearly was not a question of the right to register in one's mother tongue, but rather a demand for an ethnic Albanian, that is, an instance of ethnic paranoia.
The events leading up to the boycott of the 1991 census, the imposition of the 1994 census, and subsequent developments show a pattern of manipulation and fragmentation of ethnic and linguistic identities utilizing legitimate grievances to benefit certain types of political elites. At the time of the census, my assessment was that it would prove a statistical success but a political failure. Insofar as it has not resulted in any significant changes in the figures—both official and purported—according to which ethnically based political relations are determined, this prediction has held true. The ICOM final report, while not uncritical, affirmed that the census was carried out according to "European" or "international" standards. It has been refuted by the Albanian political actors who brought it about, but at the same time they have generally continued to try to work within the existing governmental framework. In January 1995, the constitutional court ruled that article 35 of the census law, which governed language use, was unconstitutional, that is, contrary to article 7, which declares Macedonian the official language and guarantees (or restricts) official minority language use at (or to) the local level. Thus the census law solved nothing in this respect, and when I returned to Macedonia in December 1995 as part of the fact-finding mission for the South Balkans Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action, the question of language use at the federal level was still the focus of significant political tension.

**After the Census Is Over**

If one of the purposes of the externally sponsored census was either to legitimize or to silence Albanian claims and thereby promote in one way or another greater stability in Macedonian society, the presence of European mediators in the ongoing dispute is not necessarily serving to promote stabilization. In an editorial published by the outspoken, albeit government-dependent, weekly Puls more than half a year after the census ended, Ambassador Ahrens is cited in the following terms:

Arens [sic] developed a thesis of a parallel existence instead of a common existence between ethnic groups in Macedonia, particularly between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. According to Arens, "there never was a true coexistence," but nationalities in Macedonia "have always led parallel lives." He said he had the feeling that he probably knows more about Albanian history and culture than the average Macedonian. Also, he had the impression that nationalities had aversions to one another. He backed this claim by the fact that there are no mixed marriages, and there are ethnic tensions in both public and private communication, especially between Macedonians and Albanians.56

This is a significant departure from Dr. Ahrens' admonishment to Albanian politicians at the beginning of the census, when they were still threatening a boycott. At that time, he told them they were in the same boat with the Macedonians, and that if they—the 'Albanians—rocked the boat, they would all drown. My own experience with journalists has sensitized me to the fact that what appears in the press is not always what was actually said, but regardless of its accuracy, the statement itself is an exemplary instance of a present construction being projected onto the past. It imposes a view of Macedonian reality that at the same time serves the interest of the local political elite that gives a diplomat his international legitimacy and promotes a version of the history of Macedonia that is at variance with concrete evidence—for example, the assistant minister of education is the son of an Albanian father and a Macedonian mother, the prime minister's brother-in-law is a Turk, a Macedonian friend of mine who used to work in the government has an Albanian wife—but also helps to reify modern ethnic conflicts.

In a slightly broader context, Todorova57 also projects the present onto the past, albeit for quite different reasons, when she attempts to define the term "Balkanism" only as "politically and ethnically fragmented" or, citing Bercovici, "Austro-Hungarian political policy relating to the Balkans."58 There is, however, a widely accepted meaning of the term "Balkanism" that is precisely the opposite of fragmented. In linguistics, a Balkanism is a feature shared among the unrelated or only distantly related languages of the Balkans. The grammatical structures of the Balkan languages attest to centuries of multilingualism and interethnic contact at the most intimate levels. Some features shared by Balkan Slavic, Balkan Romance, Albanian, Greek, and even some Balkan Turkish dialects result from people speaking each others' languages.59 During the 1994 census, Debar proved to be the most intractable commune (for reasons relating more to competition between the periphery and the center than between ethnicities), and in the end it was the only commune in which the census was not completed. And yet, the Albanian and Macedonian dialects of Debar provide a striking example of phonological similarity that results from centuries of bilingualism.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission that was stationed in Skopje in December 1995 provided other examples of the need for outside observers to be better informed. I encountered among members of the mission the misconception that Macedonian is a "really a Bulgarian dialect," an attitude that displays a remarkable insensitivity to the milieu in which they were supposed to operate as mediators. I was particularly curious about an incident that had occurred in the village of Ognjanci. At the time of the census, I made the following observation concerning that village in my notes: "A mixed village (Macedonians, Turks, Albanians, Roma). It was reported that interethnic relations are excellent and everyone cooperated happily with the census." And yet a little more than a year later the following news item appeared:

