One Grammar, Three Lexicons:
I Ideological Overtones and Underpinnings in the Balkan Sprachbund
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0. Introduction
The title of this paper refers to a statement made by the Slovene linguist and Imperial Austrian censor J. Kopitar (1829:86) that is widely considered to be the first formulation relating to the concept of the Balkan Sprachbund. He wrote that Albanian, Bulgarian, and Romanian gave the impression that: "...nur eine Sprachform herrscht, aber mit drei Sprachmaterie..." It is interesting to note that he only gave one example illustrating his generalization, namely the existence of the postposed definite article, as in the following illustration (after Kopitar 1829: 86): 1

(1) Albanian: njeri - njeriu
   Balkan Slavic: Eovek - čoveko[t]
   Balkan Romance: o m - omlu = omul
   person - the person

This same phenomenon has been identified by Hamp (1982) as possibly an original Albanian feature, in which case its presence elsewhere could be due to a Balkan substratum. At the same time, Bulgarian nationalist linguists use the isogloss for the definite article within Slavic to define their territorial claims (e.g. Mladenov 1929). 2 The boundary is seen in isogloss 2 on map 1. 3

Moreover, the postposed definite article is one of the “classic” Balkanisms that is not found in Greek, which is normally counted as a member of the Balkan
Sprachbund, although the Greek linguists Andriotis and Kourmoulis (1968:30) concluded in their plenary paper at the first international Balkan Congress in 1966 that: “...l’unité linguistique de nos peuples est une fiction qui n’est perceptible que de très loin; ... les similitudes sont ... tout à fait inorganiques et superficielles...” In the course of this paper I shall discuss how the linguistic ideologies of external elites, internal elites, and non-elite speakers with regard to the Balkan languages have affected both the role and the perception of language contact in historical development.

In discussing ideology, I accept Silverstein’s (1979: 193) definition “that ideologies about language, or linguistic ideologies, are any sets of beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification for perceived language structure and use.” By emphasizing use, Silverstein’s definition can be combined fruitfully with Friedrich’s (1989:301, 309) distinction of “three most valuable meanings of ideology”: 1) notional, i.e. notions or ideas that members of a society hold about a definable area (e.g., non-elite evaluations of a given language as ‘useful’, ‘beautiful’, ‘prestigious’, etc.), 2) pragmatic, i.e. a system for promoting, perpetuating or changing a social and cultural order (e.g., native elites seeking to establish a standard language as a tool and symbol of a nation state), and 3) critical (henceforth hegemonic), i.e. a tissue of rationalizations and false beliefs used to mask political domination (“underlying political economic realities” in Friedrich’s formulation, e.g., the elites of one group seeking to delegitimize the language of another group by claiming it has no grammar or no vocabulary of its own). These three types of ideology are not necessarily mutually exclusive in any given formulation, as we shall see. Moreover, the formulations themselves can be mutually contradictory, the appropriate one being invoked by the user wishing to achieve a desired effect.

From a linguistic point of view, Kopitar’s formulation can be viewed as an early recognition that grammatical structures as well as lexical items can be borrowed. From an ideological point of view, however, the statement creates a space in which the Balkan languages are conceived of as something other than belonging to the genetic linguistic paradigm that was just beginning to dominate Europe and would continue to do so for the rest of the century. In a sense, this “otherness” mirrors the orientalizing otherness projected onto the Ottoman Empire in which most of the Balkans was located and on much of which Imperial Austria-Hungary (and other Great Powers) had designs.

Yet at the same time that Empires were maneuvering to extend or maintain their hegemony over the Balkans, people living on the peninsula itself were attempting to create their own hegemonies, and language ideology was an important aspect in all these machinations. For the rest of my presentation, I would like to consider some of the most important of these ideologies and their implications for language development, contact, and shift.

I have adduced nine ideological equations, summarized in Table One, characterizing a number of historical developments in the Balkans. These equations are by no means exhaustive, but they capture a number of the most significant events in the Balkan linguistic landscape. Because a complete coverage of the entire Balkans is not feasible in a single presentation, I will concentrate primarily on Slavic and Albanian, which provide many instructive
contrasts. I shall pay particular attention to the Republic of Macedonia, which is
in any case the most complex area of the region and serves a kind of microcosm
of Balkan linguistic processes (cf. Hamp 1989). The first seven equations are
the properties of (sometimes conflicting) elites who manipulated them towards
varying ends. The eighth is shared by elites and non-elites in the Balkans,
although in some cases elites found themselves struggling against non-elite
versions of these equations. The last equation is strictly a folk belief, albeit one
that is modified by the realities of the sociolinguistic hierarchy (see Table
2). The first seven equations are the properties of (sometimes conflicting) elites who manipulated them towards varying ends. The eighth is shared by elites and non-elites in the Balkans, although in some cases elites found themselves struggling against non-elite versions of these equations. The last equation is strictly a folk belief, albeit one that is modified by the realities of the sociolinguistic hierarchy (see Table 2).

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Table One

1. unity = strength & diversity = weakness

This first equation was extremely important in the development of Albanian national linguistic ideology, which can be counted as a success, and various unifying South Slavic linguistic ideologies, which have been ultimate failures (see Skendi 1967, Naylor 1980, Banac 1984, R. Greenberg 1995).

From a strictly linguistic point of view, Albanian is divided into two very divergent dialects, Geg to the north of the river Shkumbi, and Tosk to the south. From the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Russia in 1878 until after World War Two, the creation and maintenance of an Albanian state was subject to numerous challenges and attempts at reduction of territory or elimination via partition among neighbors. Moreover, like the Southern West South Slavs, Albanians were divided according to religion (Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Catholicism). An ideology of linguistic unity was thus perceived as essential in the pursuit of territorial integrity and identity maintenance. During the pre-communist period, this unity was encouraged through selective diversity, i.e. rather than legislating a single standard, elites allowed for the elaboration of both Geg and Tosk based standards, as well as two different Latin based orthographies, with an view to eventual compromise and unification (cf. Sula 1905; for further details, see Byron 1976, Friedman 1986). After World War Two, a Tosk based standard was established in Albania, while a Geg based norm continued in SFR Yugoslavia (in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro). In 1968, however, Albanians in SFR Yugoslavia adopted the Tosk based standard of Albania for the sake of a sense of national unity. Since the so-called fall of communism, there has been a move among some Geg speakers in Albania (especially Shkodër, a cultural center in the northeast with a distinct
tradition) to reestablish the type of Geg/Tosk diglossia that was in effect before the World War Two, the argument being that a monist literary language reflects the totalitarian political system of the communist state under which it was established (cf. Pipa 1989). This movement, however, has not received the support of the Geg speakers of FR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia, where it is perceived as a threat to aspirations for greater national unity.

In the case of the South Slavs, territorial and linguistic diversity is much greater than that of the Albanians. South Slavic occupies a territory that stretches from eastern Italy and southern Austria, Hungary, and Romania across the Balkan peninsula into Turkey and Greece. Although the entire territory can be described as a single continuum (see Ivčić 1991 for details), both historical developments and linguistic facts make it convenient to distinguish East South Slavic (Macedonian and Bulgarian) from West South Slavic (Slovenian and former Serbo-Croatian). Within West South Slavic, the northern dialects that are spoken roughly on the territory of Slovenia and in adjacent parts of Italy, Austria, and Hungary can be distinguished as Northern West South Slavic. This leaves the term Southern West South Slavic for the dialects of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FR Yugoslavia, i.e. former Serbo-Croatian.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, virtually all of South Slavic linguistic territory was divided between two empires: the Ottoman (Turkey) and the Hapsburg (Austria). Since that time, the political history of the region has been concerned with the creation of sovereign (nation-)states, and language has served, among other things, as a vehicle of state-forming ideology (in its pragmatic sense). During the early part of the nineteenth century, such pan-South Slavic ideologies as Illyrianism — essentially a Croatian movement on Hapsburg territory— espoused the creation of a single South Slavic literary language and nation state. At the same time, the Serb Vuk Stepanović Karadžić was collecting and publishing South Slavic folklore from Ottoman territory that would have an enormous impact on the literature of the Southern West South Slavs. He was also advocating a major linguistic reform that would replace the macaronic Slaveno-Serbian that served as the vehicle of written expression for Serbs with a colloquially based literary language. Slovenes and Croats were attempting to resist the assimilatory pressures of Austrians and Hungarians, while Serbs were attempting to form a state (or states) independent of the Turkey. Although some Slovenes espoused Illyrianism, the majority opted for a separate language that had its roots in a brief flowering during the Reformation (see Stankiewicz 1980). In 1850, a group of Serbian and Croatian intellectuals signed a brief manifesto known as the [Bečki] Književni dogovor ‘[Vienna] Literary Agreement’, which called for the development of a common literary language based on Vuk’s eastern Hercegovinian iječakian Stokavian (see Map 3) for Serbs and Croats and proposed some details of orthography and grammar in the direction of that unification. This compromise for both sides was brought about by political necessity. Croatian was too fragmented dialectically, e.g., the cultural center, Zagreb, was in the middle of the Kajkavian area, much of the medieval-renaissance Croatian literary tradition was in Čakavian, and Stokavian speakers constituted the numerical majority. Vuk’s language met stiff
resistance in from entrenched authorities Serbia, where it was not officially adopted until 1868. The Vienna agreement was reaffirmed in Novi Sad in 1954, but repudiated by Croatian intellectuals in 1967 (see below). Both the Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian literary language and the Yugoslav state in which it served as the lingua communis (cf. Naylor 1992) instantiated an ideology that valorized unity for the Southern West South Slavs.18

In the case of East South Slavic, Macedonians and Bulgarians struggled for a common literary language in opposition to the hellenizing policies of the Greek Orthodox Church and the nascent Greek state from the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century. The beginnings of a schism within East South Slavic were already evident by the mid-nineteenth century, however, when Bulgarian intellectuals insisted that their emerging eastern based standard be adopted without compromise, while Macedonian intellectuals envisioned a unified Macedo-Bulgarian language based in whole or part on Macedonian dialects (see Friedman 1975, 1985). Bulgarian denunciations of Macedonian separatists in the popular press of the mid-nineteenth century make it abundantly clear that the ideology of unity was already being challenged during that period (see Lunt 1984).

2. **unity = subordination & diversity = freedom**

Here we see that the same linguistic ideology can be taken as pragmatic or hegemonic, depending on how speakers are positioned in relation to it. From the point of view of Tosks, Serbs, and Bulgarians, the unified literary languages in which their dialects played the major role were a source of strength. To Geg, Croatian, and Macedonian separatists, however, such strength was perceived as domination masquerading as unity. It is important to note immediately that while the rhetoric of separatism among the three latter mentioned groups bear superficial resemblances, there are fundamental differences among them.

In the case of Gegs and Tosks, the sense of a common Albanian ethno-national identity has been successfully constructed (pace Moynihan 1993:3), so that linguistic struggles are not so much over separating from Albanian identity but rather over relative equality of representation or relative degree of hegemony over that identity.19

Whereas the identities Geg and Tosh correspond to geographic and linguistic differentiation, however, the terms Serb and Croat do not. While Kajkavian and Čakavian speakers will normally be Croatian, Stokavian speakers can be Serb, Croat, Montenegrin, or Muslim (Bosnian).20 Moreover, in an ethnically mixed village or region, all the inhabitants will speak the same dialect, i.e. ethnically based dialects do not really exist (see R. Greenberg 1995). In general, a Croat is Catholic, a Serb is Orthodox Christian, a Montenegrin is Orthodox Christian from Montenegro, and Muslim is an explicitly religiously defined nationality category (see §8 below).21 Thus, the insistence upon differentiating Croatian from Serbian (and now also Bosnian and even Montenegrin, see S3) must be constructed on different bases. Symptomatic of these bases was split over the joint Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian dictionary (Stevanović et al. 1967-76, Jonke et al. 1967) that began as a joint project of the respective Serbian and Croatian cultural literary societies (matice) but ended
abruptly with the publication of the first two volumes in 1967 and the subsequent Croatian declaration of linguistic independence. Croatian intellectuals denounced the joint project as Serbian hegemonization and withdrew from it, while the Serbs went on to complete their version. A single example will serve to illustrate the bases of the quarrel. While the ethnonym Srb ‘Serb’ has two entries — singular Srb and plural Srbi — with the singulative Srbin mentioned at both entries, the entry for ‘Croat’ occurs only once, at the plural Hrvati, and only the singular Hrvat is given; there is no mention of the singulative Hrvatin. Croatian intellectuals interpreted this difference as symbolic of their marginalization. There were also many quarrels over the exclusion of lexical items felt to be Croatian.22

Macedonian rejection of Bulgarian domination, hinted at in § 1 above, is similar to the Croatian insistence on both ethnic and linguistic differentiation from Serbian, but with two important differences. First, the overwhelming majority of all East South Slavic speakers are Orthodox Christians (most of the rest are Muslim, often with a separate identity). Second, Literary Macedonian is based on a geographically defined complex of dialects — the West Central — that differ from the eastern base of Literary Bulgarian at every grammatical level (see Vaillant 1938), whereas despite more recent differential developments, the literary languages of Croats and Serbs share the same Eastern Hercegovinian dialectal heritage, albeit one that was subsequently elaborated in quite different ways, and one whose centers have now shifted for all parties concerned.23

3. nation = language = territory = state

This ideological equation is the justification for Bulgarian claims that Macedonian is a Bulgarian dialect (isogloss 2, Map 1), for Serbian claims that it is a Serbian dialect (isogloss 1, Map 1), and for Greek claims that it does not exist at all, or else that only Greek dialects can bear the name Macedonian (see Friedman 1975, 1986, Lunt 1984). This equation is also responsible for the current proliferation and elaboration of lexically differentiated Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian standards (cf. Isaković 1992, Klaić et al. 1944/1992), as well-as demands for a separate Montenegrin language (Nikčević 1993a, 1993b), Sandiaklian language, Dalmatian, Istrian, Sop, Pomakci, etc. The logic begins with the assumption of the existence of an entity (whether essentialized or constructed) called a nation, which is characterized among other things by a distinct language and which must coincide with a distinct territory, on which it must construct a distinct state. It follows that all the dialects of the language of a nation belong on one territory and thus in one state. It likewise follows that the existence of two nations implies two languages, two territories, and two states. Moreover, this ideological equation is transitive.