Yesterday in the Skopje village Ognjanci, a group of citizens of Macedonian and Serbian nationality tried to prevent the entrance in the school to 40 children of Albanian nationality. There was no incident because the police without using force dispersed the gathered people. The Ministry for Education has decided to include the teaching on the Albanian language for the Albanian children in the same school. Those protesting think that the school was built by them, and will not allow their children to learn in combined classes with children from different grades. They offer a solution—the children of Albanian nationality to continue their education in the former barracks in the village, until the Ministry reconsiders its own decision and finally decides who the school building will be given to. Minister of Education, Emilija Simoska, for the Macedonian TV stated the Ministry does not intend to succumb to any kind of formal pressure and unless there is some disturbances among local people, assistance from Ministry of Interior will be asked. [sic]

The OSCE had involved itself in the affair, which had been resolved peacefully. But when I inquired of one of the mission’s members how it was that interethnic relations had deteriorated so significantly in so short a time, my informant responded: "Maybe they were Serbs. We never found out. All we care about is human rights, and then we move on."

This same member of the OSCE mission told me of their experience in Debarska Župa, where Macedonian-speaking Muslim parents have recently been demanding Turkish-language schools for their children (recall the incident in Bačiše cited above). The OSCE observer informed me that they had met the Turkish teacher who called on children “randomly” to demonstrate how well they spoke Turkish. The observer also told me that the grandparents spoke Turkish, implying that the parents were seeking to return the children to their roots. I asked the observer if they had spoken with any of the families. The observer responded that they did not visit any homes and did not care what the home language actually was. Parents have the human right to choose the language of the children’s school even if the decision handicaps the children by requiring them to begin school in a language they do not know. The circumstances that lead to such a situation and the resolution of the deeper causes of the problems it represents were explicitly of no interest. As with the ICOM observers, so, too, the OSCE mission does not appear to be prepared to address the complexities of the specific context in which it finds itself.

**Statistical Success, Political Failure: “Europe,” the International Community, and the Future of the Balkans**

The 1994 census highlighted, among other things, the ambiguity of the term Europe. Geographically, it refers to a continent bounded by the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the southern slopes of the Caucasus and the western slopes of the Urals. Politically or culturally, however, the term “Europe” often still has the meaning of “Western Europe” or “Europe of the Great Powers.” Thus, for example, the most powerful political unit on the continent calls itself the European Union, although only Western European nations plus Greece are included in it. It is no coincidence that Greece has embarked on a vigorous internal propaganda campaign stressing its membership in this Europe. The exclusion of the southeastern peninsula of geographical Europe from what can be called political Europe is well known in the Balkans. The sense of alienation generated thereby was eloquently expressed by the Bulgarian author and journalist Aleko Konstantinov at the end of a vignette in his famous work Baj Ganjo, which satirizes the adventures of a Bulgarian rose-oil merchant in the Western Europe of his day and subsequently in then newly liberated Bulgaria. In the penultimate sentence of the story Baj Ganjo žurnalista ("Baj Ganjo as a Journalist"), Konstantinov writes, "Europezi sme nij, a na vse ne sme dotakniti" ("We’re Europeans—but still not quite!"). I heard a comparable use of the term “Europe” during the 1994 census, when an ethnic Albanian politician
brought me with him into a restricted building, explaining to the guard (in Macedonian): "Toj e od Evropa" ("He is from Europe"). My companion knew that I was an American and an employee of UNPROFOR, but he identified me as od Evropa because my role at that moment was that of a privileged Western outsider, just like a member of ICOM. Insofar as international European organizations succeeded in pressuring Macedonia into conducting a census that they funded and observed, it can be argued that political Europe was exerting authority in geographical Europe’s southeastern periphery and particularly in Macedonia as a periphery of peripheries.67

This Europe was utilized by both Albanian and Macedonian political actors to further their particular goals. The Albanian politicians mobilized quite legitimate social and political grievances based on very real discrimination against ethnic Albanian citizens of Macedonia, ranging from censorship and restriction of language and property rights to firings and jail sentences—especially since 1981—to further their own careers and demands for autonomy, federalization, and ultimately irredentism.68 Macedonian statisticians and politicians were faced with a choice between an externally imposed census or further destabilization caused by a loss of legitimacy in an international community that was at that time permitting Macedonia’s economic strangulation while continuing to prevent the full realization of its sovereignty; they chose the census. But they then imposed their own condition, namely that the funding be sufficient to cover not merely the nationality question, which was the only one Europe sought to resolve and the only one that Albanian ethnopoliticians could use to legitimate their claims on the international scene, but also all those features of the Macedonian economy (such as agricultural property and land use) that form part of a complete census but that had been omitted from the 1991 census because of insufficient funding resulting from the economic crisis.