One of the most problematic realities “erased” by this equation (cf. Gal and Irvine 1995) is that fact that territories are rarely monolingual. The result is overlapping claims and sometimes war. The second Balkan War of 1913 was fought over such territorial claims, which were bolstered, among other things, by conflicting linguistic claims (cf. Map 1, also see Friedman 1996a). The
Yugoslav Wars of Succession have also made use of this equation in ideological justifications.

For hegemonic purposes, this same equation can also be negated, e.g. if Macedonian is not a “real” language (but, e.g., an “idiom”, cf. Andriotes 1957), then there is no Macedonian nation and therefore no legitimate claims to territory or statehood (cf. §4 below). This logic was especially evident in writing about Macedonia prior to the end of World War One and was part of the justifications for territorial partitions such as the Treaty of Bucharest (1913; cf. Lunt 1984).

4. contact = impure = bad = illegitimate

This ideological equation has a variety of manifestations, some of which are related to §3. Thus, for example, if a language is portrayed as not having a distinct lexicon owing to being hopelessly mixed as the result of prolonged contact and subordination, then it can be treated as not being a “real” language and thus unworthy as the characteristic of a nation, which in turn has no right to territory or a state.24 The nineteenth-century notion that Albanian consisted almost entirely of loanwords with no native vocabulary was sometimes used to support denials of the legitimacy of claims to Albanian nationhood and statehood (cf. Meyer 1891:ix).

This ideology also supports the view of loanwords as pollution, especially if those words are from a conqueror, e.g. the Turks in the case of the Balkans. Hence, throughout the Balkans there have been conscious policies aimed at eliminating Turkish loanwords (but cf. §5 below). In a review of a Greek puristic work, Kazazis (1977:302-303) paraphrases the attitude most eloquently:

“. . . depending on their origin, loanwords differ as to the degree to which they defile a language. Thus, the Romans, the Franks (‘mediaeval) West Europeans’), the Venetians, all left their linguistic (read: lexical) imprint on Greek. Those were, however, civilized nations, so that their loanwords into Greek are not much of a disgrace and do not wound the ‘linguistic dignity’ of the Greeks as Turkish loanwords do (6ff. and passim). The latter are a shameful reminder of the centuries-long abject subjugation of the Greek nation to a culturally undistinguished people, the Turks.”

The same logic can also work in the opposite direction in studies attempting to demonstrate that a subordinate language has borrowed all of its vocabulary from the language of a group seeking to exert political and territorial dominance (e.g. Lazarou’s 1986:259 claim that Aromanian is a type of Romanized Greek).

This ideology is evident in the rejection of nineteenth century attempts to base Literary Bulgarian on Macedonian dialects or to create a separate Macedonian literary language.25 Thus, for example the Macedonian based language used in a nineteenth-century textbook by Kuzman Sapkarev was denounced in an anonymous letter to the November 30, 1870 issue of the Constantinople periodical Pravo as “. . . Ohrid dialect that stinks of Albanianisms
and Hellenisms.” Apparently the writer of the anonymous letter was the owner of the bookstore in Veles which had to take back the Bulgarian textbooks returned by the citizens of Resen (Koneski 1967:223-31).26

Denials of the existence of a Balkan Sprachbund, or rejection of membership in such an entity (cf. Andriotis and Kourmoulis 1968, cited above, as well as note 4) can also have such ideological motivation. If loanwords are seen as “defiling” a language, then other types of borrowings such as the structural borrowings that are characteristic of a Sprachbund, (sometimes called “intimate borrowings”) are even worse. The delegitimizing effect of language contact can also affect historical analyses of specific phenomena. Thus, for example, attempts to demonstrate that grammaticalized expressions of status (also called evidentiafity, cf. Friedman 1994) in Albanian and Balkan Slavic, which are sometimes adduced as examples of structural borrowings from Turkish, are in fact the result of native developments within the respective languages (cf. Kazandiiev 1943:210-11, Demiraj 1971, Ylli 1989) can sometimes have this type of underlying ideological motivation.27

5. colloquial/new = good = modern/pure

This is the type of linguistic purism that was at the basis of both Vuk’s reform of Serbian and Atatürk’s of Turkish. In Greek it was the ideology behind the colloquial-based demotic (Dhimotiki) in its opposition to the archaizing puristic (Katharevousa). Such ideologies often take on explicit political identities. Thus, for example, in Greece, the demotic has been associated with the political left while the puristic has been associated with the political right, extreme neologism in Turkey is associated with secularism, while in many countries, e.g. Nazi Germany and its Croatian puppet state, it has been associated with right-wing nationalism (cf. Friedman 1986).28

This ideology has interacted in a complex manner with §4 in Macedonian linguistic debates and usages concerning Turkisms. During the early years of codification (circa 1944-50), there was a current of thought among some Macedonian intellectuals that maintained that Turkisms should be encouraged and preserved because they were characteristic of folk speech and- also emphasized Macedonian’s differentiation from the other Slavic languages. The predominant current, however, continued the nineteenth century tradition of encouraging Slavic or “international” (i.e., Western) replacements for Turkisms. The result was that Turkisms were stylistically lowered to colloquial registers, ironic, rural, dialectal, or archaic usage, etc. (see Kazazis 1972). While this situation obtained well into the late eighties, a linguistic effect of political pluralism in the post-’89 upheavals was the rise of Turkisms in serious public discourse. The proliferation of Turkisms in the press and other media and in contexts in which the norm was expected can be seen as an attempt to “democratize” Literary Macedonian via colloquialization. The logic of such a tendency would be that since the literary standard of the 1944-90 period tended to eschew Turkisms in formal contexts while they continued to thrive in colloquial speech, and since the 1944-90 period was characterized by a one-party political system, the eschewing of Turkisms is a characteristic of monism.
Thus the opposite tendency, i.e. the use of Turkisms in formal contexts, becomes a marker of “democracy” (see Friedman 1996b).

During World War Two and again after the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatian neologizing purism has been a major force in the attempt to differentiate Croatian from the rest of Southern West South Slavic. While there has been a certain amount of lexical resurrection (see §6 below), a significant amount of the current lexical change in Croatian (a kind of “linguistic cleansing”), has involved the creation of neologisms, sometimes with false pedigrees. Thus, for example, from the word opor ‘strong, firm’ the form oporba (using the old Slavic abstract nominalizing suffix -&a) has been created to mean ‘opposition’. The new formation is claimed as a resurrected archaism, but in fact it is a neologism. Such phony archaisms are popularly know in Croatian as Tudmanice ‘Tudjmanisms’ (after Franjo Tudjman, the leader of the ruling Croatian nationalist political party and, as of this writing, still head of the Croatian state), which is a play on tudice ‘foreignisms’ (<tub ‘foreign’). Such neologisms in Croatian are sometimes parodied, one of the best known examples being the expression okolotrbušni hlačedržač ‘circumventral trouserholder’ for ‘belt’, since the Turkism kais’is now associated with Bosnian while the Slavic pojasis associated with Serbian. (In point of fact, Croatian uses the Germanism girt./ or the Slavic remen ‘strap’).

6. old = good = pure

This is the ideology that resulted in Greek diglossia by means of the creation of the atticized demotic known as Katharevousa (cf. §5 above). Similar ideologies were deployed in attempts to introduce Church Slavonic during the formative stages of the modern Serbian and Bulgarian standards, but the needs for popular support for the nascent political movements combined with ideology of the “untainted” or “natural” peasant as the pure expression of the “nation” militated against such archaizing (Cf. Friedman 1975). In Greece, however, the power of the construct of antiquity as legitimizing the nation state was considerably stronger, and moreover had overt support from the Western Great Powers (cf. Herzfeld 1982, 1987). This same ideology is responsible for the adoption of Sanskrit words -- on occasion without phonological adjustment -- in Romani language publications and for Latin borrowings in Romanian (cf. Friedman 1986).

Within Southern West South Slavic, Croatian looks to the renaissance literary tradition of Dubrovnik and other Dalmatian centers as sources of lexical replacements. As indicated above in §5, this ideology sometimes takes the form of pseudo-archaisms. In the case of Croatian, the perceived need to establish differences from the rest of Southern West South Slavic has led to the coexistence of ideologies §5 and §6, in contradistinction to Greece, where the two ideologies came into conflict and led to diglossia. In the case of Croatia, diglossia is also a potential outcome, if the combination of archaism and neologism is not successfully promulgated and accepted, resulting in a split between the proclamations of language planners and actual usage. Bosnian language planners have concentrated on resurrecting the Ottoman (Arabo-Persian-Turkish) vocabulary of the period when Bosnia was part of the Ottoman
Empire, since it was during these centuries that the ancestors of the Southern West South Slavs who now identify as Bosniacs adopted Islam and established a separate identity (cf. §8 below). This strategy thereby makes a virtue out of lexical contact, while explicitly eschewing, however, structural borrowing (cf. note 27).

A related strategy in language planning is the use of already established related languages for vocabulary enrichment, e.g. Russian for Bulgarian, French or Italian for Romanian, Hindi for Romani (cf. Friedman 1986). Here the logic is that the established literary language is somehow purer, and in any case a more suitable source for loanwords (cf. §4 above).

4. autochthony = legitimacy

This is a key issue in Albanian historical linguistics, where there is a genuine question of the relationship of Albanian to Illyrian on the one hand and Thracian on the other (see Fine 1983:10-11, Hamp 1994). According to the logic of this ideological equation, which is related to §6 in that it also valorizes putative antiquity, a given ethnic group has a greater right to the territory on which it is located if its language is descended from that of earlier inhabitants. This logic is also an important motivation in Greek claims to Macedonia (and at times to the entire territory of the former Byzantine Empire). In a sense, this is a kind of racist geneticism, in that it assumes that linguistic descendants are cocentral with physical descendants, despite the fact that it is well established that languages, like ethnonyms, are not genetically inherited and move across populations in different ways.

In the instance of Albanian, the debate over Thracian versus Illyrian provenance has its basis in serious evidence, and in any case there is no rival group claiming descent from either of these two languages. However, the logic of ideologically based contestation would argue that if Albanian is of Thracian origin then the Albanians arrived in northern Albania at around the same time as the Slavs and in southern Albania after the Greeks, and that therefore their current claims to sovereignty are somehow less legitimate, whereas if they are descended of the Illyrians then their claims are somehow more legitimate.

In the case of Greek linguistic claims to Ancient Macedonian, the evidence is inadequate (see Ilievski 1997) but in any case the motivations for the debate are frequently hegemonic. The argument is that if the Ancient Macedonians spoke Greek, then only Greek claims to the territory (and even name) of Macedonia are legitimate. Such arguments were accepted by the Great Powers at the beginning of this century, and as a result territories where the majority of the population had been Slavic-speaking for well over a thousand years were nonetheless assigned to the Greek state, which at the time was less than a century old. During the course of the past century, the territory has been linguistically hellenized to a large extent, often by force (see Human rights Watch/Helsinki 1994). The current debate seen in the press over Greek claims to the exclusive use of the name Macedonia have their origins in these circumstances. Among Modern Macedonians there is a group that has accepted Greek propaganda and drawn from this the conclusion that since only the
descendants of the Ancient Macedonians can lay claim to Modern Macedonia, therefore Modern Macedonian is not a Slavic language.

Attempts to prove that Slovenian is descended from Venetic are similarly fueled by the equation of autochthony with legitimacy. In Turkey, the Hittites are sometimes presented in this same manner. The naming of the Illyrian movement in Croatia, mentioned above, involved a similar equation of modern language with ethnonyms of classical antiquity. This type of ideology also relates to §4 insofar as borrowings are non-autochthonous.

8. religion = ethnicity = language

Of all the ideologies we have considered so far, this is the first to be shared by elites and non-elites, i.e. it is not exclusively a top-down phenomenon dependent upon education and power for implementation. Rather it is a mutually reinforcing expression of the complexity of identity. Insofar as it interacts with §3, it is manipulable by elites, and insofar as it derives from the Otcom an millet system, which defined nationality in terms of religious community, it can be viewed as pragmatic or hegemonic. At the same time, however, it forms an integral part of many notional ideologies, including those of the Balkans, and as such it must be viewed as non-elite in some of its practices. A complete survey of the interaction between religion, language, and self-ascribed identity is beyond the scope of this paper, and so we will touch on only a few manifestations here.

As indicated above, the ethnic division within Southern West South Slavic is essentially religious (Serb = Orthodox Christian, Croat = Catholic, Bosniac = Muslim), and it is on these bases that the three literary languages are being lexically elaborated. There are a number of other Slavic-speaking Muslim identities (Goran, Pomak, Torbeš, Sandžakli, etc.), but these need not concern us here.