The 1994 census was in sum a statistical success but a political failure. Although it legitimated the basic statistics of the 1991 census, it did nothing to resolve the issues of political hegemony and access to resources that continue to plague Macedonia. It did, however, help to reify a conflict whose roots in Macedonian history are not as deep as some political actors would pretend. In seeking to impose a vision of nationality that does not correspond to Macedonia’s complex cultural context, political Europe reproduced its vision of Balkan “otherness” and marginality in Macedonia more than it contributed to its stabilization.

The continued presence of various international organizations and actors in Macedonia and the ongoing tensions in the region raise the question of how the current Balkan crisis can best be resolved. Hayden in his review of Woodward makes the point that scholars specializing in southeastern Europe—one can add many of them trained with the help of U.S. federal education grants designated specifically for the creation of a cadre of area specialists—were not consulted when U.S. government policies concerning the former Yugoslavia were discussed and adopted.69 The activities of international organizations illustrated in the foregoing exposition reveal a similar exclusion of regional expertise. If the future is to be different from the past, a closer cooperation between scholars and political actors is one way to promote the kind of understanding that could lead to stability.


5. Two sources represent authoritative interpretations of the constitutional order established in 1974. One is the 1975 edition of the text on constitutional law by Yugoslavia's long-time leading expert, Jovana Djordjevic, Ustavno Pravo (Belgrade: Suvremena Administracija, 1975). The other is a volume of article-by-article explanation and commentary prepared by a group of 15 authors, eight of whom participated directly in drafting the constitution itself: Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: Sistem i objašnjenje (Belgrade: Privredni Preslag, 1975). These texts make clear the formal subordination of the provinces to Serbia. For an examination of the status of the provinces vis-à-vis the republics in federal decision-making processes, see Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

6. Strong statements of the various dimensions of the Kosovar claim are to be found in a publication distributed to the delegation by the LDK during our visit; see Gazemel Zajmi, Dimensions of the Question of Kosovo in the Balkans (Pristina, 1994).

7. The governing coalition in Macedonia and the composition of the council of ministers, has changed since the delegation's visit. This report refers to individual ministers serving at the time of our visit, in December 1995.

8. The minister's translator rendered the Macedonian "neguva" as "cherish," in which case this statement would read "cherish the culture." In the context of the minister's remarks, however, "neguva" is more accurately translated as "preserve."

9. July 1995 draft, provided to the delegation by the ministry.

10. "Mark-News" electronic mail edition (February 12, 1996). The MVD posts include the ministers of the economy, economic development, labor and social policy, science, and one minister without portfolio.