It was also indicated above that Albanian shares with Southern West South Slavic the tripartite religious division without, however, having developed a corresponding ethnic division. It is interesting to note, however, that in Moncenegro, where Southern West South Slavic speakers are associated with the Serbian Orthodox church while many Albanian speakers were Roman Catholic, there was an association between religion and language such that converts to Catholicism (known there as arbanaška vjera ‘Albanian faith’) became Albanian speakers, while converts to Orthodoxy ended up speaking a Montenegrin variety of Southern West South Slavic.

There were also Muslim speakers of Albanian and Southern West South Slavic in Moncenegro as well as elsewhere in the Balkans. According to the millet system, all Muslims were Turks, the meaning of Turk being ‘adherent of the state religion’ and not ‘speaker of Turkish’. Since the Orthodox Christian Church in Turkey was controlled by the Greek patriarchate, Orthodox Christian citizens of the Ottoman Empire were Greeks by this same definition. The millet system led to the creation of an independent Bulgarian church (the Exarchate) in 1870, and an Aromanian (Vlah) church in 1905. During this period, a term such as Bulgarian could mean, among other things, ‘speaker of Bulgarian’ or ‘adherent of the Exarchate’.
Since the majority of Albanians in former Yugoslavia are Muslim, the Albanian language has also become associated with Islam on that territory. As a result, Orthodox Christian Albanians in Macedonia frequently assimilate to Macedonian language and identity, while in Kosovo, Catholic Albanians have sometimes chosen to identify as Croats and emigrate to Croatia. On the other hand, Macedonian and Bulgarian speaking Muslims have demanded Turkish or Albanian schools for their children by this same process, believing that Muslim religion requires or corresponds to a Muslim-identified language (see Friedman 1996a).

At first glance, the Greek practice of referring to Macedonian and Bulgarian speakers living in the Greek state as slavophone Greeks, or to Albanian speakers as albanophone Greeks might appear to be a way of combining a recognition of linguistic difference with the old millet system of ethnic identification or possibly even the newer concept of nation-state citizenship (Greek thus meaning ‘Greek Orthodox Christian’ or, conceivably, ‘Greek citizen’). That this is not actually the case, however, and that this policy is aimed at assimilating non-hellenophone minorities is seen in the fact that, aside from the history of oppressive government policies that have never allowed the use of the languages of non-hellenophone Christians in any public sphere and have, during some periods, even gone so far as to prohibit these languages in private, Greek governments never refer to the Greek-speaking minority of southern Albania as hellenophone Albanians or to Greek-speakers in Turkey (regardless of religion) as hellenophone Turks. The identity of religion with ethnic identity was the basis of an enormous exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey after World War One and the subsequent Greco-Turkish war (see Ladas 1932 for a Greek view). As a result, approximately one and a half million Orthodox Christians were deported from Turkey to Greece and half a million Muslims were sent from Greece to Turkey. The Orthodox Christians were called Greeks although linguistically they were often monoglot Turkish speakers, while the Muslims were called Turks although their native language could have been something other than Turkish, e.g. Albanian, Aromanian, Megleno-Romanian, Greek, Macedonian, Bulgarian, or Romani. These populations were subsequently linguistically assimilated by the nation-states in which they found themselves.

9. languages = wealth

Of all the ideologies being considered here, this is the only one that is strictly notional in a Balkan context, i.e. it has its origins in local conditions and is reflected in traditional sayings. In its everyday form, it is a valorization of the type of multilingualism that resulted in the Balkan Sprachbund as a linguistic phenomenon. Thus, for example, in the course of my fieldwork I have frequently encountered the Macedonian version of this ideology as a saying: jazici se bogatsvo ‘languages are wealth’, meaning that the knowledge of many languages is an asset. A Southern West South Slavic version is the following: Koliko jezici govoriš, toliko ljudi vrojšiš ‘The number of languages you speak is the number of people you are worth.’ The point here is that the more
languages you know, the more people you can communicate with and the more successful you can be.48

This is not to say, however, that all languages are equally valued. On the contrary, socio-cultural and/or political prestige determine hierarchies of knowledge and desirability. Table Two is an attempt to map some of these hierarchies during the course of this century for the territory that currently constitutes the Republic of Macedonia.49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Turkish, Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Macedonian, Vlah, Romani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Serbian, Turkish, Albanian, Macedonian, Vlah, Romani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Serbian, Turkish, Macedonian, Albanian, Vlah, Romani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Serbian, Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, Vlah, Romani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Albanian, Macedonian, Serbian, Turkish, Vlah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This schematic linguistic social/political hierarchy in Macedonia is shown in Table 2.

Each of the years chosen represents a different stage in the social and/or political situation on the territory of the current Republic of Macedonia during the course of this century. In 1900, this territory was part of the Ottoman Empire and divided among the vilayets of Üsküp (Skopje), Manastir (Bitola) and Selânik (Salonica). In 1930 it was part of the Vardar banovina within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1970, it comprised the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia.50 Although the geopolitical status of the territory was the same in 1985, sociopolitical conditions in the SFRY had changed significantly: There had been a major federal constitutional reform in 1974, Tito had died in 1980, and in 1981 martial law had been declared for the first time since the Second World War when the Albanian population of the then autonomous region of Kosovo within the Republic of Serbia staged massive demonstrations demanding republic status for their region. These and other factors affected the sociolinguistic hierarchy in the SR Macedonia. By 1995, sociolinguistic changes resulting from the independence of the Republic of Macedonia at the end of 1991 were clearly visible.51

For Macedonia in 1900, Turkish was the language of the state, but Creek had considerable prestige among the Orthodox Christian population of European
Turkey as the language of the Church and of ecclesiastical administration. For the Orthodox Slavic-speaking population, Serbian and Bulgarian were the languages of neighboring states and autocephalous churches which, moreover, both laid claims to the language and loyalties of the majority Slavic population. Although a movement for the creation of a separate Macedonian language and state existed (see Friedman 1975), Macedonian dialects, together with Albanian and Vlah, lacked any sort of organized political prestige. Romani, as the language of the most marginalized population, remained at the bottom of the social hierarchy, while Judezmo, like the Jews who spoke it, was outside the Christian/Muslim social hierarchy (see Friedman 1995). The lines indicate directions of relative prestige and assimilation, based in part on religion (cf. §8). Thus, for example, since the majority of Roms were Muslim, Albanian and Turkish were the main routes of prestige and assimilation. Vlahs looked directly to Creek, whereas Macedonians faced competition among Serbian, Bulgarian, and Creek. The lower down a language is on the social hierarchy, the more likely a speaker of that language will know the languages above it. Thus, for example, a Rom would know Albanian and Turkish, while an Albanian would be likely to know Turkish but not Romani. The division of multilingualism was not strictly religious, however. During this period Macedonians and Vlahs would know Turkish, and if they lived in western Macedonia chances are they would know Albanian as well, but Albanians were less likely to know Vlah.53

In 1930, Serbo-Croatian was the official language of the state that included the territory of the modern day Republic of Macedonia, but it was always the Serbian variant that was spoken and caught in Macedonia, and moreover the language was commonly referred to simply as Serbian. Turkish was no longer an official language but still had prestige among the population. The drawing of political boundaries combined with movements of populations had essentially eliminated Bulgarian and Greek from the hierarchy. Although Albanian was by now the language of a state, its position on the territory of Macedonia in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, together with the position of the other languages, remained essentially unchanged.

By 1970, Macedonian was an official and codified standard language, but it was still subordinate to Serbian in the larger context of the state in which the Republic was located. Turkish and Albanian were official languages at the republic but not the national level. The number of Judezmo speakers had been reduced to almost zero by the Nazi deportation and murder of almost all of Macedonia’s Jews in 1943, although a few speakers do remain. Although it is not indicated in the cable, it should be noted that Creek was spoken as a second or, on rare occasion, first language by many refugees from the Creek civil war who came to Macedonia in 1948. Many other languages (including Bulgarian) were also recorded by the post-war censuses as being spoken in Macedonia, but their numbers were not sufficient to warrant inclusion in this schematic cable. The remaining status relations did not change significantly.

By 1985, a combination of political and demographic factors had put Albanian on a par with or above Turkish in the prestige hierarchy, and moreover Vlah and Romani had received recognition as the languages of ethnic groups in the 1974 constitution. In 1995, Macedonian was the official language of a
sovereign state. Its position, however, was being challenged by Albanian, among whose speakers there are political actors demanding an officially binacional and bilingual state. Serbian is no longer officially relevant to Macedonian national life, and while the older generation continues to follow news from Belgrade, the younger generation is growing increasingly out of touch with the language, which is no longer officially taught (see Herson-Finn 1996). Among Muslim Roms, Albanian has acquired increased prestige, although Turkish is still prestigious especially among the oldest generation of inhabitants of Macedonia in general. Both Vlah and Romani have received increased official recognition and have been used in official documents such as the forms for the 1994 census.

10. Conclusion

Conflicting ideologies in the Balkans have led, among other things, to the reduction of contact and bi/multilingualism. At the same time, there has been a proliferation of standard languages that appears to be an on-going trend. The very concept of the linguistic league as the areal-based alternative to the genetic linguistic family continues to come under attack (cf. Reiter 1994), while at the same time “Europe” continues to view the Balkans as a linguistic as well as socio-political “Other”. Although the folk ideology that “Languages are wealth” continues to be heard from the older generation, if the younger generation has any similar feelings, they are directed at different languages from those understood by their elders. Perhaps the greatest linguistic irony in the Balkans today, is that Kopiçar’s original formulation concerning Balkan Slavic, Balkan Romance, and Albanian, which to the extent that it was true was the reflection of centuries of multilingualism, has in the course of this decade been realized in a far more literal sense with the break-up of former Serbo-Croatian by politicians and language planners in an attempt to stymie convergence.

Notes

1I am using the relatively neutral formulations Balkan Slavic and Balkan Romance for Kopiçar’s original Bulgarische and Wafachische, since in modern terms Kopiçar drew his examples from Macedonian, Bulgarian, Romanian (Daco-Romanian), and Aromanian (sometimes called Macedo-Romanian during that period). It should be noted, however, that some Bulgarian nationalist linguists object to the term Balkan Slavic because they consider it to be a denial of Bulgarian claims to all of Balkan Slavic territory (Ivan Duridanov, comments at the colloquium Ziefe und Wege der Balkanfinguisrik. West Berlin, 1981).

2Some non-Bulgarian linguists (e.g. Hill 1982) likewise use this single isogloss as the definition of Balkan Slavic territory.

3The isoglosses are only very rough approximations but are adequate for these purposes. By contrast, the southernmost extent of monophonic reflexes of Common Slavic *tj/dj were used by Serbian nationalist linguists to justify Serbian territorial claims at the beginning of this century (see Friedman 1975).

4This rejection of a “Balkan” unity internalizes Western views of the Balkans as undesirable (cf., e.g. Todorova 1994, Bakic-Hayden 1995). A recent example is seen in the following news item: “... Tudjman got hearty applause when he said: ‘Reintegration of Croatia into the Balkans is totally unacceptable for the Croatian
people... Croatia belongs to Central European and Mediterranean circles. A short Balkan episode in Croatian history [i.e. its inclusion in Yugoslavia] must never be repeated... We should add a new article, a constitutional ban on attempts to merge Croatia with any Yugoslav or Balkan state or federation.'... Tudjman said Croatia would enter into agreements with Balkan countries only when it was a member of the EU and could act together with its EU partners.” (Patrick Moore, OMRI Daily Digest, No. 16, Part II, 23 January 1997)

Woolard (1992:238), distinguishes the negative use ideology in Friedrich’s sense of “false ideology” from the use of ideology as a tool of domination. I would argue, however, that these two understandings are sufficiently closely related that they can be treated together for our purposes, since they both involve masking and domination. I shall use the term hegemonic for this type. For an extensive survey of over three hundred works on language ideology, see Woolard and Schieffelin (1994).

Cf. the existence of such contradictory proverbs as “Great minds run in the same paths” vs “All fools think alike”, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush” vs “Nothing ventured, nothing gained”, “Better a day as an eagle than a lifetime as a worm” vs “The bowed head is not cut off”, etc. (I wish to thank Salikoko Mufwene of the University of Chicago for this observation.)

These ideologies are primarily pragmatic or hegemonic due to the nature of the events to which they relate. Kovalscik (1996) provides excellent examples of other notional ideologies such as my language = truth and my dialect = correct.

The Shkumbi runs through Elbasan (see Map 2 at the end of this paper). The diaspora dialects of Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine are all Tosk, while the dialect of the village of Arbanasi, near Zadar, Croatia, is Geg. The dialects of FR Yugoslavia are Geg, as are those of the Republic of Macedonia, except for the Tosk dialects of the extreme southwest (southwest of Bitola on Map 2).

As Jelavich (1983:275) points out, even during the Italian invasions of Greece and Albania during World War Two, Albanians and Greeks were unable to cooperate with one another due to their desires to annex each others’ territory (see Epirus/Çamëri on map 2).

Although the majority of Albanians are of Muslim background, the concentrations of Catholics in the north and Orthodox in the south meant that locally there were significant concentrations of Christians. Similarly, among the Southern West South Slavs, which I am using here as a cover term for speakers of former Serbo-Croatian (additional explanation given shortly in the body of the paper), Orthodoxy predominates over Catholicism and Islam in terms of total numbers, but not necessarily at the regional or local level.

“The famous Alphabet Congress of 1908 held in Bitola (then Manastir) resulted in the selection of Latin as opposed to Greek or Arabic orthography on the grounds that while the latter two were religiously identified (with Orthodox Christianity and Islam, respectively), the first was oriented toward the type of western nation-state for which Albanian elites were striving. However, the Congress could not decide between the Istanbul orthography, which used diacritics, and the Bashkimi orthography, which used digraphs, and so both were adopted (see Skendi 1967:366-404). Modern Albanian orthography represents a compromise between these two principles.