11. See Petrovic, Pita Su Albancu, for examples of differing attitudes toward this option.

1. This section was written by Victor A. Friedman and represents his views solely.

Author's note: This paper is an expanded and updated version of an earlier work that appeared as Woodrow Wilson Center Occasional Paper 44 under the title "Populations and Powder Kegs: The Macedonian Census of 1994 in Historical Perspective." I wish to thank Dr. John Lampe of the Woodrow Wilson Center for his helpful comments on that version of the paper. I am grateful to Dr. Svetlana Antonovska, director of the Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Macedonia, who has been unfailingly generous with her time and with documentation. I also wish to thank Ms. Jelka Markovska of the same bureau, who kindly expedited my certification as a census observer. To all the other workers at the bureau of statistics as well as to Risto Ivanov, head of the census commission, my sincere thanks for their time and efforts. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Janusz Smajler, deputy chief of civil affairs at United Nations Protection Forces headquarters in Skopje, who was unfailingly supportive of my mission at UNPROFOR (the Macedonian branch of which is now UNPREDEP) and who was instrumental in my contacting key actors in the 1994 Macedonian census. To the local staff and to the military side of UNPROFOR, as well as to Mark Penn, Elizabeth Baldwin, Tiki Salvado, Sandra Marchesa, Angel, Sasho, Sonja, Sonja, and Tina on the civil affairs side, my sincere thanks for their support. I am extraordinarily grateful to Dr. Susan Woodward of the Brookings Institution, who, as head of the Analysis and Assessment Unit for the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, attached to UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia, invited me to join her team during the summer of 1994 as a senior policy and political analyst. Without her invitation this paper could never have been written. Both she and Prof. Susan Gal of the University of Chicago, as well as Dr. Jinnie Leacherman of the University of Notre Dame, read earlier versions of this paper, and I am grateful for their comments and encouragement. I am similarly grateful to Prof. Steven L. Burg of Brandeis University for his helpful comments on the present version of the paper. I also wish to thank those members of the International Commission on Former Yugoslavia, the International Census Observation Mission, and the Group of Experts who kindly permitted me to attend some of their meetings in my capacity as an analyst for UNPROFOR. I am also grateful to the many Macedonian and Albanian politicians and activists who kindly consented to meet with me, as well as to the many other citizens of the Republic of Macedonia of all nationalities who showed me unfailing courtesy and warm hospitality. I wish to express a special debt of gratitude to the Ministry for Information of the Republic of Macedonia, which for more than twenty years has supported my research by supplying me with newspapers, magazines, journals, and books. Research for this publication was supported in part by a grant from the International Researches and Exchanges...
Board, with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, which enabled me to return to Skopje in May 1995. Additional material was gathered when I was a member of the December 1995 fact-finding mission of the South Balkans Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations. None of these organizations or individuals is responsible for the views expressed. The opinions and analyses expressed in this article are entirely my own and do not represent those of any of the organizations and individuals named or mentioned above. Any responsibility for error is mine.

2. For an example of a Great Power view of the causes of World War I that bears striking resemblance to some modern attempts to lay the entire blame for the collapse of Yugoslavia at a single doorstep, see Edith Durham, The Serajevo Crime (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925). See also Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention," Slavic Review 53 (1994), p. 460, on recent attempts to resuscitate the myth of Balkan responsibility for World War I.

3. Throughout this paper, the term "Macedonia" will be used in both its geographical and political senses depending on the relevant time period. For the time period up to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, "Macedonia" refers to the geographic region defined by Mount Olympus, the Pindus range, Mount Sar, Mount Rila, the western Rhodopes, and the river Mesta (Greek Nestos). After 1913, unmodified "Macedonia" refers to the part of geographic Macedonia that was given to Serbia by the Treaty of Bucharest and that, with a few border adjustments resulting from subsequent treaties and administrative acts, ultimately became the Republic of Macedonia in 1991. Other parts of geographic Macedonia for the period after 1913 are referred to with additional modifiers, such as Greek (Aegean) Macedonia, Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, Golo Brdo and Lower Prespa (Albanian Macedonia).

4. Although the veracity of the 1989 Albanian census figures on minorities has been questioned—the census officially registered about 5,000 Macedonians, for example, while sources in Macedonia insisted the number was twenty to thirty times greater (Novo Makedonija, February 2, 1990)—it is generally acknowledged that Albanians constitute the majority in Albania.

5. For an objective and scholarly discussion of the linguistic issues by an American expert in Slavic linguistics, see Horace Lunt, "Some Sociolinguistic Aspects of Macedonian and Bulgarian," in B. Stoil, I. Titunik, and L. Dalezel, eds., Language and Literary Theory: In Honor of Ladislav Matejka (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1984), pp. 83–132; Robert D. Kaplan, "History's Cauldron," The Atlantic Monthly (June 1991), p. 103; Hugh Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 116; and Misha Glenny, "The Birth of a Nation" (review of Poulton), The New York Review of Books (November 16, 1995), p. 24 all fail to grasp the significance of this type of equivocation. Thus, for example, Poulton on page 116 privileges Bulgarian attempts to claim Macedonian as a dialect of Bulgarian by uncritically citing as a "comprehensive refutation" of Macedonian "as a language distinct from Bulgarian" a Bulgarian work first published as an article in the first number of the journal Bulgarski zvuk in 1978. Lunt characterizes that work as "incompetent in terms of linguistic theory, and resting on a poorly organized series of propositions and claims, many of them dubious, exaggerated or false," pp. 87–88. Unfortunately, Poulton fails to cite that response. Similarly, Glenny writes: "primarily, Bulgarian has a definite article and no case declension (unlike all other Slav languages until the Macedonians codified their Bulgarian dialect into a new language)" (p. 24). Aside from the facts that the sharing of two grammatical features is hardly justification for classifying one language as a dialect of another and that these two particular features are shared with the southern Serbian dialects, describing Macedonian as a Bulgarian dialect is like describing Norwegian as a Danish dialect. See Einar Haugen, "The Scandinavian Languages as Cultural Artifacts," in Joshua Fishman, Charles Ferguson, and J. Das Gupta, eds., Language Problems of Developing Nations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968). See also Horace Lunt, "On Macedonian Language and Nationalism," Slavic Review 45, no. 4 (1986), pp. 729–34.


7. Although U.S. officials reportedly supported the extraordinary census in their private discussions with Macedonian leaders, there was no public U.S. support or participation. The census was essentially a "European" event taking place on Macedonian territory.


9. It is significant that, while claiming factors other than language as the determiners of nationality, every Greek government has prohibited education in the languages of Greek Orthodox Christians other than Greek. That is because language can function as the determiner of nationality or as a pathway to altered ethnic self-identification, although it does not always do so. It is likewise significant that the Greek-speaking minority of Albania is never referred to as "hellenophone Albanians."


11. Similarities in folklore and folk traditions were also invoked to support Serbian claims.


15. Vaillant mentions, for instance, the fate of the jers (short i and u) and jases (nasal e and ë), foi, and vocalic ë and notes that vestiges of /o/ in the
TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

The principal difference was that Albanians had sufficient national consciousness and political organization to lay claim successfully to a part of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in which they constituted a majority, while the Macedonians were left completely out of these processes. Although the Romanian government showed some interest in supporting Vlah claims, especially after the establishment of the Vlah Church (and therefore millet) in 1905, the Romanians were too far away and the Vlahs too few in number and not particularly strong in national consciousness. Those in the towns were mainly Greek-identified merchants while the transhumant shepherds of the countryside were hardly in a position to organize. Compare Keith Brown, Of Meanings and Memories: The National Imagination in Macedonia (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1995).

20. See, for example, the map by Čupovski, in Ilja Petruševski, Macedonia on Old Maps (Skopje: Detska Radost, 1992), p. 83, or Čirči Pulèvski’s statement on Macedonian national consciousness in Rečnik od Tri Jezika (Belgrad: Državna štampaštia, 1875), pp. 48–49. Also see Kreško P. Misirkov’s formulation of Macedonian language and statehood in Za Makedonskite Raboti (Sofija: Liberalni Klub, 1903), p. 71; the correspondence concerning the Kostur (Greek Kastoria) school of 1892, in Hristo Andonovski, “Makedonštiska dvijeńe vo Kosturo,” Makedonija 22, no. 387 (1985), p. 26; and Allen Upward’s account of his trip to Voden (Greek Polihsa) in The End of Europe (London: John Murray, 1988). Upward writes of an interview he conducted in a village two hours ride from Voden: “I asked what language they spoke and my Greek interpreter carelessly rendered the answer ‘Bulgarian.’ The man himself had said ‘Makedonski!’ I drew attention to this, and the witness explained that he did not consider the rural dialect used in Macedonia the same as Bulgarian, and refused to call it by that name. It was Macedonian, a word to which he gave the Slav [sic] form of Makedonski.” Upward continues: “The Exarchist claimed that his party had sixty or seventy houses in the village; the Patriarchist had awarded him fifteen or twenty” (pp. 204–205).


23. See Kănicev, Makedonija, pp. 210–14, for figures from the end of the last century.


25. A PPD campaign poster from the 1994 Macedonian elections gives symbolic representation to the PPD attempt to appeal to its Albanian constituency and the European actors who have played such a significant role in supporting
its claims. The poster’s slogan is in Albanian, English, and French. The poster thus erases both Macedonian and the other minority languages of Macedonia, while attempting to portray the party as oriented toward “Europe” (see the discussion of the term “Europe” at the end of this article).


27. Ibid.

28. The large variations in percentages are attributable not only to immigration and emigration, but also to sociopolitically motivated changes in choices in declaring identity. See Susan Oak, “Diversity and Contestation in Linguistic Ideologies: German Speakers in Hungary,” Language in Society 22 (1993), pp. 337–59; and Darko Tarasović, “The Planning of Turkish as a Minority Language in Yugoslavia,” in Ranko Bugarski and Celia Hawkesworth, eds., Language Planning in Yugoslavia (Columbus: Slavica, 1992), p. 143. The history and specifics of these phenomena are beyond the scope of this paper and deserve separate monographic treatment. My purpose in calling attention to them here is to emphasize that shifts in demography and shifts in identity are independent phenomena.