The current situation is diglossic insofar as most Geg speakers will speak Geg except on the most formal occasions. Geg is never written except for specific regional or colloquial effect (cf. Friedman 1993). Throughout the entire period under discussion, Albanian has never had any official status in Greece, except as the object of occasional interdiction, and thus the speakers and dialects of Greece have remained entirely outside these processes (see Trudgill and Tzavaras 1977, Tsitsipis 1995).

It is important to note that this linguistically defined population is not everywhere compact, nor everywhere monoglot. The border areas contain South Slavic speech
islands, while the heartland contains significant non-South Slavic populations. Moreover, discussions of the rise of individual standard languages in the Balkans of necessity “erase” (see Gal and Irvine 1995) the fact that much of the population was in fact bi- or multilingual.

14The names of the three major dialects of Southern West South Slavic are based on the respective words for ‘what’, viz. ča, kaj, što. Within Stokavian, a major diagnostic of differentiation is symbolized by the different reflexes of Common Slavic *ae, viz. i, e, or [i]je, e.g. lipo - lepo - lijepo ‘nicely’. Along the entire South Slavic continuum, the boundaries between Slovenian and the adjacent Kajkavian and Cakavian dialects of former Serbo-Croatian, as well as between Macedonian and Bulgarian and the adjacent Stokavian dialects of former Serbo-Croatian, and also between Macedonian and Bulgarian themselves, are essentially geographic and/or political. See Map 3 at the end of this paper for schematic representations. (See M. Greenberg 1994, 1996, R. Greenberg 1995, Brozović and Ivić 1988, Vaillant 1938 for details.) These distinctions should not be viewed as essentialized or reified, but rather as convenient labels for complex phenomena whose gradations and transitions involve cross-cutting classifications. (See Vidoeski 1986 and also Brozović and Ivić 1988 for an example of the recent reassignment of a dialect spoken on Serbian territory to the Macedonian group on linguistic grounds.)

15Montenegro, however, became de jure independent in 1799. See Magocsi (1993:73-86) for details.

16The literature on the history of Southern West South Slavic is enormous and often polemical. See R. Greenberg (1995) for a number of useful references.

17The agreement was also signed by the pioneering Slavic linguist Franz Miklošič, who was a Slovene.

18Under Tito, this ideology had the label bratstvo i jedinstvo ‘brotherhood and unity’. It applied in principle not only to the Southern West South Slavs but to all citizens of Yugoslavia.

19During the recent anarchy in Albania (March 1997), there was a definite sense of the rebellious south against the loyal or at least less rebellious north. Thus, for example, there were roadblocks in the south at which armed bands stopped cars and demanded Fol shqip! ‘Speak Albanian!’, the implication being that the rebels intended to determine loyalty on the basis of dialect (Larisa N. Kaminskaja, University of St. Petersburg, personal communication). Albanians generally insisted, however, that the conflict was political, not ethnic.

20The term Bosniac refers to a Bosnian Muslim (Southern West South Slavic bošnak), whereas Bosnian refers to anyone from Bosnia (or Bosnia and Hercegovina). This terminology, however, does not cover the Southern West South Slavic speaking Muslims of the Sandžak, a region that straddles Montenegro and Serbia (see Map 2). The Sandžak Muslims have also demanded political and linguistic separateness, but so far to no effect. On the other hand, Bosniacs have attempted to extend their hegemony to the Macedonian speaking Muslims of the Republic of Macedonia (see Friedman 1996a).

21This has not prevented hegemonists of various stripes from referring to Catholic Serbs, Muslim Croats, Serbian Catholics, Muslim Serbs, etc. The degree of congruity between the ethnonyms Serb and Croat and religion is epitomized by what a colleague of mine in Belgrade told me many years ago: “My grandfather was a Catholic, but he converted to Orthodoxy, so I am a Serb.”

22It is important to recall that words from any given place will be shared by all the inhabitants. Thus, for example, while an often cited lexical difference between Croatian and Serbian is the Croatian Germanism kruh versus the Serbian Slavonicism hleb (actually also a Geramnicism, but of considerably older origin, viz. Gothic hlaifs ‘loaf’, which was borrowed into Common Slavic), Serbs from Croatia used the same
word as their Croatian neighbors, viz. kruh, and in the days before mass communication and widespread literacy, Serbs from Croatia had no more idea of the meaning of hleb (or hjeb) than their Croatian neighbors.

To be sure, there are Bulgarian-identified Macedonians who insist that all Macedonian dialects are Bulgarian dialects while speaking those same West Central Macedonian dialects that serve as the basis of Literary Macedonian. However, it is precisely the pre-existing linguistic differentiation that was central to the genesis of Modern Macedonian identity, whereas the differentiation of Modern Croatian and Modern Serbian identities has other bases, to which language was and is recruited.

In its most extreme form, it is applied to Romani, e.g. claims that Romani is not a language but a jargon, that it has no grammar and/or no vocabulary. Here the question is not so much one of state formation as identity legitimation. (A recent example is Wexler 1996). Thus, for example, German governments avoided making any reparations to Gypsies (Roms and Sinti) for the murders and atrocities committed against them by the Nazis during World War Two by claiming they were a “social group” (like homosexuals) rather than an ethnic group. See Hancock (1991).

See Friedman (1975) on the gradual evolution of Macedonian separatism out of East South Slavic resistance to hellenization.

Veles is slightly northeast of Bitola. Resen and Ohrid are southwest of Bitola on Map 3.

Cf. the following quotation about Bosnian: “Not a single grammatical category of our language was damaged by pressure from Turkish linguistic elements, nor did it lose its Slavic structure, basis, or color during such a long period of time.” (Ismet Smailović, Svijet 8 May 1970, p. 9. cited in Isaković 1992:14, my translation). On the other hand, the existence of a structural similarity does not rule out the possibility of parallel development, especially if the similarity is more superficial than it first appears and evidence exists that calquing is not solely responsible (cf. Friedman 1978).

The distinction between “left” and “right” is often blurred when issues of nationalism supersede issues such as economics. In Greece, for example, when the socialists came to power and in 1982 definitively declared amnesty for refugees who had fought on the side of the communists during the Greek civil war (1946-49), the decree specifically applied only to those who were “Greek by genus” (i.e. ethnically Greek: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 1994:68). This was in contravention of international law, as was the official Greek defacing of Macedonian visas in the passports of foreign nationals entering Greece during the 1990’s (author’s personal experience). Such policies have been consistently followed regardless of whether the party in power was “left” or “right”.

The fact that this reasoning is essentially syllogistic does not change its ability to affect change in linguistic usage. A similar rise of Turkisms also occurred in Albanian, Bulgarian, and Romanian, as well as Bosnian Southern West South Slavic (cf. Friedman 1996b).