29. “Egyptians,” in Macedonian “Čupei,” “Eqipci,” or “Eqipkani” (also “Guptin”), are descended from Roma but do not speak Roman and do not identify themselves as Roma. The ethnonym themselves are cognate with English “Gypsy,” which is derived from the claim or belief that the Roma people come from Egypt. The majority of Eqipkani live in Ohrid and Struga and speak Albanian, while those of Bitola speak Macedonian. Some Eqipkani attempted to register as a separate ethnic group in the 1981 census, but they were listed as “unknown” (Subota, March 6, 1982). The Eqipkani claim to be descended from Egyptians, but there is no concrete evidence to support this claim. A more likely explanation is that they settled at a very early date and assimilated linguistically but not ethnically with non-Roma speakers and maintained ethnic separateness from Roma-speakers who were nomadic or became sedentarized at a later date. See Victor Friedman, “Problems in the Codification of a Standard Romani Literary Language,” Papers from the Fourth and Fifth Annual Meetings: Gypsy Lore Society, North American Chapter, 1985, pp. 56–75; Ger Duizjins, “The Making of the Egyptians in Kosovo and Macedonia,” in Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, forthcoming); Ian Hancock, A Handbook of Vlax Romani (Columbus: Slavica, 1995), p. 17; Miroljub Hadži-Ristić, “Praisamja na etnogenezata na Eqipkani vo Makedonija,” Nova Makedonija, September 13, 1994, p. 16; September 14, 1994, p. 16; September 15, 1994, p. 15; September 16, 1994, p. 22; September 17, 1994, p. 9; and Islam Ahidoramanski, “Veštica delbi na Roman,” Nova Makedonija, October 30, 1994, p. 7. The category “Romine” refers to Serbo-Croatian-speaking Muslims.


34. Niyazi Limanovski, head of the Association of Macedonian Muslims, came out against the census. Bekir Zhuta, a PDI minister in parliament and Albanian from Struga, stated that there was no need for help from outside. Radical Albanians accused both men of trying to divide and conquer, although Zhuta did serve as his party’s spokesman in declaring the census invalid after the preliminary results were published; see MILS, April 13, 1994, and MILS, November 18, 1994.

35. Article 7 of the Macedonian constitution reads: “The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language in the Republic of Macedonia. In the units of local self-government where the majority of the inhabitants belong to a nationality, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in a manner determined by law. In the units of local self-government where there is a considerable number of inhabitants belonging to a nationality, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, under conditions and in a manner determined by law.” The nationalities named are Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, and Roma, in that order. Serbs object to the fact that they are not specifically named but are subsumed under the expression “other nationalities.” When the census law was being debated, Macedonian nationalists argued that the census forms should be only in Macedonian, since the census was being conducted at the national, not the local, level. In the end, however, bilingual forms were used for all five principal minority languages (but see the discussion later in this paper).


37. The two exceptions were Greek historians from the Institute of Balkan Studies at Thessaloniki. According to information supplied to me by a member of the Group of Experts, there was originally one Greek appointed to the observation team, but the weekend before the team left for Macedonia, while the chief of the statistical bureau of the Council of Europe was away, the vice-chief, who was Greek, added another Greek to the team without the required approval of his superior. The Macedonian government granted both Greeks visas without demur. At the time Macedonia was under a Greek economic blockade, and holders of Macedonian passports could not enter Greece. Moreover, as indicated above, the official Greek position denies the existence of a Macedonian minority on its own territory (Human Rights Watch/Ishinik Report, The Macedonians of Greece, p. 11). The International Census Observation
Mission (ICOM) thus placed the Macedonian government in the position of granting privileges to citizens of a country that refused to do the same for Macedonians.


39. Significant lack of objectivity, however, was ascribed by Macedonian officials to a high-ranking member of the ICOM team who bore substantial responsibility for organizing the mission’s work. She was perceived as being particularly difficult—even nasty. It is a measure of the tensions inherent in the situation that Macedonian officials speculated that this individual’s peculiar behavior was because she was of Albanian descent, a rumor that I was unable to verify. The behavior of this individual that I observed myself led me to understand why Macedonian officials regarded her as a source, or at least an active supporter, of the adversarial attitude described later in this paper.