I am indebted to Vesna Pusić of the University of Zagreb for the data in this paragraph.

The term Illyrian refers to a language or group of languages spoken on the territory of modern Albania and parts of modern former Yugoslavia around the time of the Roman Empire. (It may in fact have been a cover term used by the Romans in much the same way that American Indian or Australian Aborigine do not refer to single languages but whole groups of not necessarily related languages.) There is evidence that suggests that the linguistic ancestors of Albanian moved to the current territory of Albania from a region around the modern-day conjunction of the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian borders, but there is also evidence to support a direct descent of Albanian from Illyrian (whatever the reference). Given the paucity
of lexical items and the complete absence of texts, these speculations remain in the realm of conjecture.

Consider in this light the following textbook example: *Bulgarlar türkü, bunları İslâv yapan dildir* ‘The Bulgarians are Turks, it is the language which makes them Slav’ (Lewis 1953:81). This type of hegemonic ideology assumes that since the proto-Bulgars who crossed the Danube in 681 CE and established a state on territory that is now part of modern Bulgaria were Turkic-speakers, therefore the overwhelming Slavic-speaking majority, who in the course of the subsequent few centuries absorbed the proto-Bulgars linguistically (and in other ways) but kept the ethnonym as a self-ascribing label, must be considered somehow genetically Turkic (cf. Barth 1969).

This same type of logic motivates conflicting claims to the history of Transylvania, where the majority of the population is Romanian-speaking but there is also a very large Hungarian minority. According to the Romanian argument, Romanian-speakers are descended from Romanized Dacians living in the area and therefore autochthonous. According to the Hungarian argument, Transylvania had become depopulated by the time of the Magyar invasions at the beginning of the tenth century, and Romance speakers migrated there from south of the Danube at some later date (cf. Friedman 1986, Verdery 1983:79-125). There are linguistically based arguments to support both scenarios, but insufficient historical evidence to prove either (see Du Nay 1977).

As in the case of all the ancient languages of the Balkans except Greek and Latin, we have no Ancient Macedonian texts, only a handful of isolated lexical items. The evidence of these lexical items is ambiguous. While about half of them appear to be of Hellenic origin, the other half are recognizably Indo-European but not recognizably Hellenic. Assuming the words of obvious Greek origin to have been loanwords, then either Ancient Macedonian split from the rest of Hellenic at an extremely early date, or it belonged to a group that was already a separate dialect within Indo-European before the formation of Hellenic as such.

The remaining territory of geographic Macedonia was assigned to Serbia (later Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, and Albania, none of whom had any interest in promoting a separate Macedonian language and identity and all of whom attempted to assimilate the populations on the territory they received in the various relevant treaties. Geographic Macedonia is defined roughly by a series of mountains and rivers from Mount Olympus and the Pindus range to Mounts Šar and Rila and the lower course of the Mesta (Nestos) river (see Friedman 1985, 1996a).

During this same period, Albanian was referred to as Epirotic. Western maps of the Balkans did not begin to use contemporary toponyms in place of those of antiquity until the middle of the sixteenth century (Petrusevski 1992:46).

To some extent §4, §5, and §6 operate notionally as well as pragmatically or hegemonically, but they are not generally self-consciously manipulated except by elites. In the case of §8, however, popular feeling interacts with elite manipulations.

See Braude (1982) on questions of the antiquity of the millet system.

See Verdery (1983:79-125) on the interaction of the Romanian, Hungarian, and German languages and identities with religion in Romania.

The concept of a Montenegrin identity distinct from Serbian is complex. Montenegrins belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Slavic dialects of Montenegro do not form a single unit. Nonetheless, Montenegrin constitutes a distinct identity based on a complex of geography, language, religion, and kinship.

Cepenkov (1972:132-35) gives nineteenth century Macedonian anecdotes in which the usage of *Turk* to mean ‘Muslim’ rather than ‘Turkish speaker’ is an object of humor. These anecdotes, which have as their target Macedonian-speaking Muslims, depend on linguistic jokes that involve Macedonian-Turkish interlinguistic puns or various forms
of code mixing. Such stories demonstrate a certain type of cognitive dissonance between the millet system and popular perceptions.

42 The maltreatment of Albanians in FR Yugoslavia is too well documented to require further comment, but it is not well known that within the Albanian community the Catholic minority is sometimes subject to additional pressure (personal communication to the author).

43 Given that the purpose of minority language education is to facilitate learning for children, such demands raise serious questions about government requirements to provide schooling as demanded by parents. Some Albanian and Turkish ethnopolitical actors argue that Slavic-speaking Muslims are Slavicized Albanians or Turks, although historical evidence does not support these claims (see Friedman 1996a for details and additional references).

44 The Albanian dialects of Greece are known as Arvanitika, and the speakers as Arvanites (see Trudgill and Tzavaras 1977 and Tsitsipis 1995 for details).

45 See Friedman (1996a) and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (1994:38-44) for additional references. In recent years, these languages have been permitted in very limited spheres. The basic oppressive policies remain in place, however.

46 This does not mean, however, that a version of it has not been harnessed by elites. In the context of minority resistance in Balkan states, the learning of Great Power languages (especially English, but also German, French, Italian, and Russian, depending on the location and orientation of the state and/or individual) is seen as a source of advancement (i.e. “wealth”) while the need for linguistic minorities within a Balkan nation-state to study the national language is presented as useless on the international scene and therefore a handicap not suffered by native speakers of that language (see Friedman 1993). In this way, even this notional linguistic ideology is utilized pragmatically or hegemonically and encourages the elimination of traditional Balkan multilingualism, which itself, however, was the result of pragmatic circumstances and not state-sponsored education.

47 I am grateful to Vesna Pusić (University of Zagreb) for the Croatian version of this proverb.

48 Cepenkov (1972:85-86) supplies a nineteenth-century folk tale in which this value is challenged (a monoglot merchant with high quality goods gets a better price than a polyglot merchant with poor quality goods, because “good quality merchandise speaks for itself and sells itself”), but at the same time, this tale is addressing the existing notional ideology.

49 A complete mapping would be considerably more complex and would have to take into account more factors than can be conveniently displayed here, e.g. local variation, minority religious identification within a linguistic group, etc. Nonetheless, the mapping as it is presented here gives a reasonable overview of the main aspects of the situation.

50 For part of World War Two the territory was partitioned between Bulgaria and Albania, during which time Bulgarian and Albanian, respectively, replaced Serbian at the top of the hierarchy.

51 See Woodward (1995) for a careful analysis of the break-up of Yugoslavia, which led to Macedonian political independence. See also Christie and Bringa (1993).

52 Under the millet system, the Orthodox Christian hierarchy had significant autonomy and power, especially in matters that did not involve any Muslims.

53 Urban dwellers were more likely to be multilingual than villagers (except in mixed villages) and men were more likely to be multilingual than women (except in mixed marriages). These conditions reflected the relative opportunities for contact with strangers.
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