40. There are also two other Russian letters that do not occur in Macedonian.

41. In addition to the household forms filled out by the enumerators on the basis of answers given by those being interviewed, both enumerators and ICOM observers filled out supplementary, or “control,” forms for the purposes of statistical verification and enumerating household members.

42. See Gal, “Diversity and Confrontation in Linguistic Ideologies,” p. 345, on abuses of the 1941 Hungarian census during the postwar period, when the 1941 census data, which was supposed to be confidential, was used to deport not only Germans in Hungary who had openly worked for the Nazis, but also anyone who had claimed German nationality and, later, anyone who had claimed German as their mother tongue. The 1994 Macedonian census was officially one of residents, not citizens.

43. There is a certain irony in the fact that some member countries of the European Union, such as Germany, have citizenship laws that are considerably more exclusionary than the Macedonian one.

44. That same day, June 22, 1995, an article appeared in Nova Makedonija asserting that international attention had exacerbated ethnic tension.

45. MILS, April 13, 1995. The pomelic over figures also continued during the course of the census itself. An article in the Skopje-based Albanian-language daily newspaper Plaka e vëlëzërimit, July 11, 1994, entitled “Over 8,000 Albanians,” reported that one of the municipal instructors in Bitola claimed this figure for that municipality. “Any other figure connected with the number of Albanians given by the Bureau of Statistics will be declared a falsification. . . . I have no informed all communal, republic and international bodies” (my translation). This figure continued to be cited in the Albanian-language media even though the data had not yet been processed. The official preliminary figure for Albanians in the municipality of Bitola was 3,970. See Svetlana Antonovska and others, Popis '94: Podataka za seguisnost i ihsanila. Prvi rezultati, Sospitene 1, Sospitene 2 (Skopje: Republikicki Zavod za statistiku, 1994).


47. The precipitous banning of the Muslim veil (zor i fereze) in the early 1950s also created significant alienation of some Macedonian-speaking Muslims from the state and increased their sense that Macedonian identity was a Christian identity. The current dispute is thus not a new one; see Victor Friedman, “Language Policy and Language Behavior in Macedonian: Background and Current Events,” in Erna Franckel and Christina Kramer, eds., Language Contact, Language Conflict (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 88–89. However, there are also Macedonian Muslim organizations actively encouraging Macedonian Muslim identification with Macedonian language and ethnicity.


49. An example of how “national” feelings in Macedonia are more complex than portrayed by ethno-political or international organizations is the Serbian husband of a Macedonian who, unknown to his wife, had always declared himself a Yugoslav in national censuses. He went through a great personal crisis in connection with the 1994 census, because he did not wish to identify with current Serbian policies and did not consider Yugoslavia to be a valid category any longer. He chose to declare himself as a Macedonian.


53. The problem of identity in relation to both the census and Macedonian foreign relations received the following expression in the satirical journal Osten, July 8, 1995: “I’m going to declare myself a Martian in the census.” “Can you speak Martian?” “No need to. Here you can declare yourself a Turk or Albanian without knowing Turkish or Albanian. It’s enough to be a Muslim. And as a Martian, no one can negate me. The Martians were never Greeks or involved in a Serbo-Bulgarian quarrel.” “I dig it, buddy. You’ll go far in life” (my translation).


59. One such feature is the replacement of infinitives by subjunctive clauses.

60. See note 5.

63. Because no one in the mission speaks Turkish or Macedonian, it is not clear how they could judge the children's ability. See note 47.
64. See note 46 and the paragraph to which it refers.
65. A Greek colleague of mine who was born in 1950 told me that when he was growing up, people routinely referred to Western Europe as "Europe." For example, one might say, "I'm going to Europe for my vacation," as if Greece were not part of that entity.
67. The image of political Europe as a political or cultural entity that represents a desired or rejected "other" has been and is widespread in the economically peripheral nations of geographic Europe. See Susan Gal, "Bartok's Funeral: Representations of Europe in Hungarian Political Rhetoric," American Ethnologist 18, no. 3 (1991), pp. 440-8, for a Hungarian example of the same types of attitudes with additional references.
68. See Xhaferi, "Registreimi i jashtëzakonshem i popullisë."

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